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Our observations of the political world are filled with examples of presidents who 
move policy with the stroke of a pen. The executive order, one of several tools 
available to presidents, is a primary example of unilateral governance wherein 
presidents change policy, create programs, and reorganize the government without a 
single vote in Congress. In political science, we study these demonstrations of 
executive action by paying attention to a subgroup of so-called “significant” 
executive orders, those with policy implications that garner the attention of other 
institutional actors (including the press). However, this broad category still covers a 
wide range of salience that muddles our understanding of how and when presidents 
use unilateral action. In the dissertation, I identify an even narrower set of “critical” 
executive orders that represent the most impactful unilateral actions of presidents. 
Focusing on these orders, I study the political context in which they are issued so that 
we can better understand the dynamics associated with greater presidential prolificacy 
  
in their unilateral governance. I use count models to identify the political factors that 
shape a president’s ability to issue such orders and find that divided government, 
polarization, presidential approval, the economy, war, and other timing variables all 
provide clues to the president on whether he or she has a favorable environment for 
issuing such orders. I also find a difference in the factors that influence the issuance 
of critical executive orders when broken down by domestic versus foreign and 
defense-related policies. When these factors are associated with lower numbers of 
critical executive orders, I argue that presidents are effectively constrained because 
they recognize that their circumstances do not as easily lend themselves to unilateral 
action. Recognizing that executive orders are just one of many unilateral tools 
available to presidents, I close with discussion about the need to identify significant 
subsets of these other tools and aggregate them to create a fuller picture of unilateral 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“To every mayor, governor, and state legislator in 
America, I say, you don’t have to wait for Congress to 
act; Americans will support you if you take this on. 
And as a chief executive, I intend to lead by example. 
Profitable corporations like Costco see higher wages as 
the smart way to boost productivity and reduce 
turnover. We should too. In the coming weeks, I will 
issue an Executive Order requiring federal contractors 
to pay their federally-funded employees a fair wage of 
at least $10.10 an hour – because if you cook our 
troops’ meals or wash their dishes, you shouldn’t have 
to live in poverty.” 
-President Barack Obama, 2014 State of the Union 
address to Congress 
 
When President Obama stood before a joint session of Congress on January 28, 2014, 
and announced his intention to unilaterally move forward on important policies by 
himself because Congress would not cooperate, many people across the country 
noticed. Television news and newspapers reported Obama’s determination to move 
ahead with raising the minimum wage by himself. The next day, people did not need 
to read beyond the headlines to know that the president intended action on the 
minimum wage: “Obama Kicks Off State of the Union Action with Minimum Wage 
Push” (Kaplan 2014a), “Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Wish List” (Kaplan 
2014b), “Obama to Sign Executive Order Raising Minimum Wage for Federal 
Contractors” (Fox News 2014), “In State of the Union Address, Obama Vows to Act 
Alone on the Economy” (Baker 2014), “Obama to Raise Minimum Wage for Some 
Federal Workers” (Jackson and Madhani 2014). 
Two weeks later, the President signed Executive Order 13658 to increase the 




him. He discussed raising the minimum wage in his 2013 State of the Union address 
but did not make significant gains on that front. In 2014, he vowed to take action on 
his own, and he did just that. In signing the executive order, he said, “We are a nation 
that believes in rewarding honest work with honest wages. And America deserves a 
raise” (Schneider 2014). With the stroke of a pen, Obama initiated a policy change 
that would affect employees (and employers) across the country (Landler 2014, Shear 
2014). 
As he sat on the House floor for Obama’s State of the Union address, then-
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) had already released one report on what 
he considered a rising “Imperial Presidency” (Cantor 2014). The report discusses “the 
break-down in the rule of law under the Obama Administration” that raised 
constitutional questions and negatively affected the economy (Cantor 2014, i). 
Specifically, the report addresses concerns with Obama ignoring advice and consent 
on federal appointments, creating his own laws and programs by unilateral action 
beyond those regulations called for by Congress, ignoring other laws and 
responsibilities for executing the laws passed by Congress, and governing by 
“waiver,” in which the president can exempt certain criteria or requirements from 
execution (Cantor 2014). A month after Obama signed Executive Order 13658, 
Cantor released a second version of his memo to allege that the President’s 
unconstitutional and illegal abuses of power continued. The original report and re-
release include a long list of actions improperly pursued by the President in 
seemingly groundbreaking fashion. 
“In some instances, President Obama attempted to 




unilaterally in defiance. In other instances, the President 
never even sought to find consensus and instead 
ignored Congress and its authority from the outset. In 
speeches, the President has proudly acknowledged that 
he has acted without Congress, contending that he has 
no other alternative.” 
-Cantor’s “Imperial Presidency” Memorandum (2014) 
 
Cantor’s intention is clear. He believed that Obama’s actions were not appropriate 
uses of unilateral actions. By his calculation, the President circumvented the will of 
the Founding Fathers and the Constitution by becoming a single-person legislative 
body that could produce laws without needing bipartisan cooperation between other 
branches of government. 
 Despite the criticisms by Republicans of a Democratic president’s unilateral 
actions, the topic remains salient years later in a country now led by a Republican 
president with a Republican Congress. During the campaign, before even the first 
caucuses in Iowa or first primary in New Hampshire, candidate Trump had called for 
a moratorium on the immigration of Muslims into the U.S. “Donald J. Trump is 
calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until 
our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on” (Trump 2015). In the 
first week of his administration, President Trump delivered on that issue and promise 
when he issued Executive Order 13769, halting visas for citizens of seven majority-
Muslim countries in the name of national security. In a statement given the next day, 
the new President said of his action, 
“We will again be issuing visas to all countries once we 
are sure we have reviewed and implemented the most 
secure policies over the next 90 days. I have 
tremendous feeling for the people involved in this 
horrific humanitarian crisis in Syria. My first priority 




President, I will find ways to help all those who are 
suffering.” (Trump 2017) 
 
 Within hours, families that were traveling were detained at airports around the 
country. Legal challenges arose quickly with protests staged for international terms of 
major American airports (Haberman 2017). A three-judge appeals panel heard a case 
brought by the State of Washington against Trump’s executive order and maintained 
a lower court’s decision to stay the order (Liptak 2017). Failing to see a reasonable 
argument for advancing national security through the broad order, and rejecting 
Trump’s argument that some presidential decisions made in the name of national 
security are above reproach, the court slowed the President’s ability to sweep into 
office and make the changes on which he campaigned. “Courts ought not second-
guess sensitive national security decisions of the president,” said Senator Tom Cotton 
(R-AR) in response to the decision (Liptak 2017). Interestingly, the response from 
Congressional Republicans changed once their candidate was in the White House 
using unilateral tools to affect policy. “Once fierce promoters of the separation of 
powers, Republicans are now embracing Mr. Trump’s early governing by executive 
order, something they loudly decried during Mr. Obama’s second term” (Steinhauer 
2017). With increased scrutiny, executive orders and unilateral tools more broadly 
serve as important topics for continued study. 
Significance of the Project 
 Citizens today expect presidents to actively pursue policy objectives, and the 
voters laud the accomplishments or decry the failures – the very actions of Edwards’s 
(2009) so-called “leadership” – of presidents for those things inside and outside the 




Toward that end, we study the legislative and unilateral efforts of presidents so that 
we can better understand when and how and why they act. In this dissertation, I 
examine the unilateral activism of modern presidents in different policy arenas and 
ask just how they accomplish what they do during their time in office. What factors 
influence the ability of presidents to use their unilateral authority to pursue policy 
goals with impunity? To what extent are presidents effectively constrained by 
external factors beyond their immediate control? It may be that the term “unilateral” 
is a misnomer if the prevalence of these actions is based on the political context of the 
time. 
 The executive order is the most recognizable unilateral action available to 
presidents. Used by all presidents, executive orders are effectively laws created by the 
president for implementation within the Executive branch. They are easily created 
with a stroke of the president’s pen, but they are just as easily undone by another 
executive order, whether issued by that same president when circumstances have 
changed or by any successor. Law requires that executive orders are numbered and 
printed in the Federal Register, making them easy to observe and track. While other 
types of unilateral actions can be hidden from public review and scrutiny or may be 
classified in the name of national security, the executive order is clearly defined and 
accessible. 
 The scope of executive orders is nearly limitless. They range in effect from 
giving federal employees a day off work to renaming federal buildings to exempting 
an individual from the mandatory retirement age to imposing sanctions against a 




federal departments with sizable budgets and a host of policy goals. The executive 
order can be used to accomplish policy change in all aspects of the president’s duties: 
influencing military readiness and selective service requirements as commander-in-
chief, providing the bureaucratic regulations to enforce laws as chief executive, 
establishing terms of international relations and cooperation as chief diplomat, or 
regulating aspects of the economy through fiscal policy as chief economic planner. 
All manner of tasks, from the routine to the extraordinary, can be accomplished by 
presidents with the use of the executive order. 
A conversation about unilateral governance and presidential power hinges on 
the presumption that these actions are impactful. After all, Cantor was not decrying 
Obama’s use of the executive order to give employees an extra day of vacation for 
Christmas. His attack on Obama’s “imperial presidency” was rooted in the idea that 
the President was doing substantial things with his executive orders that were 
deserving of everyone’s attention. The examples used throughout the dissertation 
show some of the most impactful unilateral actions to come from the Oval Office. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 Much has been written about the political factors under which presidents can 
be successful with their legislative and unilateral efforts and the resources available to 
presidents for such efforts. I argue here that presidents take these dynamics and 
resources into account when looking to move policies toward their desired policy 
preference points. Presidents have preferred policies and will choose the strategies – 
whether legislative or unilateral – that move them toward those policy preferences 




 The president’s assessment of his or her political context helps the president 
determine which strategy is appropriate given the dynamics in play. Part of this 
presidential calculus for determining approach is a determination about the costs 
associated with moving policy goals through legislation (a costly and cumbersome 
process) and the likelihood of challenges to unilateral actions. Legislative pursuits 
may be better for presidents who can get their bills through Congress, but there may 
be times when presidents want to move faster than Congress will allow or want to 
move at all when Congress otherwise refuses. In these cases, presidents will not issue 
an endless series of executive orders. They will weigh their ability to issue orders 
against the likelihood of Congress overcoming the costs involved in challenging the 
president’s orders. 
 As the political context becomes more influential to the number of executive 
orders that presidents issue, I argue that presidents are effectively constrained. These 
may not be formal constraints, but the president looks at his or her opportunities and 
determines that it may be harder to issue orders or have those orders be successful at 
certain times. If the president fears an effort by Congress to challenge the president’s 
unilateral governance, then these factors associated with such periods of lower 
unilateral activity are effective constraints on the president’s ability to act with 
impunity. I set out to determine what these relevant political dynamics are. 
Critical Executive Orders 
 Studies of executive orders focus on a subset of these orders. Seeking to move 
beyond the routine orders with little policy impact, political science has narrowed its 




press, the Congress, or the courts (Mayer 1999, 2001, 2009; Howell 2003). We call 
this smaller cut of executive orders “significant executive orders.” In Mayer’s model, 
these orders tend to be influenced by timing (the beginning or end of an 
administration), a change in partisan control of the White House, political timing 
(based around presidential elections), the president’s approval rating, and whether or 
not the president’s party also controls Congress. In Howell’s model, these orders are 
traditionally influenced by the size of congressional majorities, a change in partisan 
control of the White House, and whether or not the president enjoys unified 
government. From this perspective, presidents appear somewhat bound by their 
circumstances. These political dynamics in which presidents operate change the 
extent to which they can tend to be prolific with these kinds of actions or must sit on 
their hands and not sign into effect all of their desired policies. 
 However, our understanding of these significant executive orders is 
complicated and incomplete for several reasons. First, some of these studies disagree 
on the factors relevant to the issuance of significant executive orders in the first place. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, not all studies find the same effects for 
different factors that may embolden or effectively constrain presidents. Second, these 
studies omit important aspects of the political context that should be included in such 
a discussion. A president’s approval rating is not studied in all of these assessments, 
and ideological polarization is largely missing from the conversation as well. Third, 
we also have a long-standing question within presidential scholarship on whether or 
not presidents act differently and enjoy different successes based on whether their 




when it comes to executive orders and other unilateral actions as well, or are these 
exercises solely at the president’s discretion and immune from such differences by 
policy type? 
Fourth – and most central to the dissertation – is a question of whether 
previous studies have looked at the right set of unilateral tools in the first place. 
Because of its relatively broad definition, so-called significant executive orders still 
include a large swath of orders that are not policy-oriented or still meet routine 
responsibilities of the president. Several executive orders in this category give federal 
employees the day off work immediately before or after Christmas, add a star to the 
presidential seal when new states are added, exempt particular individuals from the 
mandatory retirement age, and more. Surely, these orders do not carry the same 
policy weight as other actions that declare a war on drugs, establish the Peace Corps, 
realign the American military industrial complex before or after armed engagement, 
establish sanctions against a country that has taken American hostages, and so forth. 
To capture this smaller subset of particularly significant executive orders, I propose a 
method for further categorizing significant executive orders to identify the most 
significant among them, my so-called “critical” executive orders. 
To identify these orders, I return to one of Howell’s criteria that signals that 
an executive order is significant in the first place: a mention in The New York Times 
within one year of issuance. As significant executive orders cover a wide range of 
subjects, so too do we see a wide range of coverage given to these orders. The 
majority of significant executive orders from Howell’s list have just one mention in 




use a higher number of stories to indicate a higher level of significance to the order, 
indicating that the order had larger implications, dealt with a larger budget line, 
related to higher levels of importance to people, and drew greater attention from the 
public and the punditry. Critical executive orders have three or more stories in The 
New York Times, placing them above the mean and apart from the vast majority of 
total and significant executive orders. With this subset of orders identified, I can 
assess the factors involved with these critical executive orders and identify the 
political dynamics when they are issued so that I can compare them to the dynamics 
associated with broader classifications of executive orders. 
So what elements of the political context are relevant to the critical executive 
orders presidents issue when they take their most substantive unilateral actions to 
change or create public policy? Part of this discussion includes adding factors that 
have not previously been studied when it comes to executive orders so that we can 
better understand the uses of presidential actions and the dynamics that influence 
them. I also set out to continue the academic debate raised by some like Wildavsky 
(1966), Canes-Wrone (2006), and Kriner (2009) about differences in presidential 
policy success by policy type. Is there a difference between a president’s domestic 
and foreign policy prerogatives? 
 With data for the numbers of executive orders issued by Presidents Truman 
through Bush II, I run negative binomial regression models to assess the political 
dynamics that lead to more or fewer critical executive orders. I find that congressional 
majorities and taking control of the White House from the opposition party are less 




Contrary to Mayer’s model, I also find a positive effect for the role of presidential 
approval. Adding in new external elements, I further find a significant role for 
polarization, the economy, and war. These factors tend to influence how prolific 
presidents can be when it comes to writing critical executive orders that will have a 
large impact on federal policy. 
 Given the academic disagreement over whether or not presidents’ abilities to 
influence and lead differ between domestic policy issues and foreign policy issues, I 
additionally test the number of critical executive orders issued under these broad 
policy categories. I run secondary negative binomial regression models for critical 
domestic and foreign orders. While the presidents in my data have issued roughly the 
same numbers of these types of orders, they tend to do so at different times under 
different circumstances. Divided government, presidential approval, the economy, 
and the engagement of American troops all influence the number of critical executive 
orders that presidents issue on matters of domestic policy. When it comes to crafting 
policy at home, presidents find a number of factors that effectively limit the number 
of critical executive orders they issue. Consistent with previous literature on the 
subject, presidents are not given great latitude in affecting domestic policy, and they 
must have the resources to do so: a unified government that will back them up, higher 
presidential approval ratings, an economy that demands attention, and so on. 
 However, my model presented here explains less of the variance in the 
number of critical executive orders issued by presidents to impact foreign policy. 




context in these situations, though I find that polarization also plays a role.1 We see 
less constraint placed on presidents by their external circumstances when it comes to 
their critical foreign orders. Some of the time periods in which several of these orders 
were issued were even very short time periods, such as President Carter’s final day in 
office when he signed several such orders to have a final impact on the situation in 
Tehran, where several dozen Americans were held captive by Iranian militants. 
Chapter Outline 
 In the chapters that follow, I explore presidential unilateral governance as 
exemplified by the executive order. In the second chapter, I begin with a review of 
what we already know about executive orders based on the work of previous scholars. 
A part of this discussion focuses on the information that is still missing in our 
understanding of how executive orders work and when presidents issue them. This 
conversation leads necessarily to incorporating other parts of the political context into 
the discussion so that we better understand the world in which presidents are 
operating when they set their pen to an executive order. 
 In the third chapter, I then introduce my categorization of the critical 
executive order and how these are identified. By extending the work that has been 
done to classify significant executive orders, I provide a method for identifying the 
orders that stand out from their peers and should be considered differently. While we 
may find great utility in studying significant executive orders apart from their non-
significant counterparts, so too can we find value in further discriminating between 
                                                
1 The role of the economy in foreign policy may be a connection between the U.S. and the global 
economy in which presidents issue orders that impact both the global and American economy at the 
same time. Or some of these executive orders may be aimed at addressing international issues that 





levels of significance. Given the wide range of topics and purposes and attention 
captured in the population of significant executive orders, finding a way to capture 
the most exceptional from this group and study them provides more insight into not 
just how presidents broadly influence policy, but rather about how presidents 
influence the policies that shape their agendas and define their legacies. It is no 
surprise when looking at the data that some of the most attention-gathering critical 
executive orders are those married to the reputation of their respective presidents: 
Kennedy and the Peace Corps, Carter and the Iran hostage situation, Reagan and the 
War on Drugs. This chapter presents the methodology for this work. 
 The fourth chapter presents the quantitative data behind the dissertation. It 
begins with the summary statistics behind critical executive orders and their related 
New York Times story counts, defines the rest of the variables of interest, and lays out 
the negative binomial regression count models used to identify the factors that have 
the greatest impact on the number of critical executive orders issued by presidents. 
This chapter also provides a secondary set of models by policy type (domestic versus 
foreign) and the results that show that these political dynamics in which presidents 
operate have different effects for different kinds of policies. The chapter concludes 
with some discussion about what we learn from these many models. 
 The next two chapters provide case studies that help illustrate the findings of 
the quantitative chapter when it comes to critical domestic and foreign orders. These 
chapters show cases where presidents issued relatively high numbers of critical 
executive orders of a particular policy type (domestic or foreign) and how the 




on the relationship between divided government, approval, and the economy faced by 
President Kennedy during the 87th Congress and President Bush II during the 107th 
Congress and the relatively high numbers of critical domestic orders they were able to 
issue during their respective administrations. The sixth chapter then details the 
relationship between divided government, polarization, and the economy for 
President Truman during the 82nd Congress, President Eisenhower during the 83rd 
Congress, and President Carter during the 96th and 97th Congresses and their ability to 
issue higher numbers of critical foreign orders during these times. 
 In the seventh chapter, I step away from the focus on executive orders to 
elaborate on the broader exercise of unilateral authority. The executive order is just 
one example of such a tool that presidents have at their disposal. Another such tool is 
the presidential memorandum, which has grown in usage over time. Similar in many 
ways to the executive order, the memorandum largely differed from the former based 
on reporting requirements. Executive orders must be numbered and published in the 
Federal Register, but the same is not true for memoranda, which presidents need not 
publish. However, the Obama administration pledged to publish all of its memoranda 
as well in an act of transparency. This move provides the ability for scholars to study 
these actions as well so that we can better understand all of the tools used by 
presidents in their pursuit of policy, especially when we have cases where the Obama 
administration used more memoranda than executive orders. These memoranda 
become tools with increased power and publicity now on par with executive orders. 
In this chapter, I discuss what we know so far about memoranda; some of the 




consider a research agenda whereby we think about ways to study the totality of 
presidential unilateral actions in the future. If memoranda are just executive orders by 
another name, I argue that we should find a way to study them as their own tool and 
as part of a larger tool set. 
 Finally, I conclude with a discussion of what we have learned about executive 
orders, particularly critical executive orders, and what is left to learn about executive 
orders and presidential unilateral governance. Given the findings of how many factors 
influence the numbers of critical executive orders issued by presidents, to what extent 
are presidents actually in control of their policy agendas? I also conclude with some 
initial observations about the Trump administration and provide some expectations 







Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives on Executive Orders 
“I have joined the political arena so that the powerful 
can no longer beat up on people that cannot defend 
themselves. Nobody knows the system better than me, 
which is why I alone can fix it.” 
-Donald J. Trump, accepting 2016 Republican 
Presidential Nomination 
 
In accepting the Republican nomination for president of the United States in 2016, 
Donald Trump spoke about the changes that he alone would make to the system. 
While he did not specifically mention executive orders as part of his speech, his 
language reflects his desire and ability to single-handedly impact the political order 
and change the operation of the government. Rival Hillary R. Clinton addressed the 
claim in her own acceptance speech the following week, noting that the promise to fix 
problems with unilateral methods from the outset was an abnormal assertion for a 
potential – and in this case, future – president. She noted, “Don’t believe anyone who 
says, ‘I alone can fix it’” (Clinton 2016, Martel 2016). 
 But all presidents have used unilateral actions to fix things throughout time: 
the economy, the structuring of departments, the rules governing military 
conscription, international policies, antiquated rules and regulations, and more. The 
questions that arise are why presidents sometimes turn to tools like the executive 
order and what conditions factor into these decisions. I argue here that presidents use 
executive orders for a number of reasons related to wanting to achieve policy when 
they otherwise cannot get their desired policies from Congress, when they think they 
have sufficient room to act without facing rebuke from Congress (especially when it 
would be difficult for Congress to organize against the president), or when they want 




Congress may join them later. Regarding the factors that signal opportunity to 
presidents, I build on the existing literature to create an argument about dynamics that 
would affect the president’s and Congress’s ability to coordinate and overcome 
legislative costs to action.  
 In this chapter, I explore the literature on the executive order to underline 
what political scientists already know about presidents’ unilateral actions and 
delineate a new theory about how presidents exercise unilateral governance. I begin 
with core assumptions about the actions of presidents and then turn to what we have 
learned thus far about executive orders. I then leverage existing literature to 
distinguish between types of executive orders and explore how presidents may issue 
these different types of orders based on different sets of criteria. 
Building toward a theory 
This project starts with the assumption that presidents have policy objectives. 
Regardless of party, the country’s modern presidents campaigned on policy promises 
and then sought to achieve those goals when they moved into the White House (Han 
2011, Walker 2009). Whether Democratic or Republican – or liberal or conservative 
– presidential candidates, presidential nominees, and presidents have policy 
objectives. These goals may be to expand or contract the government, the 
bureaucracy, the budget, regulations, and more, but each of these positions is a policy 
objective for the eventual winner. These policy objectives, brought together in 
candidate and party platforms, are some of the reasons why the citizens vote for 
particular candidates in the voting booth (Hillygus and Shields 2009) with the 




Perspectives of presidential action stem from the assumption that presidents 
are strategic actors. Using information about the political environments and 
circumstances in which they find themselves and the ability to get what they want 
based on their relationships and information, presidents make the decisions that will 
help them move strategically toward their goals (Edwards 2009a). Inherent in this 
calculus of choosing a strategy that will work for the president on a particular issue 
during a particular time is the assumption that presidents have preferences on their 
policies and choose the strategy that gets them closest to where they want to be. 
Because the status quo point, the president’s preferred policy point, and Congress’s 
preferred policy point (be it the preferred policy point of the median member or of the 
majority) can be different on each individual policy issue, there is not a dominant, 
preferred strategy. Instead, there is an evaluation for each policy issue as to what the 
president can move via legislation, what the president can move via unilateral action, 
and what the president chooses to not move via any strategy at any given time. 
For many policy objectives, presidents may try to achieve their policy goals 
through a legislative process in which they bargain with members of Congress 
(Neustadt 1991) or appeal to voters for public support (Kernell 1997, Cohen 2009, 
Eshbaugh-Soha 2011). In Neustadt’s theory of presidential power, the president’s 
“power is the power to persuade” (11) lawmakers to get what the president wants. 
The president relies on professional reputation, the president’s stature based on 
previous interactions with the legislature and others in Washington, and public 
prestige, legislators’ perceptions of the president’s approval rating among the public, 




convince them to enact the president’s policy. Presidents rely on members of 
Congress believing that the president will honor his or her promises and is esteemed 
enough by the people that they should make the president happy to thereby make their 
voters happy. Kernell’s theory is one by which presidents take their policy proposals 
to the people to raise the salience of the issue and get the people to contact their 
respective members of Congress to give the president what he or she wants. Either 
way, this story of presidential power is a president who uses resources to get 
legislation from Congress.  
What options are available to the president outside of legislating – via 
negotiating or appealing, taken collectively here – via congressional action?2 At 
times, a unilateral action by just the president may actually be the president’s (and 
even the Congress’s) preferred method for the given initiative. The president can use 
unilateral actions without requiring the consent of Congress. Some examples include 
executive orders, executive agreements, presidential proclamations, presidential 
memoranda, presidential directives, and more. Here, I focus on the executive order 
because it is the most clearly defined and observable manifestation of the president’s 
unilateral options and because it is the primary focus of the scholarly literature on 
unilateral tools. Focusing on the executive order as a case study for presidential 
unilateral governance provides a foundation on which to build for assessing the next 
step in understanding presidential power in the American system and how we can 
                                                
2 It should also be noted that presidents cannot legally act via executive action on every item in their 
policy agenda. While unilateral tools help them move toward their preferred policy point on many 
issues, some items can only be accomplished via Congress. For example, Obama could not have 
accomplished the Affordable Care Act or established Dodd-Frank reforms to Wall Street by executive 
order alone. These policies change several laws, can represent large budget lines beyond spending 
controlled by the president, and exceed the scope of just the Executive branch. As much as presidents 





understand the opportunities available to presidents and the choices they make in 
running the country.  
Neustadt writes of presidential orders only as a “second best” option to 
legislation. He spends a great deal of time talking about cases of presidential 
commands – orders by the president to the Executive branch – which Neustadt rates 
as less reliable ways to accomplish policy change. He writes that such commands are 
only effective when they meet five criteria: that the president has clearly spoken, that 
the order is clear, that the order is publicized, that the person receiving the order has 
the ability to carry out the order, and that the president is perceived to have the 
authority to make the order in the first place. These criteria for an effective, self-
fulfilling order are high and encourage executives to instead rely on shared 
governance wherein the Congress and president work together to create policy. True 
presidential power, as Neustadt writes, is a president getting others to legislate his or 
her issues without resorting to unilateral action. 
The core question of the dissertation is how political factors constrain the 
ability of presidents to issue an executive order when such an action is their 
preference. What dynamics are associated with the president being able to issue fewer 
or more executive orders of critical impact? What political dynamics shape the ability 
of the president to provide such orders without challenge and reversal? The 
constraints need not be formal, legal restrictions on the president to use unilateral 
actions. Rather, I posit the question in terms of the unfettered ability to issue 
executive orders with impunity. As Kriner (2009) writes, 
“The logic driving most of these analyses is 




controlled by the opposition party is considerably more 
likely for a variety of ideological and partisan electoral 
reasons to challenge their conduct of foreign affairs 
than is a legislature controlled by the president’s 
partisan allies. Thus, when choosing their foreign 
policy strategies, presidents look to the partisan balance 
of power on Capitol Hill, anticipate the amount of 
leeway Congress will grant them to pursue their policy 
preferences, and adjust their conduct of policy making 
accordingly.” (670) 
 
Though Kriner is discussing the president’s ability to make foreign policy without the 
input of Congress, the same relationship and assessment of political dynamics holds 
true for domestic policy as well. If presidents find particular environments in which 
they can more easily issue such orders, or where these orders are more likely to be 
effective, those factors constitute constraints on presidents. In a theoretical sense, they 
are hurdles that give presidents pause and keep them from simply issuing executive 
order after executive order because strategic presidents will reserve this tool for when 
it does the most good in advancing their policy agenda. 
Recent models of executive orders, such as those advanced by Mayer (2001, 
2009) or Howell (2003), study the effects of political factors to explain the prevalence 
of so-called “significant executive orders,” those orders with policy implications that 
garner the attention of the public or other branches of government.  As Mayer (2001) 
notes, “Presidents come to office in widely varying electoral and political contexts 
that shape their ability to transform their formal powers into action” (11). Skowronek 
(1997) similarly notes a role for political context in the ability of the president to 
shape policy and politics. 
Models by Mayer and Howell provide a foundation for explaining how 




Unilateral Politics Model. Howell’s work on significant executive orders tests three 
main factors: the size of the majority parties in Congress, the beginning of a new 
party’s control of the White House after time out of office, and the presence of 
divided government. To test these independent variables, he uses a negative binomial 
regression count model where the observations are president-Congress dyads with the 
number of significant executive orders issued in that pair as the dependent variable of 
interest. 
First, Howell finds a negative effect for majority sizes along the lines that 
strengthened parties, whether of the president’s party or the opposition, would 
provide less space for the president to act unilaterally. These results hold when 
Howell measures the size of congressional majorities as a percentage of the chambers 
and with the Legislative Potential for Policy Change (LPPC) as measured by Hurley, 
Brady, and Cooper (1977). Whether the large majorities exist in the president’s party 
or the opposition party, larger majorities mean the president either has more friends to 
help pass legislation or has more incentive to work with opposition to work with the 
opposition party to avoid have vetoes overridden. 
Second, changes in partisan control of the White House found some positive 
results with presidents acting to make changes to correct for previous administrations, 
such as Clinton looking to make quick changes via executive order after 12 years of 
Republican presidents. Just as many outgoing presidents may issue a flurry of 
executive orders to make a final mark on the office and help cement their legacies, so 
too may we expect incoming presidents to issue orders to set the tone for their new 




the last president, these initial actions may target some of the outgoing president’s 
final actions for reversal or repeal. 
Finally, divided government leads to fewer significant executive orders. This 
story may be one of presidents who do not want to see the reversal of their policies 
should Congress vote down their orders. The argument here from Howell is that 
presidents evaluate their opportunities based on whether or not their party controls 
both houses of Congress based on the threat of challenge and repeal, especially in the 
courts. If an executive order is challenged in court, the expectation is that the courts 
will evaluate the order against the will of the Congress. If the judges determine that 
the Congress is in favor of the order or that the order fits within the laws passed by 
Congress, they are more likely to uphold the order. If the opposition party controls at 
least one house of Congress, however, it is less likely that Congress will support the 
action and therefore less likely that the president will issue as many orders. Howell 
also includes control variables for war and the economy and fixed effects variables 
for each president to account for differences in how individual presidents may 
approach their job. 
The existing literature therefore tests the following hypotheses as they relate 
to political dynamics:  
H1: As the size of the majority in Congress increases 
(regardless of party), the number of significant 
executive orders decreases. 
 
H2: When a new party takes control of the White 
House, the number of significant executive orders 
increases. 
 
H3: Under divided government, the number of 





Following his testing of the Unilateral Politics Model, Howell runs a similar 
count model for testing “non-trivial” legislation. Again, his model finds statistical 
significance for his variables of interest, though the models produce opposite signs on 
the coefficients for some of the variables: congressional majorities and new 
administrations. A larger majority naturally leads to a larger number of significant 
bills coming out of the given Congress. The president either has a larger majority of 
allies in Congress with whom to work for legislation or more incentive to negotiate 
with an opposition to legislate. A new administration also experiences fewer pieces of 
important legislation. Consistent with the Unilateral Politics Model, though, Howell 
still finds a statistically significant negative coefficient for divided government. 
A New Theory 
We know that presidents are faced with the decision of whether they should 
seek their policy objectives via legislation or via unilateral action. All presidents use 
both legislation and executive orders to accomplish their goals, but what determines 
why a president chooses a particular strategy for a particular policy initiative? 
Unlike Neustadt’s contention that executive orders are less desirable than 
legislation because they indicate a weak president who cannot otherwise bargain his 
or her way to legislation, I argue that there are times when unilateralism can be a 
preferred course for presidents to pursue policy change. The president and Congress 
may actually prefer unilateral action to legislation for any number of reasons, 
including topic, efficiency, salience, expediency, or what is politically palatable at the 




effective may be low to meet than the coordination costs imposed by legislative 
action to legislate or rebuke unilateral action. 
At times of crisis when fast action is required, the legislative process may be 
too sluggish to provide effective results. Some actions may require a swift and 
decisive move from the country’s most recognized leader. Sometimes, change is only 
required within the Executive branch in the first place. The president may not need an 
act of Congress when he or she directs the agencies and departments (or at least 
appoints the heads of those agencies and departments) that fall within the scope of the 
policy change. 
Legislative action is a consistently costly endeavor. Even when there is clear 
consensus on a piece of legislation, the process involves a great amount of time and 
institutional resources. The legislative process involves gathering cosponsors, 
scheduling logistics, and committee hearings. In addition to all of these factors, there 
can be amendments that affect the likelihood that some legislators will be willing to 
vote for a bill that they might otherwise favor. Even when a clear majority intends to 
vote for a bill, legislative opponents can have a wide range of options for disrupting 
the legislative process and making noise. And it can be difficult to maintain coalitions 
even with the party when you have moderate and extreme wings that are looking for 
different solutions to a policy problem. With all of these factors, legislating is a costly 
endeavor. Still, it provides for policy change in a way that no executive order can 
because the act of repealing the law is just as costly.  
Republicans who thought they won their 2016 elections with a mandate to 




action. Despite their sizable margins in the House and control of the White House and 
Senate, Republicans have still spent the first two months of the new Trump 
administration unable to actually move forward with a repeal (let alone replace) 
strategy for Obamacare. They twice scheduled a vote to repeal the Affordable Care 
Act but postponed and then ultimately pulled those votes when they could not garner 
enough votes because Tea Party Republicans felt the repeal bill did not go far enough 
in dismantling Obama’s healthcare legislation. Even with unified party control, 
maintaining a legislative coalition is a difficult effort. 
Given these costs, attention paid to legislating – whether it is to pass a new 
law or oppose an executive order – comes at a cost to lawmakers (and presidents who 
want those laws, in the case of the former). Fenno (1973) writes of the goals for 
members of Congress: reelection, good public policy, and prestige or advancement 
within the chamber. When engaging in the legislative process, members of Congress 
cannot do other things they typically do (in line with such goals), such as 
campaigning back in the district. The more time they spend in Washington, the less 
time they have back home. They and their staffs also have less time that they can 
devote to constituent services when they otherwise have to spend time legislating and 
orchestrating the processes by which laws are passed. 
In terms of legislating to reverse an executive order and stop a president in his 
or her tracks, the legislative route also takes time away from other legislative 
activities and priorities. Members who went to Washington to sponsor legislation and 
deliver on their policy agenda have less time to do so when they instead spend time 




members to pursue their other goals in Congress. These costs may explain some of 
the reasons as to why Howell (2003) finds the rates at which Congress repeals 
executive orders to be relatively low.3 It appears that members would rather spend 
their time on other activities than legislating to challenge executive orders. 
So how do presidents make their decisions on whether or not to create policy 
change with the stroke of their own pen versus asking Congress to do so? They look 
at their political environment and assess their options for each policy. Even with the 
above costs to legislating, presidents recognize that legislation is generally preferred 
because it is a longer-term policy tool that comes with more credibility than just the 
president acting alone. As discussed in the last chapter, Republicans were quick to 
label Obama’s executive orders as overreaching, but an act of Congress obviously 
involves more people and is harder to criticize as such.4 Kriner (2007, 2009) 
“finds that the emergence of opportunities in both the 
political and strategic environment that the emergence 
of opportunities in both the political and strategic 
environment critically influences when and to what 
degree the president’s opponents in Congress confront 
his policies both on the floor and in the hearing room. 
When popular support for the president and his military 
policies is strong, openly challenging the commander-
in-chief is unlikely to afford any political advantage and 
may even backfire.” (687) 
 
                                                
3 Howell finds a similarly low rate of repeal from the courts. Together, these statistics from the 
Legislative and Judicial branches show that presidents tend to be successful in their exercise of 
unilateral governance without facing recurring threats from other branches. Even with the occasionally 
successful challenge, presidents fare well with their use of executive orders. Not considered here is 
also the rate at which presidents have their executive orders, especially their significant and critical 
executive orders, revoked by future executive orders. Do these executive orders fare better than non-
critical orders? 
4 Acts of legislation are still not above reproach. Obama’s Affordable Care Act was not without its 
critics from the Republican Party as soon as it was passed with several dozen bills to repeal it in the 
years following passage. However, as a bill that had been passed by a bipartisan coalition in Congress, 




Therefore, when there is sufficient political support for a policy change via 
legislation, presidents will tend to seek legislation instead of an executive order with 
all else equal. If a president thinks he or she can assemble the necessary legislative 
coalition to pass legislation, he or she will attempt to do so. If Congress is movable, it 
can also overcome its coordination problem to oppose presidential orders when it sees 
fit, creating a disincentive for the president to try unilateral action in the first place. 
As factors begin to change the calculus of the decision, however, presidents may 
move away from legislation and rely on their own powers to issue rather than the 
power to persuade with some of their policy targets. What kinds of changes affect the 
presidents’ choices of strategies?  
One setting that could change this calculus and make a president opt for 
unilateral action even when there is support for legislation is a state of emergency. At 
times when a crisis demands fast response, the costs of congressional legislative 
activity could prove too prohibitive to respond in an appropriate and efficient manner. 
In such instances, a unitary actor who can singlehandedly achieve policy objectives 
holds an advantage that many (including Congress) could prefer in the moment. 
Depending on the circumstances of the emergency, presidents may assess the 
situation and determine that the costs of legislative action are too high to respond 
appropriately while the threat of legislative retaliation against presidential action is 
too low to effectively challenge (or convincingly threaten to challenge) the 
president’s action. When that situation occurs, it may lead the president to take 




Another characteristic that may influence the decision by changing the costs 
associated with opposing the president despite sufficient support for legislation is 
presidential approval.5 Mayer (1999, 2001, 2009), Mayer and Price (2002), and Pious 
(2009) all recognize a role for popularity when it comes to executive orders. Mayer 
and Mayer and Price address the negative relationship between approval and 
unilateral action as a determinant of executive action alongside issue area and timing 
within the administration. According to these accounts of unilateralism, a lack of 
approval – consistent with a weak president who cannot persuade in Neustadt’s 
theory – translates to more unilateral actions. An unpopular president who has no 
capital with Congress is willing to do whatever he or she can to make policy progress 
and need not fear repercussions from Congress or the public if popularity is already 
suffering anyway. 
Pious, however, notes that an increase in popularity accompanied by partisan 
advantages leads to an increase in executive orders. This point agrees with the 
literature on the prevalence of executive orders during times of unified government in 
which the president is relatively strong and fears less from his or her co-partisans in 
Congress (Krause and Cohen 2000, Mayer 2001, Mayer and Price 2002, Howell 
2003, Howell and Pevehouse 2007, Mayer 2009, Pious 2009, Waterman 2009). Just 
as unified government leads to more significant executive orders, Pious argues that 
presidents who have resources and the popular support they need are more easily able 
to accomplish their goals via executive order. 
                                                
5 In legislative efforts, presidential approval is a resource that helps presidents accomplish more with 
the public and Congress (Ostrom and Simon 1985, Gronke and Newman 2003, Canes-Wrone 2009, 




Howell only notes a role for presidential popularity as a factor that leads the 
Supreme Court to strike down executive orders. When the president is already in poor 
standing among the public, the courts are more willing to negate a president’s 
unilateral actions because they believe the president will more strongly feel the 
weight of public scrutiny and therefore acquiesce in rescinding the order and 
enforcing the court’s judgment. Public approval influences the president’s calculus 
regarding the cost of negligence but does not otherwise play a direct role in Howell’s 
analysis of contextual factors. But this story fits the broader frame of Pious’s story 
wherein higher approval ratings are a resource for presidents that successfully allow 
them to do more with their own tools and get away with it. Whether in their issuance 
of such orders in the first place or in defeating challenges to their use of orders, some 
of the literature shows that approval ratings are an advantage in unilateral 
governance. 
 If this story holds true, presidents may look at times when they have higher 
approval ratings as instances in which they have the resources needed to take action 
themselves. They may determine that they have the public support they need to be 
able to take positive action in a situation. Furthermore, they may also decide that the 
rates of being challenged on such action are less if they have the support of the people 
behind them. Through one or both of these considerations, presidents who enjoy a 
favorable approval rating may choose to issue more executive orders in addressing 
policy changes rather than turning to Congress for every issue even if Congress could 




A third instance in which presidents may look at the costs of legislating 
against the president’s unilateral action and determine that unilateral action is a 
preferred approach despite sufficient support for legislation may be based on 
polarization. Polarization is the notion that Democrats and Republicans are growing 
ideologically farther apart on issues at the same time that the parties internally 
coalesce around a liberal (in the case of Democrats) or conservative (in the case of 
Republicans) position (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 
2007). When it comes to issues that can be reduced to a liberal - conservative 
dimension, the parties are becoming more internally homogenous while 
simultaneously growing farther apart from each other. This phenomenon can be seen 
in the disappearing overlap of ideological space between members of the two parties 
in Congress and the exit or defeat of moderate members. This case is akin to the story 
of fragmentation in Congress offered by Howell (2003) in his discussion of 
congressional majorities. Figure 2.1 shows the growth of polarization in each 
chamber of Congress based on the distance between ideological means of each party 



















Figure 2.1: American Ideological Polarization, 1879-2015 
 
Trend in ideological polarization among members of Congress. Image from VoteView.com. 
 
How does this increase in polarization affect presidential action? To start, it 
may influence presidential approval. Jacobson (2003, 2006), Abramowitz and 
Saunders (2005), Gronke and Newman (2009), Fox (2009), and Newman and Siegle 
(2010) write that polarization has driven increasing partisanship in presidential 
approval numbers with the president’s co-partisans consistently ranking the president 
higher and the president’s non-partisans ranking the president lower, resulting in a 
growing partisan gap. More people will dislike a president of the opposite party out of 
hand and will deny him or her favorable approval ratings regardless of the policies 
that he or she offers. Even if presidents receive favorable approval ratings from their 
non-partisans in the aftermath of a tragedy or so-called “rally-around-the-flag” event, 
this approval is short-lived and can quickly start to fade (Jacobson 2006) and may be 
limited to only certain aspects of the president’s job performance (Jacobson 2003). 
Even when Democrats were willing to give Bush II higher approval ratings for the 




evaluations for his domestic policies and his job performance as a whole (Jacobson 
2003). 
The increase in ideological polarization and partisan competition also changes 
the size of the audience to whom presidents can appeal with their popularity. While 
presidents serving in relatively unpolarized environments – like Roosevelt or 
Eisenhower – would have some popular approval that they could use to curry favor 
with opposition party members in Congress, today’s presidents faced a different 
political climate in which they cannot gain popularity from their non-partisans in the 
public and their non-partisans in the legislature. Bush II and Obama faced such strong 
opposition from Democrats and Republicans, respectively, that they found it difficult 
to win approval from them except on particular issue areas and in the wake of some 
tragedy. The trend of increasing polarization also means that presidents have fewer 
moderate members to whom they can appeal because these members are either voted 
out of office (like Blanche Lincoln, D-AR) or choose to retire (like Olympia Snowe, 
R-ME). The exit of these members eliminates an audience to whom the president can 
make bipartisan appeals in more traditional settings. 
The case presented by Mann and Ornstein (2013) discusses Obama-era 
Republicans who would rather achieve nothing and wait for the election of a like-
minded Republican president than compromise on their ideals with a Democrat in the 
White House. Klein (2014) writes that this could reflect a difference in intent between 
Democratic and Republican legislators, the former of whom would rather produce 
policy and the latter of whom would rather stay true to their conservative ideology 




a significant division in understanding how the parties interact (or fail to do so) and 
why this is true. We see it in the inability of opposition members to work together. 
In observing their political context, presidents may look at their ability to 
work with members of the opposition party – whether those members are in the 
majority or minority – and assess the implications of those circumstances on their 
ability to lead. If the parties are ideologically moving apart and share less ideological 
space, presidents may recognize this trend and its impact on the ability of Congress to 
coordinate. Such a problem would make it difficult to build a coalition that can 
successfully reverse the president’s actions if he or she acts alone. Even with unified 
government, we see a rise in polarization corresponding to a time of more 
obstructionism like Republicans during the Obama administration. Wider ideological 
distances between the parties may have a bigger effect when the parties share control 
and must compete for dominance in the institutions of government in the first place 
(Rottinghaus 2011).Given these anticipated problems for the Legislative branch to 
effectively challenge the president, these kinds of situations may also lead presidents 
to determine that they would prefer to achieve their policy goals by direct presidential 
action to get what they want. 
Finally, we should probably consider war and the economy as more than 
control variables. They are likely to color the president’s assessment of his or her 
political contexts in determining the likelihood of success for their executive orders. 
Either dynamic could create an environment in which the president perceives the 
ability to exert more unilateral actions. American troops could lead presidents to 




situations that require the president’s attention. The economy, likewise, could indicate 
times when the president sees the need to act in order to address problems.  
Finally, different policy areas may influence presidents’ determinations on the 
costs of legislation to challenge presidential unilateralism. A classic question within 
the presidency literature is that of the two presidencies thesis. Wildavsky (1966) 
noted a difference in legislative success for presidents based on whether they were 
working to achieve foreign versus domestic policy goals. In many cases, we tend to 
believe that presidents enjoy more success with foreign policy actions than domestic 
policy actions because presidents and the public see foreign policy as falling more 
within the purview of the president’s responsibilities and the president having an 
informational advantage over other actors. More recently, Canes-Wrone (2006) found 
evidence to suggest that presidents may have the ability to even shape public opinion 
and make strategic decisions differently based on whether the policy position in 
question deals with foreign or domestic policies. While scholars may continue to 
debate whether such a division is still true today of legislative priorities, it also a 
question to extend to presidential unilateral governance as well. 
It may be the case that presidents evaluate some policy needs as being areas 
where they can get away with more direct presidential action because Congress and 
the people are less familiar with the issues at stake and grant the president more 
latitude as the commander-in-chief and the nation’s chief diplomat. In judging cases 
where a policy needs to be addressed by either legislation or unilateral action, then, 
there may be some instances when a president determines that coordination of 




high. In those issues, the president could instead just assert more direct presidential 
action in the form of an executive order to initiate a policy change. 
We may also see presidents changing policy with their unilateral powers when 
Congress seems uninterested (or even opposed) to a legislative policy change but 
when this lack of support is not strong enough to preclude executive action. If the 
president determines that he or she would be unable to get a law from Congress but 
does not believe that Congress would otherwise coordinate itself to overturn an 
executive action, the president will more likely assert unilateral action in the matter. 
The reduced fear of opposition combined with the inability or refusal of Congress to 
move legislation on its own gives the president incentive to achieve the policies that 
he or she wants as quickly and as easily as possible. An example of this might be the 
case of Obama’s executive order on raising the minimum wage for federal 
contractors. Having raised the idea without congressional action, Obama observed 
that there was not congressional interest in passing such a law and estimated that 
there would not be congressional retaliation against such an executive order if he 
were to issue one. 
Presidents consider all of these factors in determining how to move on 
different pieces of policy. Though they are not calculating the DW-NOMINATE 
scores to measure polarization or taking into account a precise measure of the state of 
the economy each day that they are in office, they are assessing the political 
environment in which they find themselves and making decisions based on their 
ability to achieve action through legislation and the likelihood that the Congress 




presidents consider their options in light of whether or not they think the courts would 
likely uphold their executive orders based on the will of the Congress, so too do I 
argue that they consider the likelihood of the Congress to coordinate and overcome 
legislative costs associated with challenging presidential orders. When presidents 
think they can get their desired policies through legislating, they will tend to do so 
with all else equal. They will instead use unilateral tools in cases where they cannot 
move Congress to action or where they do not believe Congress can organize to 
effectively challenge the president’s action.  
As the time and resource costs for overturning direct exercises of unilateral 
action are high, strategic presidents will consider the conditions under which they 
expect legislators to try to overcome those costs to reverse the president’s executive 
order. As presidents see it, Congress may be more willing to engage in votes to 
overturn executive orders when there is not a crisis situation that demands swift 
action in the first place. Congress may also be more able and willing to move against 
an executive order when the president has poor approval ratings, representing a lack 
of support for policies among the population. Presidents may also determine that 
times of relatively low polarization allow Congress to overcome the costs of 
legislating against the president in a way that he or she will take more seriously the 
threat of an overturn. Congress may also be more likely to overcome these costs if the 
president appears to be setting policy on a matter that the people would determine to 
be outside the scope of his or her authority and that would otherwise tend to be the 




president’s lanes, presidential action on some domestic policies may induce Congress 
to mobilize against the action. 
The salience of the issue is also an area where the president is likely to assess 
the ability of Congress to move against his or her policy initiatives. On issues that are 
addressed by non-significant executive orders, we observe no reaction from 
lawmakers. Part of how an executive order becomes classified as significant in the 
first place is when Congress takes notice of the action in some way and members at 
least make speeches on the topic in the Congressional Record. The majority of 
executive orders do not receive this kind of attention. Among significant executive 
orders, we start to observe some levels of congressional response, though these issues 
might not always be enough to warrant a collective response to the executive order in 
the form of a vote to support or overturn such an order. 
Where the president may expect to find the greatest chance of congressional 
response, however, is on those issues of greatest importance where the president is 
trying to have the largest impact. Where presidents try to make their biggest marks on 
the policy landscape with bolder actions on more salient issues are the areas in which 
they might subsequently expect to see Congresses mobilize to strike down their 
executive orders. These critical issues are the areas where presidents will issue the 
critical executive orders that I discuss in the rest of the dissertation. These critical 
orders are the ones where presidents make the most significant changes to policies 





Again, Howell shows that the rate of congressional action to successfully 
overturn a presidential executive order is low. All of these considerations may factor 
into the reasons that presidents find this trend to be true. They tend to accurately 
assess the areas in which they can marshal their resources and issue executive orders 
without fear of congressional overturn. They determine that Congress is unlikely to 
exceed related costs for legislating against the executive order based on the political 
context in which they are operating and the salience of the issues at hand. Of course, 
presidents are not always accurate in their assessments, and there are times when 
legislators are willing and able to overcome the costs of legislative action in order to 
reverse a president’s executive order, but Howell reveals that these times are rare and 
relatively few in number. 
Theoretical Contribution 
What can we learn from the president’s most impactful demonstrations of 
unilateral action via executive order? What do we stand to gain from studying the 
issuance of critical executive orders and the environments in which they are issued? 
As noted in the introduction, the dissertation seeks to build on the existing 
literature related to unilateral action broadly and executive orders specifically. While 
we have studied executive orders to understand how presidents use their unilateral 
powers, the existing research raises some questions about the political context that 
deserve continued study. Many factors shape presidents’ decisions on how to pursue 
their desired policies. These influences serve as constraints to presidents based on 
their read of the dynamics they see before them, the distance of the status quo policy 




to work with them to change policy or congressional action to oppose their efforts. To 
see how presidents react to these conditions in determining the use of executive 
orders, we should look at the executive orders that are most impactful. But as I 
discuss in the next chapter, the list of significant executive orders is still too broad for 
effective study. The only way to see the interactions of interest is to look at the most 
important executive orders. This smaller set of orders represents the strongest 
examples of presidential unilateral leadership in which presidents have their largest 
singlehanded impacts on their biggest issues. Testing this group of orders will 
therefore provide an insight into the times that presidents most effectively use their 
executive orders to influence policy. 
Mayer (2009, 443) writes that many conceptions of unilateral action models 
have a “troubling” trajectory and play through to an endpoint of unchecked 
presidential power in the hands of the president.  
“If presidents have an incentive to act first, and generally succeed in 
changing policy; and if Congress and the courts face institutional 
hurdles in trying to counteract presidential initiatives, the long-term 
consequence should be a steady expansion of presidential power. 
Following this argument to its conclusion, at some point it must be that 
checks and balances become ineffective, as Congress and the judiciary 
are unable to protect their own institutional authority. Presidential 
power becomes uncontrollable and sinister” (443). 
 
In a discussion of checks and balances, Mayer argues that presidents acting as 
unchecked first-actors ends in a situation in which presidents have accumulated great 
power and the precedent on which to rest the exercise of that power. In such a story of 
unilateral power, presidents act with impunity and receive little pushback from 




If we find broad political factors outside of the president’s control that 
influence the prevalence of critical executive orders, presidents face environments 
that effectively constrain their ability to issue critical orders. Under these 
circumstances, models would be routinely overestimating the president’s unilateral 
policymaking ability when it matters most. Others’ models are based on a broader 
group of orders under which presidents have fewer binding constraints on them than 
the constraints they face when they issue their critical orders on critical policy topics. 
On the other hand, not finding political dynamics that have an impact on 
critical orders would indicate that presidents are somewhat constrained when it comes 
to overall use of the executive order but have the ability to really make an impact on 
those bigger issues. This story would be one of greater presidential latitude to have an 
impact when it likely matters most for the president. In such a case, empirical 
analyses would underestimate the president’s unilateral policymaking ability by 
equating higher hurdles for significant executive orders with the lower hurdles that 
presidents actually face with critical orders on critical issues. In short, this would be a 
story whereby the president can actually move the policies he or she wants when they 
matter most without the literature recognizing this ability to lead by executive order. 
As described in the following chapters, I find that the prevalence of critical 
executive orders is primarily a function of political environmental factors: divided 
government, polarization, approval, the economy, war, and other factors of timing 
within the political calendar. With these results, I challenge Mayer’s “troubling 
implication” of an unchecked presidency that can continue to gather power. The 




use unilateral actions to achieve policy change – is a function of political context and 
not the individual president’s desire to accumulate power or redesign the government. 
In these ways, presidents are constrained in their use of unilateral tools. These 
constraints are not formal or legal limits to their actions, but their observations about 
their political surroundings inform them of when they can more easily issue such 
orders to affect policy change and when they should hold back to instead try a 
legislative approach or not move on the policy for fear of having their orders 
challenged and overturned.  
Moving Forward 
 We have a foundation of literature that addresses and builds the Unilateral 
Politics Model for understanding when presidents will issue greater numbers of 
significant executive orders based on the size of congressional majorities, whether it 
is the beginning of a new party’s control in the White House after years out of office, 
and whether the White House and Congress are controlled by the same party. These 
dynamics of the political environment can tell us about the number of significant 
executive orders, but questions arise along three veins: whether the count of 
significant executive orders is the appropriate unit of analysis, whether we should 
include additional factors about the political context in which the president operates, 
and whether we should parse out any of our study by policy area to detect differences 
in domestic versus foreign policy issues.  
What other dynamics are missing from the model that could be instructive in 
understanding when presidents will issue their most impactful executive orders? In 




I propose the inclusion of polarization and presidential approval ratings for unilateral 
models so that we have a more comprehensive picture of the political world in which 
our presidents operate. Ideological polarization increases the costs of congressional 
coordination for legislating and challenging the president’s actions. Polarization also 
makes it harder for the president to find an audience to whom he or she can appeal 
when pushing Congress for legislation on a policy issue. Approval ratings indicate a 
level of public support for the president (and, by extension, his or her policies). 
Popular presidents may have more capital they can exchange for either legislation or 
unilateral action. Both measures provide additional information about the 
environments in which presidents operate and the resources they believe are at their 
disposal in pursuing policy change by any of the available methods. 
 In the next chapter, I detail the process for identifying my new dependent 
variable to better distill the most significant demonstrations of presidential unilateral 
actions. I label these actions “critical executive orders.” In the next chapter, I then 
specify my relevant variables and describe the models used to test the hypotheses I 
draw from the existing literature. My discussion of the results at the end of the fourth 
chapter propels the work forward with chapters that exemplify my findings on the 




Chapter 3: Critical Executive Orders 
Not all executive orders are created equal.  In fact, not even all “significant” 
executive orders are created equal.  Some truly important unilateral actions alter the 
policymaking landscape in a consequential manner that epitomizes the exercise of 
unilateral tools with impunity.  Existing theoretical perspectives towards unilateral 
governance fail to incorporate these important substantive distinctions.  In the 
previous chapter, I outline a theory of unilateral action focused on the most 
significant examples of its use.    To evaluate my theory, I must begin by answering a 
question: Which orders represent the greatest exercise of the president’s unilateral 
tools in the first place? Identifying the most significant of these orders helps assess 
which factors – if any – create an environment in which the president can successfully 
issue an executive order. In the process, we see how effectively constrained a 
president may or may not be based on whether political dynamics create the space in 
which a president acts with the stroke of a pen or whether the president works 
independently of the political context to issue particular executive orders of greater 
importance and impact. 
In this chapter, I introduce a new concept: the critical executive order. Rooted 
in previous work on executive orders, I explain why such a distinction is necessary 
and what researchers can gain from a more nuanced approach to significance among 
executive orders. I then explain the methodology for operationalizing that concept 
through exhaustive research in The New York Times news coverage that give an 
indication of the scope and importance of executive orders. Upon conducting this 




and impactful executive orders. This method provides us with a more fine-tuned 
definition of just 176 critical executive orders based on the number of stories that 
refer to these executive orders. With this definition established and subset of 
executive orders identified, I can then develop models accounting for when presidents 
issue their most significant executive orders. 
 Distinctive substantive results would reveal which contextual factors lead to 
the president issuing more or fewer executive orders based on circumstances outside 
of his or her control. Significant characteristics are associated with the political 
contexts that lead to presidents issuing more or fewer executive orders. If these 
variables of interest are significant to understanding the number of orders that 
presidents issue, it would suggest that political dynamics create the environment 
favorable for presidents’ unilateral actions. A lack of statistical and substantive 
significance, on the other hand, may indicate that such external factors are not 
deterministic of critical executive orders and unilateral governance more generally. In 
this case, we would see presidents deciding on their own the extent to which they use 
their unilateral tools with impunity and absent considerations of their context. The 
question here is about how political dynamics influence the president’s perception of 
the environment and the prevalence of using unilateral governance to achieve policy 
goals. 
The Need for a New Concept 
 The literature on executive orders proposes a methodology for testing 
expectations of how political factors influence the issuance of these orders. Mayer 




subset of so-called “significant” executive orders. While some of the details differ 
slightly, the main idea is the same throughout: significant executive orders are policy-
based orders that move beyond routine actions of the presidency. By and large, these 
orders do more than simply reorganize a department or rename a federal building. 
Instead, they are orders that receive popular and press attention in newspaper stories, 
receive congressional attention, or receive judicial attention from the courts relatively 
soon after issuance. The argument follows that if people do not pay attention to the 
order, if the Congress does not acknowledge the order by condemning it or seeking to 
codify it into law, and if the courts do not take up a case related to the order to strike 
it down or uphold it, it is of less impact. Even if all the attention paid to an order is 
positive and supportive of the action, this attention shows that the order and its 
subject matter are more significant than an order that simply renames a post office 
and so receives no attention.  
 For Mayer and Howell, this work mirrors the attention given by Mayhew 
(1991) to significant legislation by allowing both contemporary political observers 
(“Sweep One”) and historians and policy experts (“Sweep Two”) to weigh in on the 
question of what matters. Mayer replicates Mayhew’s two sweeps with a series of 
questions about if and how different audiences treat or discuss each executive order. 
For the first sweep, he considers executive orders that received attention from several 
national newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal) and 
actions from Congress. For the second sweep, Mayer includes whether or not law 
students or presidential scholars have discussed the order, whether presidents 




the order, and whether or not the order created significant and substantive change to 
the structure of government or the status quo of the relevant public policy. In both 
cases, we see these political scientists creating rubrics whereby significant orders can 
be objectively identified. 
In Howell’s work, mentions of a policy order in the New York Times within 
one year of order issuance qualifies an order as being a significant executive order 
(consistent with the first sweep). Similarly, mention of an executive order in the 
Congressional Record or in at least two federal court opinions within fifteen years of 
the order’s issuance makes an executive order significant (consistent with the second 
sweep). Through both measures, researchers can identify a full set of executive orders 
that may qualify as significant orders. 
At the time of Howell’s writing, however, New York Times records were only 
electronically available back to 1969, and so his ability to search for mentions of 
particular orders were bound to a particular time period. And while this source could 
be used up until the time of Howell’s writing in 2000, the lag in court mentions or 
Congressional Record mentions meant that some orders had less time to become 
significant through these qualifying criteria. That is, an order issued in 1998 would 
not have had a full fifteen years to make its way into congressional proceedings and 
especially not be raised in federal court proceedings. The New York Times could 
therefore only be used for orders from 1969 to 1999, and the Congressional Record 
and court opinions could only be used for orders from 1945 to 1985. Newspaper 
records could help capture more recent orders but would fail to help identify earlier 




might miss later orders that did not yet have a full fifteen year window to mature and 
appear in these sources. 
 To justify and reconcile the two separate measures, Howell provides some 
source validation and OLS regressions that show the compatibility of both sweeps to 
adequately capture significant executive orders. The separate qualifiers for 
significance generally do a good job of identifying the appropriate orders in the 
overlapping time period from 1969 to 1985 when both measures can be fully 
employed. From this, Howell identifies a list of significant executive orders from 
1945 to 2000 with extensions of the list provided by Williams (2014) for 2000 to 
2009. Together, this list totals nearly 1,000 significant executive orders to study and 
further classify. 
But a final list of some 1,000 orders is still a wide swath that includes 
differing degrees of importance with ranges from orders that close the federal 
government on December 26 and receive a single mention in just one sentence of a 
New York Times story to an order creating a new federal initiative and agency like the 
Peace Corps. Every president has executive orders with zero, one, two, three, and 
even four story mentions. Orders with zero, one, and two story mentions represent the 
majority of the data set and do not reflect particularly significant orders. These are the 
orders that close the federal government the day before or after Christmas, exempt 
particular employees from the mandatory retirement age, make small adjustments to 
previous orders, or add a new star to the American flag or the presidential seal. These 




that orders with more stories tend to do. These orders do not alter the direction of 
policy or tend to change lines of the federal budget. 
 In short, too many orders of varying magnitude, policy importance, and 
budgetary weight fall into the same, singular category of “significant” executive 
orders. While we can learn something about the nature of presidential actions by 
looking at this group and excluding those that garner no media, legislative, or judicial 
attention, there is still a great amount of variation within this set. We can learn even 
more about the decisions that presidents make and the dynamics that shape these 
kinds of decisions if we drill down and focus on the exceptional cases. We learn less 
about these most significant orders that embody the greatest exercise of unilateral 
tools when we consider an order giving federal employees the day off from work 
alongside the order creating the Peace Corps. In a discussion of presidents’ unilateral 
action and the times when presidents have the largest single-handed effect on policy, 
we can and should dismiss the nominally significant order and focus on the echelon 
of orders that best demonstrate times when the president acted and others noticed. 
Whether the issue is presidents trying to subvert Congress and the courts or needs 
faster and more decisive action than the legislative process might otherwise provide, 
there is a classification of orders that demonstrate the president taking bigger steps to 
address issues of policy, and those actions have a larger impact on the policy 
landscape for the country. 
 To better leverage this notion of more deeply exploring certain executive 
orders to better understand unilateral governance, we must therefore further winnow 




factors influence the president’s ability to issue more critical orders. In order to 
determine the extent to which presidents can truly act unilaterally in setting policy or 
the extent to which they are limited in their actions by the political context in which 
they operate, the first step is to identify those actions that are most impactful so as to 
determine the role of political dynamics on those orders. To separate the list of orders, 
I use the count of New York Times stories for each order and establish a threshold that 
helps distinguish lesser-significant orders from their more significant counterparts – a 
group I term “critical executive orders.” They are critical because they tend to 
represent a broad use of presidential action to create something new or alter the 
direction of something already in existence with budgetary and legal implications 
worthy of note. 
Establishing the Critical Executive Order 
To narrow the list, I count how many New York Times stories mention each 
executive order on the list. For my purposes, I look only at the New York Times 
criterion. While other executive orders may qualify for the list of significant 
executive orders based on the Congressional Record or federal court decisions, it 
stands to reason that the stories with higher number counts are the most likely to also 
qualify through these other avenues.6 An executive order extending the retirement age 
for a particular employee and with only one mention in the newspaper is not likely to 
have related congressional mentions or court references. An order that garners many 
stories is more likely to be a topic also taken up by Congress or reviewed by the 
courts as well. The Peace Corps, for example, was later codified into law and given a 
                                                
6 A cursory look at The Congressional Record within fifteen years of a randomly drawn sample of 
twenty post-1995 (when the Record is digitized and electronically searchable) significant executive 




substantial budget with several expansions over the following decades. For the 
purposes of identifying the most significant orders, my definition precludes orders 
gathering minimal attention in the first place. 
 Since Howell originally wrote about significant executive orders, records for 
The New York Times have been digitized for a much larger portion of time. We now 
have the availability to search stories well before 19697 based on key words. 
Researchers no longer face the same restrictions for which Howell needed additional 
methods to identify significant executive orders based on limits at the time. Now, this 
one qualifying event is available for the entire time period of interest and provides a 
method for identifying the most outstanding cases of executive orders by a single 
method. I therefore use only this one method for determining which significant 
executive orders meet the criteria for being a critical executive order based on story 
counts in The New York Times without duplicating this effort to search the 
Congressional Record and federal court decisions as well.8 
 To accurately count the number of stories for each executive order, I use 
ProQuest to search The New York Times for the executive order’s number and key 
words within a one-year window. I use as broad of terms as possible to capture all 
stories and editorials that might potentially include a reference to the target executive 
order, and then I read all of the stories found in Proquest.9 To be counted, each story 
must include a clear reference to the order of interest, which usually includes some 
                                                
7 ProQuest now includes the ability to search The New York Times back to 1851. 
8 This step presumes that all significant executive orders are equally accessible to the public via news 
media coverage. Without also conducting content analysis of each of these executive orders, I assume 
that newspapers would be able to report on the substantive impact of a significant executive order 
regardless of technical language, jargon, or content erudition included in the order. 




form of temporal reference to “the president’s executive order yesterday” or “last 
week” or “last month.” To ensure I count only appropriate stories and mentions, I 
check all of the president’s executive orders for that time period to make sure that the 
reference could not apply to another executive order on the same topic at the same 
time. That is, when a story mentions “the president’s executive order on the selective 
service last week,” I check to determine that the executive order I am researching is 
the only executive order that the president in question issued about the selective 
service in the previous week. Otherwise, the story is not counted.10 
If I cannot attach a story to a particular executive order based on description 
or timing, I do not count the story. For example, if the president issues numerous 
executive orders related to the selective service one year, and a story the next year 
simply refers to “the president’s executive order last year” or “the president’s 
executive order on the selective service” without specifying a timeframe, I do not 
count this story because it cannot be attributed with certainty to any particular order.  
I start the research with the list of significant executive orders and not The 
New York Times. Given this distinction, the search and counting process is not 
susceptible to errors where I count stories that the media may incorrectly refer to as 
an “executive order” when it is actually some other form of executive action. When 
President Obama, for example, announced unilateral action on immigration in 
November 2014 or gun control in January 2016, many news outlets incorrectly 
                                                
10 I note one particular issue (that appears at first as an exception to the rule) with this counting 
procedure in Chapter 6 when discussing critical foreign orders. In his last full day in the White House, 
President Carter signed several orders related to frozen Iranian assets because of the hostage crisis in 
Tehran. Stories at the time would refer to the several executive orders signed by Carter related to 
frozen assets, and so all of these stories were counted for each of the appropriate executive orders. 
These stories were not counted for the several other non-asset, Iran-related orders of the same day. 
Other orders dealt with Iranian issues but did not address issues of frozen assets and so were not 




labeled these actions “executive orders,” and many news observers followed suit. The 
beginning of the Trump administration also faced a great deal of mislabeling, some 
generated by the White House and some generated by news outlets, of executive 
actions wherein some presidential memoranda were at first reported as executive 
orders but were later clarified to be memoranda. All of these other forms of unilateral 
action are also important and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, but they 
are not included in my analysis here because they are not as available for all 
administrations and face reporting problems. My categorization of executive orders 
starts with Howell’s list of significant executive orders, and we also lack an 
established list of significance for some of these other unilateral tools. 
Findings 
Presidents Truman through Bush II provide some 992 significant executive 
orders from their collective years in the Oval Office. The executive orders in this time 
period have a mean story count of 1.844 stories (standard deviation of 2.82) per 
executive order with a modal response of 1 (for some 512, or 51.6% of, these orders). 
Just over 160 orders (16.3%) have a count of 0 stories11 and approximately 140 orders 
(14.3%) have just 2 story mentions. Moving away from the mean, nearly 70 orders 
have three story mentions, just over 30 orders have four story mentions, 25 orders 
have five story mentions, and just fewer than 20 orders have six story mentions. The 
remaining 33 orders have story counts that range from seven stories to thirty stories. 
Given these numbers, we see that 82.3% of significant executive orders have just two 
or fewer stories written about them. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of story counts 
                                                
11 Stories with no New York Times mentions are considered significant by meeting one of the other two 
criteria set forth by Howell. See Table 4.1 on page 82 of Howell (2003) for more about orders that 




with a right skew that goes as high as 30 stories and is truncated at 0 story mentions 
for many orders.  
Figure 3.1: Distribution of New York Times Story Counts for Significant Executive 
Orders 
 
This figure shows the frequency of New York Times story counts for significant executive 
orders in Howell’s list. More than half of the orders have just one singular story mention. 
The right tail is condensed here for space considerations, though the count goes as high as 
30 stories for one significant executive order. 
 
The order with the highest number of stories in The New York Times in the 
period 1945-2009 is President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10924 establishing the 
Peace Corps in March 1961. In the year that followed, The New York Times printed 
some thirty stories that referred to Kennedy’s executive order to establish the 
program. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the years 1961 to 1976 contains 
several hundred mentions of the Peace Corps, and Congress passed some eight pieces 
of legislation related to the Peace Corps in the same time period. In this case, an 
executive order that received a great deal of news attention also received a great deal 
of congressional attention, much of which sought to codify the president’s new 














program into statutory law, create a staff structure for the agency, and establish 
budgets to support the program’s many projects and objectives. 
 Other orders receiving the greatest amount of attention in the newspaper of 
record include orders to address foreign relations with China under Clinton, Reagan’s 
policy to “Just Say No,” equal opportunity requirements in employment and housing 
under Kennedy, and trying to end the hostage situation in Iran in the closing hours of 
the Carter administration. Examples of executive orders that have some newspaper 
stories but are not critical orders include changes to Selective Service regulations, 
acts related to union membership and dues, administration of the military, and state-
specific orders to provide federal assistance in times of disaster or crisis. Orders that 
received no media attention include actions that affected administration within federal 
departments, the establishment of national advisory commissions, or executive orders 
that amended previous orders (such as a Carter order about the Peace Corps issued in 
1979, nearly two decades after the program was initially created by executive order).   
Figure 3.2 shows the nearly flat trend in the average number of stories written 
about each significant executive order across these presidents with President 
Truman’s significant executive orders garnering an average of 1.86 stories while 















Figure 3.2: Trend in New York Times Story Counts by President 
 
This figure shows the trend of average New York Times story counts per significant 
executive order by president. Overall, the trend has not changed drastically in 60 years of 
newspaper stories. 
 
This trend is important in allowing me to set a single threshold for the entire 
data set rather than a dynamic threshold based on other factors. In particular, I want to 
be sensitive to changing media trends and platforms and an increasingly common 24-
hour news cycle that would make it easier for sources like The New York Times to 
write more stories about executive orders as time continued. If we witness a steady 
growth in the average number of stories over time, it may be appropriate to raise the 
threshold over the course of the data set so that an order with four stories in Truman’s 
day would not be treated the same as a story that easily received attention in four 
stories during the Bush II administration. The lack of such a trend, however, makes a 
single threshold appropriate for the entire data set. Four story mentions for a Truman 
order or a Bush II order is equally a high number of story mentions for either 
president without needing to discount a president’s story count for external factors 










Simultaneously, the number of total and significant executive orders for each 
president decreases over time, as shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. In the time period 
covered in the dissertation, Truman has the largest total number of executive orders 
with nearly 900. Eisenhower issued almost 500 total orders. Presidents Kennedy 
through Bush II then issued a number of orders ranging from just under 200 orders to 
just under 400 orders. The downward trend in Figure 3.3 confirms the findings of 
Howell (2003) and others (Lowande 2014) that presidents are generally issuing fewer 
executive orders over time with an average of some 150-200 orders per four-year 
term. This decline in total executive orders comports with a presidential turn to other 
unilateral tools, such as the presidential memorandum discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7.12 Obama is the first president to have issued more memoranda than 
executive orders during his eight years in the White House. 
Figure 3.3: Trends in Total Executive Orders Issued by President 
 
This figure shows the total number of executive orders by president. 
 
                                                
12 As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, memoranda are important tools deserving of study, but 
not all administrations have made a practice of publishing all memoranda the same way they are 
legally required to publish executive orders. Additionally, this study starts with a list of significant 
executive orders, but corollary lists of significant memoranda do not currently exist as a launching 
point for related research. 
















Figure 3.4: Trends in Significant Executive Orders Issued by President 
 
This table shows the number of significant executive orders by president. With a 
smaller y-axis scale, it comports neatly to the total number of executive orders shown 
in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.4 also shows the decreasing number of significant executive orders 
signed by presidents over time. This trend may also reconcile with the increased use 
of other unilateral tools by presidents. Presidents not only issue fewer routine orders 
over time but also replace some of their significant executive orders with other 
unilateral actions. Again, Truman has the highest number of significant executive 
orders with some 250 such orders, and Eisenhower follows with over 100 such 
orders. But the rest of the presidents Kennedy through Bush II each issued fewer than 
100 significant executive orders with Ford and Bush I issuing just 24 and 31 
significant orders, respectively. Again, we have a decreasing trend line for significant 
executive orders over time as they became less prevalent. 
Identifying the Critical Executive Order 
To determine appropriate thresholds, I look to the distribution of New York 
Times story counts and consider any order with three or more story mentions. Such a 













threshold captures any significant executive order with a story count above the 
rounded mean, from 1.84 to 2. Setting a cut-point of three or more stories as the 
threshold for critical executive orders yields a group of 176 orders, which represent 
17.7% of significant orders or 4.5% of total orders issued by Presidents Truman 
through Bush II.13 
What kinds of orders would become critical orders? Here, I discuss some of 
the types of orders that make it into the set of critical executive orders with just three 
or four New York Times articles. Chapters 5 and 6 provide more in-depth case studies 
about the critical orders that presidents issue under different sets of political 
circumstances. For Truman, many of his critical orders with three story mentions deal 
with programs that ended different parts of the war effort, such as Executive Order 
9621 that ended the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition or Executive Order 
9809 to provide for the disposition of war agencies. For other presidents, many of 
these orders deal with programs like the military preparedness and the draft 
(Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon), establishing and protecting civil rights (Kennedy and 
Johnson), or current issues of the times (Ford with clemency, Carter with Iran, or 
Reagan with the Challenger explosion). Some of the orders with four stories created 
new departments with instructions to study and report on national problems of the 
time: Truman’s Executive Order 9672 to create the National Wage Stabilization 
Board, Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10472 to establish the National Agricultural 
Advisory Commission, Kennedy’s Executive Order 10940 to establish the President’s 
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, and Clinton’s Executive 
                                                




Order 13038 on an Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations and Digital 
Television Broadcasters. 
The number of critical orders also tends to fall as some other tools like the 
presidential memorandum are on the rise, as depicted in Figure 3.5.14 Truman has the 
highest number of critical orders with a total of 28 orders, but the number then drops 
for his successors. We then see Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan 
with critical orders numbering in the 10-15 range; Clinton and Bush II in the 5-10 
range; and Johnson, Ford, and Bush I with fewer than 5 critical orders each. The 
range represented here is somewhat small with relatively low numbers across the 
board. These orders are a small portion of each president’s total executive orders and 
represent a subset of the work accomplished for these presidents via unilateral tools. 
Figure 3.5: Trends in Critical Executive Orders by President (and by Policy Category) 
 
This table shows the total number of critical executive orders by president and by policy 
type per president. Again, it matches the overall trend of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 with an 
adjusted y-axis scale to reflect the lower numbers but similar patterns. 
                                                

































A president’s use of other policy tools may explain the decline in the number 
of critical executive orders like it does the decline of other executive orders, but these 
small numbers also reflect that this new measure captures the truly exceptional among 
presidents’ actions and times in which they may choose to act most strategically 
given their options. This measure is no longer a category of policy prerogative that 
can be accomplished through other methods and instead marks those areas in which 
presidents truly made their biggest marks in the first place. With that understanding, 
we see some of the legacies of presidents reflected in their critical executive orders: 
Kennedy and the Peace Corps or Reagan and the War on Drugs. Many of these orders 
reflect not just what was a major issue for the president at that time but also what we 
continue to remember about these presidents decades later. These orders were critical 
for the presidents at the time, generating conversation within the press, among the 
people, and likely within other branches of the government. But they were also 
critical for how we remember some of these presidents after they have left office, 
proving the utility in thinking of these as critical orders. In many cases, these 
particular executive orders are the highlights of an administration and some of what it 
accomplished in office. 
The slight rise in percentage of critical orders from significant orders may 
indicate that while presidents tend to issue fewer orders in general, they are reserving 
some of that unilateral action for times in which they intend to be particularly 
impactful. Figure 3.6 demonstrates the change in percentage across administrations as 
well with a trend line that increases over time. With so many total executive orders 




executive orders is less than 12% of his significant executive orders. These numbers 
drop as low as Johnson’s critical executive orders (totaling 4) being just 5% of the 82 
significant executive orders he issued during his time in the Oval Office. But this 
number also rises as high as 17% for Carter. Though their counts may be decreasing, 
critical executive orders represent a growing proportion of presidents’ unilateral 
governance via executive order. 
Figure 3.6: Trends in Critical Executive Orders as a Percentage of Significant 
Executive Orders by President 
 
This figure provides information on the percentage of significant executive orders that 
are critical executive orders by president. While the total number of executive orders, 
significant executive orders, and critical executive orders appears to be slightly 
declining over time, the percentage of orders is on a slight increase since the Truman 
administration. 
 
With critical executive orders identified for each president, I am able to take 
one final step in this work by dividing the critical orders by policy type: domestic 
policies and foreign policies. To accomplish this work, I use the Policy Agendas 














each executive order into its primary and sub-policy buckets, I additionally sort out 
each president’s critical orders into how many are critical domestic orders and how 
many are critical foreign orders. This distinction will allow for testing in the next 
chapter about not only how political dynamics limit presidents in their issuance of 
executive orders generally but also how these factors may vary based on whether the 
president is pursuing domestic policy change or foreign policy change. Among 176 
critical executive orders, 87 orders are critical domestic orders, and 89 orders are 
critical foreign orders (as also seen in Figure 3.5). As a whole, presidents are acting 
on both types of policy prerogatives nearly equally when it comes to employing 
executive orders that will later be deemed as critical. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I introduce my new concept of the critical executive order with 
details on how to identify such orders. I develop a system rooted in established 
literature for further classifying significant executive orders so that we can weed out 
some of the orders that are classified as significant but are not comparable to other 
orders with clearer or more substantive policy implications. By counting the number 
of New York Times stories that mention or refer to each significant executive order, I 
am able to set a threshold for separating critical executive orders from their 
counterparts and allows us to study the most impactful things presidents do without 
the Congress or the courts. Setting a threshold at three or more stories includes 176 
executive orders (some 17.7% of the significant executive orders population) that are 




that can be used as a dependent variable in quantitative research about which factors 
may or may not shape a president’s ability to issue his or her most impactful orders. 
 I turn to this question in the next chapter to assess which political dynamics 
influence the number of critical orders issued by presidents. In running models where 
the dependent variable is the count of critical executive orders and the independent 
variables are different factors of the political context in which presidents interact, I 
analyze which dynamics have significance in the models and in our world. More 
variables with significance and models with greater explanatory power indicate a role 
for these dynamics in determining the numbers of critical executive orders issued by 
presidents. While these relationships may not be formal constraints or limits on the 
ability of presidents to use their unilateral tools, I argue that presidents observe their 
political context and make strategic decisions on policy pursuit based on what they 
think they can successfully accomplish through legislative and unilateral approaches. 
Presidents may find executive orders more useful under some circumstances and find 
themselves effectively constrained when unilateral efforts are more difficult or less 
useful in accomplishing desired policy change. This work helps answer the larger 





Chapter 4: Model Analysis 
In this chapter, I turn to methods for testing my expectations about how 
political factors influence the exercise of presidential unilateralism. What factors help 
determine the issuance of critical executive orders? How do they influence the 
decisions of presidents to issue executive orders that more substantially move public 
policy? I begin by laying out my hypotheses based on previous and related literature. 
I then define and specify the variables that I use in these models and run count models 
to determine the influence of political dynamics on the issuance of critical executive 
orders. 
I begin with variables already tested in the literature for significant executive 
orders and add additional variables based on discussions from Chapter 2 related to 
other political factors that shape a president’s context. The relevant dynamics from 
the literature that I test are the size of congressional majorities, whether or not a new 
party is in the White House, and whether or not the president faces divided 
government. The literature also includes dummy variables for the economy and war, 
which I consider as political factors as well. The additional variables I include are the 
president’s approval rating and a measure for ideological polarization, both of which 
may impact the president’s assessment of his or her context and what he or she 
(thinks they) can accomplish with legislative versus unilateral approaches. Finally, I 
include some additional timing variables related to whether or not the observation is 
that of a lame duck president, a lame duck Congress, or a new party in control of at 
least one chamber of Congress (analogous to the partisanship variable I include for 




I run count models for the number of critical executive orders issued during 
president-Congress pairs using the total number of critical executive orders and sub-
counts of critical domestic and foreign orders. The scope of my data set encompasses 
the Truman administration through the end of the Bush II administration, 1945 to 
2009. This allows us to use whole administrations for which we already have lists of 
significant executive orders on which to base our queries of New York Times story 
counts and identify critical executive orders.15 Among total critical executive orders, I 
find that divided government, polarization under divided government, the economy, 
presidential lame ducks, and congressional lame ducks all influence the number of 
critical orders issued by presidents. I also run similar models for the number of 
critical domestic and foreign orders to see if there is a difference in the political 
dynamics that influence presidential governance by policy type. I find that divided 
government, polarization under divided government, presidential approval, the 
economy, war, presidential lame ducks, congressional lame ducks, and a party change 
in Congress have an impact on presidents’ domestic orders. Divided government, 
polarization, polarization under divided government, and congressional lame ducks 
have an impact on presidents’ foreign orders. We see, then, that different factors 
impact these two types of orders, and fewer dynamics influence the ability of 
presidents to issue critical foreign orders than their ability to issue critical domestic 
orders. 
                                                
15 At the time that data collection began on New York Times story counts, the Obama administration 
still had nearly 22% of its time left in office. Additionally, Not every executive order that had been 
issued in the year before data collection began had the opportunity to make an appearance in the 
newspaper at that point (let alone have its full fifteen-year period to qualify for significance via 
congressional or judicial mentions. Without a formal list of significant executive orders available at the 




In the conclusion, I discuss the implications of these results for our 
understanding of the limits of unilateral action. With so many factors beyond a 
president’s control being predictive of the number of critical orders being issued, we 
see that presidents show some deference to the political context in which they 
operate. Under these particular conditions, presidents determine that they can more 
easily use executive orders and that these orders maybe more useful or effective for 
achieving the desired policy change. Whether this decision is based on an opposition 
party that threatens the president’s policy successes outright with the use of unilateral 
actions or just the president’s interpretation of what actions can be supported by 
Congress or courts in the event of a challenge, the president is acting strategically 
based on his or her circumstances. The president will not want to suffer attacks on his 
or her unilateral actions and be weakened through sustained challenges and overturns. 
and so will act accordingly. The president is therefore effectively constrained by 
circumstance so as to move in such a way that facilitates action and avoids as many 
potential challenges as possible. Instead, presidents are strategic in issuing these 
orders and tend to do so more under particular circumstances. The difference we 
observe in the factors that influence the numbers of critical domestic versus foreign 
orders gives continued credence to Wildavsky’s theory of two presidencies, 
especially given that we find the model less predictive for foreign orders in the first 
place. This result could reflect the contention that presidents have a freer hand in 
making policy with the stroke of a pen when it comes to their defense and 





Expectations for Influences of Unilateral Governance 
 Existing research focuses heavily on the contextual factors that effectively 
constrain or facilitate a president’s exercise of unilateral authority.  Howell’s 
Unilateral Politics Model is a primary example of this vein of research.  I first set out 
to test the same three factors that Howell tested related to significant executive orders. 
Do we expect congressional majorities, administration changes, and divided 
government to affect the issuance of critical executive orders as they do significant 
executive orders? First, I expect larger congressional majorities to decrease the 
number of critical executive orders as they do the number of significant executive 
orders because the chambers – whether controlled by the president’s party or not – 
can more easily mobilize to pass pieces of legislation. As I expect presidents to 
respond to their circumstances and use tools when they find them most useful, I 
expect presidents to continue to use executive orders when they find it easiest and 
most beneficial to do so. While this ability to act may sometimes be used to subvert 
the president’s will on policy, it can also be used to produce quick and decisive 
legislative wins for the president when that is the preferred route for achieving policy 
change.  
H1a: The size of the majority parties in Congress is 
inversely related to the number of critical executive 
orders issued. 
 
Second, the same factors that motivate presidents to issue more significant 
executive orders in the first years in which a party is back in power – and in control of 
the unilateral powers of government – might lead presidents to issue more critical 




office after opposition party control, they will want to move quickly on a number of 
items. Since these cases follow an election in which the other party was removed 
from office, the new president may even feel that he or she has a mandate from the 
people to move quickly on at least some of these policy issues. And because these 
may be the issues on which the new president campaigned, they may tend to be policy 
issues that garner additional press attention because we see the new administration 
moving quickly on its signature issues. Because executive orders can be overturned 
by other executive orders, this tool may be particularly salient for achieving policy 
change at the end of an administration just as executive orders may have been used at 
the close of the previous administration before leaving office.  
H1b: A new party in the White House is positively 
related to the number of critical executive orders issued. 
 
Third, I also stipulate Howell’s finding for the effect of divided government 
leading to fewer critical orders, though a contrary finding would not necessarily 
change his story. While presidents may not need congressional majorities generally 
for unilateral governance, we may find higher numbers of the truly critical orders 
come under times of divided government when the president has more impactful 
policies that cannot otherwise get through the legislature. That is, it may be the case 
that presidents generally issue executive orders that are significant when they have 
unified government because they have a legislature that will back up their unilateral 
actions anyway, but perhaps the most impactful of these orders could still come when 
the president has no such legislative advantage. 
H1c: Divided government is negatively correlated to the 





 Turning to other factors of the political environment, I begin with 
polarization. I expect polarization to have a positive relationship with the number of 
critical executive orders issued by presidents. The rise of polarization means that 
presidents will find it more difficult to work with Congress whether their party is in 
control or not. Even in a case like that of the Obama administration and the 111th 
Congress controlled by Democrats, the president found it difficult to act because of an 
obstructionist minority that threw up roadblocks as often as they could. Even when 
Senate Democrats maintained control of the upper chamber in the 112th and 113th 
Congresses, the minority Republicans managed to stall the president’s agenda along 
the way. Therefore, I expect this increased ideological competition to leave the 
president to rely on unilateral actions to accomplish more policy objectives when he 
or she can no longer work with the legislature. I expect this relationship to be similar 
to the theory behind congressional majorities: there are fewer orders when it is easier 
for the president to legislate and more orders when it is harder to legislate. 
H2a: Polarization is positively correlated to the number 
of critical executive orders issued. 
 
 We might also consider, however, the role of polarization under different 
political alignments of government. Perhaps looking at just polarization is too broad a 
factor. It might be the case that polarization affects the president’s decisions to act via 
executive order differently depending on whether the president has a unified or 
divided government. The difficulties imposed on presidents by polarization would 
appear the most difficult under divided government. While presidents would still 
struggle with keeping their co-partisans in line for votes on their agenda items under 




legislative position in which a president may find him- or herself would appear to be 
a highly polarized and divided government. By the very nature of polarization, it 
would likely be harder for the president to convince members of the opposite party to 
join him or her on a policy move. Because of the gridlock introduced by polarization, 
the president would likely find only the ability to get his or her minority in the 
legislature on board. Wider ideological distances between the parties may have a 
bigger effect when the parties share control and must compete for dominance in the 
institutions of government in the first place (Rottinghaus 2011). Therefore, I expect 
polarization under divided government to increase the number of critical executive 
orders that presidents issue because they have so few paths to legislative victory 
available to them. 
H2b: Under divided government, polarization is 
positively correlated to the number of critical executive 
orders issued. 
 
Previous work presents a divided story on the role of presidential popularity 
with executive orders. Many of these stories point to a relationship in which higher 
presidential popularity means more executive orders because executives have the 
backing of the people. Whether presidents have control of the parties in Congress or 
not, having higher popularity may give them the capital they need to be able to 
influence policy, especially when this is a significant policy change on which the 
president is demonstrating unilateral action. Whether the president needs a 
congressional majority that would support the action or popular support behind the 




with a positive relationship between presidential approval and the number of critical 
executive orders. 
H3: Presidential approval numbers are positively related 
to the number of critical executive orders issued. 
 
Additionally, I analyze the effect of the economy on presidential governance. 
Howell considered the unemployment rate a control variable and found few 
statistically significant results in his models. In cases where he found statistical 
significance, Howell found a negative relationship between the unemployment rate 
and executive orders, such that high unemployment led to fewer orders. However, a 
troubling economy may provide the president with more latitude to exercise unilateral 
action – especially critical orders – in order to change policies and make an impact. 
Such cases may also reflect times when the president wants to (or even needs to) 
move faster to affect change without wanting to engage in the more laborious 
legislative process. Again, this finding need not be contrary to Howell’s findings on 
the subject. It may be the case that the economy has little bearing on the larger swath 
of significant executive orders but is more predictive and instruction in terms of 
critical orders. I expect the performance of the economy to have a negative 
relationship with critical executive orders such that more economic troubles lead to 
more critical orders. 
H4: The health of the economy is inversely related to 
the number of critical executive orders issued. 
 
 The other control variable from Howell’s Unilateral Politics Model is war, 
which has a positive relationship with the number of significant executive orders 




president may be forced to make faster decisions is particularly relevant. This type of 
environment reflects the type of situation in which presidents might use unilateral 
actions as a means of acting more swiftly and efficiently without engaging in the 
legislative process with congressional leaders. Therefore, I expect a positive 
relationship between times of war and the use of critical executive orders. 
H5: Times of war are positively associated with the 
number of critical executive orders issued. 
 
Finally, I turn to differences in political dynamics among policy types: 
domestic versus foreign policy. Here, a directional hypothesis is more difficult to 
offer as it is unclear how we might expect political factors to influence foreign versus 
domestic policies. Instead, I test a null hypothesis that there is no difference in the 
factors that lead to domestic and foreign policies. The alternative hypothesis is that 
there is difference in the factors that lead to domestic and foreign policy orders. It 
may be (1) that different variables have statistical significance in the number of 
critical domestic and foreign executive orders, (2) that the coefficients on the 
independent variables have opposite signs for domestic and foreign critical executive 
orders, or (3) that the magnitude of the variables may be substantially different for the 
different policy types.  While I do not have expectations for the type of difference 
between policy types, I generally expect a Wildavsky-esque story of two presidencies 
that operate differently between domestic and foreign authorities. Furthermore, I 
generally expect more factors to play a role in domestic policy than in foreign policy, 
where the president may have more authority to engage in international relations with 




H6: Dynamics of the political context affect the number 
of critical executive orders issued differently for critical 
domestic orders versus critical foreign orders. 
 
I expect the signs on the coefficients of the original dynamics – majorities, 
new parties in the White House, and divided government – to remain the same for 
critical orders as they were for significant orders. However, we may see any of these 
factors lose statistical significance if it is the case that these dynamics play a role for 
the larger category of significant executive orders but are not as predictive when it 
comes to those orders that are most significant and most impactful. The literature also 
does not provide expectations for factors like polarization and approval, but I advance 
those hypotheses here to see if they help determine the ability to which the president 
can issue critical orders and thereby truly exercise unilateral governance to achieve 
policy change. 
With these hypotheses set, I turn to the operationalization of my variables for 
testing my hypotheses. Once I detail how I specify all of the variables in my data set, 
including my control variables, I analyze the effects of different political 
characteristics on the issuance of the most impactful executive orders. Discussion 
based on the results then follows the findings from the models. Given the results, it 
appears that presidents respond to their political context in determining the number of 
critical executive orders that they can issue. Several political dynamics seem to shape 
the president’s assessment of his or her situation and the subsequent ability to issue 
executive orders that he or she wants to be successful. Furthermore, we see some 
differences in the variables that influence the number of critical domestic versus 






 In this section, I detail model specifications, including the types of models 
used, the units of observation, and operationalization of each of my dependent and 
independent variables. As discussed in the sections that follow, I use a count model 
that allows me to directly engage with previous literature on the subject of significant 
executive orders. Recognizing some additional concerns and options for other 
models, I also explore alternatives in the appendix. The units of observation are 
president-Congress pairs that provide the opportunity to analyze presidential 
prolificacy against political context. To measure this unilateral activism, I use three 
different dependent variables: one for the total number of critical executive orders to 
test Hypotheses 1-5 and then two separate counts of critical domestic and foreign 
orders for comparing work in line with the two presidencies thesis (Hypothesis 6).  
Model Type 
 The nature of the dependent variables and previous work in this field lend 
themselves to count models. I use negative binomial regression count models because 
the variance of all three dependent variables is larger than the respective means for 
the variables, which would violate the conditions for using a Poisson count model.16 
However, a Poisson model provides nearly identical results across the models that I 
use.17 Mayer (2001) and Howell (2003) both use count models in their work, and I 
aim to respond directly to this literature. The dependent variable for the first eight 
hypotheses (Hypotheses 1-5, including subparts) is a count of the number of critical 
                                                
16 Table A4-1 of the appendix provides information on the means and variances for these variables.  
17 See Appendix Table A4-2 for results of a Poisson count model with robust standard errors that can 




executive orders issued within each of the president-Congress dyads. The dependent 
variables for the final hypothesis are counts of the number of critical domestic and 
foreign policy orders issued during these dyads.18 All models are run with robust 
standard errors. To contextualize the effects of these variables, I produce predicted 
counts to show the substantive significance of these factors. 
Observations 
The unit of analysis here is a dyad of president-Congress pairs. In general, 
these pairs go from the start of a pairing until the next election (approximately 22 
months) and from the election to the start of the next pairing (approximately 2 
months). That is, presidents will have one observation from the day they take office 
until the date of the next election and then another observation from the day after the 
election until the following January 3, when the new Congress begins. For outgoing 
presidents, whether after the first or second term, there is an additional observation 
from the start of the new Congress on January 3 until the inauguration of a new 
president on January 20. While the basic structure is similar to that employed by 
Howell, I create shorter timeframes that allow for better capturing and specifying 
different aspects of the presidential-congressional relationship over the course of 
time.19 Instead of forcing all observations into two-year periods that have some 
                                                
18 A zero-inflated model was also considered for use here since there are several dozen observations 
with 0 critical executive orders, 0 critical domestic orders, and 0 critical foreign orders. However, these 
zeroes have no systematic explanations for why we would expect zeroes in any particular observation. 
It would be possible for any president to have at least one critical order in any particular cell (since 
there are executive orders issued in every observation and significant executive orders in most 
observations) and so this model ultimately seems inappropriate.  
19 Mayer, however, uses a month as the unit of analysis so all of his observations are similar, short 
periods of time. While I use a method more similar to Howell because of the long-term nature of many 
variables (a new party in the White House, divided government, polarization across a Congress, etc.), it 




variation within them in terms of majorities, divided government, lame ducks, etc., I 
allow for these variations to exist by including some smaller units of time.20 
 As we see a difference in the literature’s approach to variables and findings, 
so too do we see a difference in the models employed and the observations used 
within those models. Mayer (1999, 2001) uses negative binomial regression models 
where the unit of observation is an individual month. He studies the number of 
significant executive orders in each month against many independent variables: 
lagged counts of significant executive orders, whether or not it is the first year of a 
new administration (that is or is not of the same party of the previous administration), 
whether or not it is the last month of an administration (that will or will not transition 
to an administration of the same party), whether or not it is a presidential election 
year for an incumbent president, whether or not we have divided government under 
particular presidents, popularity, presidential dummy variables, and some particular 
events that spurred several executive orders. Given a monthly observation, Mayer’s 
models have 756 observations (covering April 1936 to December 1999) with some 23 
primary independent variables. While it is true that some of Mayer’s variables 
                                                                                                                                      
dependent variable being a count of executive orders in that month) in order to standardize the timing 
issue. 
20 Of course, this approach is not without its drawbacks. I include a count of the number of days in 
each observation to control for these variations in time, but comparing half-month periods to 22-month 
periods may still be problematic. The longer periods also have several dynamics (like economic 
indicators) whose movement may not be captured in such large swaths of time. I therefore run one 
additional model with results available in the appendix (Table A4-5). This additional model is an OLS 
model where the dependent variable is the rate of critical executive orders issued per day (a weekly or 
monthly rate provide the same statistical significance and signs with different coefficients). This model 
then allows for easier comparisons between observations without the problem of vastly different 
lengths of time. A second additional model for comparison would be another count model similar to 
the main one used here but with shorter observations. To help better capture variation in some 
variables, I would be interested in breaking the longer observations into their component sessions of 
Congress so that the longest observation becomes just one year rather than 22 months. Such a model 





fluctuate (final months of an administration, presidential approval), many of these 
variables are more static in nature. Whether or not it is the first year of an 
administration, an election year, who the president is, and divided government do not 
change on a monthly basis. 
 Mayer and Price (2002) use some of the same variables from Mayer’s 1999 
and 2001 work, but they move to a calendar year observation. Their Poisson models 
have just 51 observations with eight independent variables. The longer observation 
period is more appropriate for many of the variables they test, including whether or 
not it is the first year of a new administration (of the last administration’s party or 
not), whether or not it is a presidential election year for an incumbent, the 
partisanship of the president, and whether or not it is a time of divided government. 
These factors are not likely to change within a calendar year, making the longer 
length of time more appropriate for the model and its specified dependent variable 
counts of significant executive orders. 
 Howell (2003) instead uses a negative binomial regression model where the 
unit of observation is an entire congressional term. The main political dynamics of 
interest are partisan majorities in Congress, legislative potential for policy change 
scores in Congress, whether or not a new party is taking control of the White House, 
whether or not we have divided government, war, the unemployment rate, and 
presidential fixed effects. Nearly all of these variables are fairly stable over the course 
of a two-year Congress. “The data are aggregated by congressional term because 
virtually all of variation in the key independent variables occurs across two-year time 




similar results as his congressional term observation. However, Howell’s two control 
variables – war and the unemployment rate – can have more movement that may not 
be adequately captured in a two-year observation. 
This approach also misses some of the movement we might expect to see like 
in lame duck periods or the first 100 days of an administration that might be more 
easily captured by Mayer (1999, 2001) or Mayer and Price (2002). Finally, because 
presidential terms and congressional terms no longer start on the same day, there is 
some overlap that is not clearly addressed in Howell’s full-Congress observation. We 
may be interested in some of these brief but overlap periods, such as the very end of 
the Carter administration. For the vast majority of his four-year term, Carter served 
with a Democratic Congress. His final two weeks, however, coincided with the 
beginning of a Republican Senate that would then carry into most of the Reagan 
administration. Those days – with quite a few lame duck orders from the outgoing 
president – comprise an interesting time period that we want to include in our 
discussion. 
 My approach, then, is constructed as somewhat of a compromise between 
these other main approaches. With independent variables that capture the size of 
congressional majorities, party changes in the White House, divided government, 
polarization, polarization under divided government, party changes in Congress, and 
presidential fixed effects, these variables tend to hold fairly steady for an entire 
Congress. In fact, some variables like polarization are explicitly based on an entire 
Congress and are not available on a smaller time scale.21 Other variables, presidential 
                                                
21 Comparing the overall mean and daily mean of the data in Table 4.1 shows that these variables 




approval and the misery index, tend to move with more frequency. War may be a 
longer-term dynamic, but it has particular start and end points that fall within longer 
observations. I also employ two variables for presidential and congressional lame 
duck periods that are particularly associated with shorter periods of time. 
To try to balance a data set that uses mostly longer-term and some shorter-
term variables, I ultimately favor the longer-term dynamics that are less likely to 
change on a month-by-month basis and then carve out some shorter periods in which 
I might theoretically expect additional activity (consistent with Mayer 1999, Mayer 
2001, and Mayer and Price 2002). The data set therefore includes dyads of varying 
lengths as described above and exemplified below. Using only long observations 
conceals some of the variation in my independent variables of interest (particularly 
presidential approval and the economy). My data also includes changes in the 107th 
Congress that would otherwise be missing if we only looked at the whole Congress 
rather than splitting the Congress into several observations. Using only shorter 
periods of time – such as Mayer’s models based on months – across the whole period 
of 1945 to 2009 would otherwise fail to recognize the stability of other important 
independent variables and lead to a repetition of some values for 24 observations at a 
time. 
To account for this irregularity and inconsistency in observation length, I 
include a count for the number of days as a control variable. This variable may not be 
sufficient for this purpose, but it is an attempt to strike balance where other work in 




(subsuming moving pieces into less meaningful averages) or unnecessarily breaks 
long-term variables apart over the course of several observations.22 
Given this structure, a president who serves one full term will have five dyads 
included in the data set. Carter, for example, has one dyad from his inauguration in 
January 1977 until the congressional midterm elections in 1978 (about 21 and a half 
months). A second dyad spans the end of the 95th Congress from the November 
election until early January 1979 (about 2 months). The third dyad then marks the 
beginning of Carter’s time with the 96th Congress in the beginning of January 1979 
until the presidential and congressional elections of 1980 (about 22 months). The 
fourth observation marks the end of Carter’s relationship with the 96th Congress from 
the November elections until the end of the 96th Congress in early January 1981 
(about 2 months). Carter’s fifth – and final – observation then spans the beginning of 
the 97th Congress until the end of his term later in January 1981 (17 days). 
Similarly, a president who serves two full terms will have nine dyads included 
in the data set. Reagan has observations that cover (1) his 1981 inauguration until the 
1982 midterm elections, (2) the midterm elections until the end of the 97th Congress 
in January 1983, (3) the beginning of the 98th Congress until the 1984 elections, and 
(4) the time period from the day after the election until the end of the 98th Congress in 
January 1985. Additional observations include (5) the beginning of the 99th Congress 
in early January 1985 until the next midterm elections in 1986, (6) from those 
elections until the end of the 99th Congress in January 1987, (7) the beginning of the 
                                                
22 Given this discussion, I believe the most appropriate alternative would be a model where the 
observation is a shorter time period of one calendar month. Allowing variation in key independent 
variables is more important and costs less than the price associated with aggregating information to 




100th Congress in January 1987 until the presidential and congressional elections in 
1988, (8) the day after those elections until the official end of the 100th Congress in 
January 1989, and (9) the start of the new Congress on January 3 until Reagan’s term 
ended two and a half weeks later on January 20. Unlike a one-term president, there is 
no need to distinguish the time from the start of a new Congress to the second 
inauguration (breaking apart the 5th observation) because it is the same president-
Congress pair before and after January 20. 
With the exception of assassinations and resignations, all presidents have the 
same set of dyads in the data set. In the case of Kennedy’s assassination and Nixon’s 
resignation, those observations end on those respective days and the next president’s 
first observation begins that same day (and Truman’s observations start the day FDR 
died). The only other exception to this pattern is an additional observation for Bush II 
because of the drastic change in the 107th Congress during his first term in office. 
With the resignation of Senator Jeffords (VT) from the Republican Party and the 
resulting change in party majorities and leadership, this change seemed too great to 
capture in just one observation from January 2001 through November 2002. Rather, 
this change in the relationship between a president and Congress seemed akin to 
relationships between new presidents or new Congresses. Bush II therefore has ten 
observations represented in the data.23 
New Dependent Variables 
                                                
23 They are (1) January 2001 to June 2001 with the Republican 107th Congress, (2) June 2001 through 
November 2002 with the Democratic 107th Congress, (3) November 2002 to January 2003 with the 
lame duck 107th Congress, (4) January 2003 to November 2004 with the 108th Congress, (5) November 
2004 to January 2005 with the lame duck 108th Congress, (6) January 2005 to November 2006 with the 
109th Congress, (7) November 2006 to January 2007 with the lame duck 109th Congress, (8) January 
2007 to November 2008 with the 110th Congress, (9) November 2008 to January 2009 with the lame 




From the list of significant executive orders that are now marked critical or 
not critical, I count the total number of critical executive orders that are issued in each 
of these president-Congress observations. These counts are the primary dependent 
variable of interest in my models. As secondary independent variables, I also employ 
counts for the number of critical domestic and foreign orders issued in each 
observation for testing the Wildavsky hypothesis that the political dynamics in which 
presidents operate affect presidential calculations differently depending on the type of 
policy. To classify each executive order as domestic or foreign policy, I use the 
coding scheme from the Policy Agendas Project, which has categorized all executive 
orders into different policy categories. From these buckets, I coded those categories 
related to the military and international relations as foreign orders and all other orders 
as domestic policy orders. I rely on the total count of critical orders for testing 
Hypotheses 1-5 in the context of how different particular environmental factors affect 
the president’s decision to issue such orders. I use the counts of critical orders by 
policy type for testing Hypothesis 6 with one count model for domestic orders and a 
separate count model for foreign orders. 
The summary statistics for the model data can be found in Table 4.1. Across 
the observations, each president-Congress dyad averages 2.32 critical orders with a 
minimum of zero critical orders and a maximum of seventeen critical orders. Among 
these critical orders, each president-Congress dyad averages 1.14 critical domestic 
orders with the remaining 1.17 orders being critical foreign orders.24 Table 4.1 also 
                                                
24 Given the negative binomial regression count models that are used here so as to draw direct 
comparisons to the literature and the nature of my observations that include some long observations 
and some very short observations, there may be concerns about discussing data averages.  While the 




presents some more summative data that takes into account the different lengths of 
the observations. 
Table 4.1: Model Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
Daily 
Mean 
New York Times stories per significant 
executive order 1.84 2.82 0 30 -- 
Critical executive orders (176) 2.32 3.19 0 17 .0076 
Critical domestic orders (87) 1.14 1.78 0 8 .0037 
Critical foreign orders (89) 1.17 1.86 0 9 .0038 
Congressional majorities 13.43 8.90 .8 35.2 13.48 
New party in the White House .20 .40 0 1 .21 
Divided government .61 .49 0 1 .59 
Polarization .60 .07 .48 .74 .60 
Polarization in divided government .37 .31 0 .74 .36 
Presidential approval 52.38 11.95 26.63 74.79 53.28 
War .57 .50 0 1 .61 
Misery index 9.70 3.98 3.28 21.8 9.55 
Length of time 306.09 297.66 17 675 -- 
Presidential lame duck .24 .43 0 1 .03 
Congressional lame duck .42 .50 0 1 .08 
New congressional majority (first time) .32 .47 0 1 .31 
Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables. The first section of the table provides 
information from the disaggregated data set on the number of stories in The New York Times that 
mentions a significant executive order within one year of issuance. From that, I identify a set of critical 
executive orders based on a threshold of 3 stories or more in the newspaper (with numbers of each 
dependent variable provided in parentheses). Statistics for those orders in the count model data set 
(aggregated up to president-Congress dyads) are provided in the second section of the table. The third 
section of the table provides summary statistics for all independent variables in the count models. 
Political Dynamics of Interest 
The political dynamics of interest are the size of congressional majorities, 
whether or not there is a new party in the White House, whether or not we have 
divided government, polarization, polarization under divided government, 
presidential approval, the economy, and war. Other aspects of political timing include 
whether we are in the final months of a presidency, whether we are in the final 
months of a Congress, whether the Congress is controlled by a new party, and the 
                                                                                                                                      
average for each variable in the data set in the final column. This statistic (which is the data’s daily 
average) provides a sense of the “true mean” of the variable and allows for comparison against the 
unweighted averages used in the model. This difference is most dramatic for lame duck variables that 




length of the observation. The summary statistics for all independent variables can 
also be found in Table 4.1. The model uses three primary independent variables from 
the literature: the average size of congressional majorities, whether or not a new party 
controls the White House immediately after opposition party control, and whether or 
not we have divided government. Congressional majorities are averaged within and 
then across chambers for each Congress. I take the average of the majority’s seats by 
percentage in each chamber and then find the mean of the two averages. This measure 
tells us generally – whether the majority is of the president’s party of not – the ability 
of majorities to get things accomplished via legislation. 
Consistent with Howell’s (2003) work, the timing variable employed here is a 
dummy variable to indicate a new party in the White House. While Howell applied 
this variable to the entire first term of a new party in the White House, Mayer (2001) 
marked the first year of a new party in control of the White House. Balancing the two 
approaches, I use a modified variable that instead only applies to the first Congress of 
a president whose party has just re-gained the White House after time out of office.25  
This model uses a divided government dichotomous variable based on 
whether the dyad was organized under unified or divided control of the White House 
and both chambers of Congress. A positive indicator of 1 signifies divided 
government (whether the opposition controlled one or both houses of Congress) while 
a 0 marks president-Congress dyads of unified government. By dividing the majority 
of the 107th Congress into two observations, one for the first five months of 
Republican control under Bush II (with therefore unified government) and the other 
                                                
25 By subdividing the variable and capturing a smaller swath of time, I move from situations of having 
eight straight years of 1s for this variable from 1977-1985 to instead just having 1977-1979 and 1981-




for the next eighteen months of Democrats controlling the Senate (and therefore 
having divided control of government), I am able to capture the movement that 
happens here. Also, Republicans held enough seats by the end of the 107th Congress 
to have re-taken control of the Senate and re-establish unified government, but this 
movement happened during the chamber’s recess, and they did not reorganize for the 
closing days of the 107th Congress. This time period therefore remains one of divided 
government. 
The other political dynamics of interest in this research include polarization, 
polarization under divided government, presidential approval ratings, the state of the 
economy, war, and other aspects of political time (presidential lame ducks, 
congressional lame ducks, and a new congressional majority). As developed by Poole 
and Rosenthal (2007, 2015), polarization is measured as the difference in mean 
Democratic and mean Republican scores on a single DW-NOMINATE axis. Each 
party’s mean ranges from zero to negative one or positive one, respectively, making 
the total range for polarization two. Here, I use the Senate’s polarization number, 
which correlates strongly with polarization in the House. This figure reflects a change 
in moderate partisans as the elected members of the two parties coalesce around 
means that move farther from each other over time. As the number for polarization 
grows, so too does the distance between the mean positions of partisans in the 
legislature. 
To determine the effects of polarization under particular arrangements of 
government (particularly divided government), I generate an interaction term equal to 




of divided government. The resultant variable is therefore equal to the level of 
polarization when government is divided and equal to zero when government is 
unified. The higher the value, the more polarization exists under divided government. 
The lower the value, the less polarization under divided government. When the value 
is at zero, we have unified government. This value helps account for situations in 
which the president faces the opposition party in the majority of at least one chamber 
and is more or less likely to be able to move members of the majority to his or her 
preferred policy items. That is, under low polarization, the president may still be able 
to move non-partisans to his or her side of a piece of legislation, but under higher 
polarization, the president finds it increasingly difficult to make inroads with non-
partisans in Congress. 
The figure given for presidential approval is an average of Gallup polling 
available for each president through the American Presidency Project within a given 
dyad. For each observation, I average all available Gallup polls available in that time 
period. For particularly short windows of time, the observation may only include one 
poll whereas longer dyads include a significantly larger number of polls. I also find 
that polls occur more frequently in later presidencies with a typical Bush II dyad 
including more polls than a typical Truman or Eisenhower dyad. 
For economic performance, I draw on the misery index as a sum of both 
unemployment figures and inflation rates.26 Because this is a sum of two negative 
economic indicators, a larger number tends to indicate more problems for the 
economy. Whether they are driven by inflation or unemployment is an unnecessary 






distinction for this measure. As the number grows, inflation and/or unemployment are 
on the rise. As the measure declines, however, the economy is getting better with 
inflation and/or unemployment shrinking. This concept is particularly enlightening 
for a discussion of presidential action and the freedom with which the president may 
move to set policy. If presidents are truly able to unilaterally shift policy whenever 
they want, we would expect no correlation between the state of the American 
economy and presidential action. If, however, we see a strong effect of an indicator 
like the misery index on presidential behavior, we can determine that presidents find 
it easier or most useful (or both) to use some of their unilateral tools at particular 
times (and likely to respond to particular circumstances). There is an external force in 
their environment that influences when and how they make decisions. 
Another external characteristic of interest is the presence of war. To 
operationalize this reality, I employ a dummy variable based on the presence of 
armed conflict involving American troops. If the U.S. is engaged in active military 
missions during the majority of the observation, I code that observation with a 1. 
Otherwise, the observation is a 0 for lack of fighting during that period. I use World 
War II, the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the War on Terror 
as periods of war in the data set. Slightly more than half of the periods are marked as 
such. 
Finally, I include a handful of timing variables in the models to further reflect 
circumstances beyond the president’s control. To reflect presidential lame ducks, I 
include a dummy variable to mark the observation from the day after an election to 




applied in the president’s last term (since all the presidents in my sample knew by the 
day after the election whether or not they would spend another four years in the 
White House). That is, a two-term president only faces this variable at the end of the 
second term. A president whose term comes to an unexpected and abrupt end 
(Kennedy and Nixon) does not have a presidential lame duck observation since the 
idea behind the variable is that presidents who know their time in office is coming to 
an end may choose to act differently than they did earlier in their administration. In 
his work, Mayer (2001) includes a dummy variable to mark the final month of a 
president’s term and distinguishes between lame duck months when the same party is 
moving into the White House and lame duck months when the incumbent’s party is 
losing the White House. 
Similarly, I am also interested in congressional lame duck sessions. These are 
periods after congressional elections before the new Congress gavels into session on 
January 3. Like presidential lame duck sessions, I employ a dummy variable here 
where 1 indicates an outgoing Congress and 0 indicates a Congress that has not yet 
been replaced. Here, the makeup of the outgoing and incoming Congress does not 
matter; it only matters that the current Congress is ending soon. Additionally, a 
second congressional timing variable indicates those times when a new Congress has 
at least one chamber controlled by a new majority from the previous Congress it is 
replacing. 
For effective comparisons, it is also necessary to account for the length of 
time covered by the dyad. For this measure, I include a count of the number of days. 




for a lame duck president), I want to note that the number of orders is different in 
those periods than dyads that are considerably longer at 675 days (from January 3 to 
the following election day). Because presidents may use this time to accomplish final 
policy objectives before leaving office or before losing legislative allies, we find 
many critical orders that occur during these unique periods of time that should not be 
folded into the dyad preceding or succeeding a lame duck session. I also include 
presidential fixed effects to account for presidents who may be more or less prone to 
issue executive orders in the first place. The data set therefore contains dummy 
variables for each president to control for different governing styles. 
 With this data set, I have the ability to run models that help reveal how 
political dynamics may affect the issuance of critical executive orders in presidential 
unilateral governance. To analyze results, I employ negative binomial regression 
count models to show how the above characteristics influence the number of critical 
executive orders.  Political environmental factors with statistical significance indicate 
ways in which the president is restricted – or at least influenced – by factors outside 
of his or her control.  
Results 
 An initial negative binomial regression model replicates Howell’s main 
independent variables for the size of the majority, administration change, and unified 
government with significant and critical orders in order to provide a baseline for 
comparison.27 Table 4.2 displays the results for both models. Among significant 
                                                
27 These baseline comparison models also include a count for days in the dyad to control for differing 
periods of time. Otherwise, the models reveal no statistical significance for any variables because 





orders, congressional majorities have the anticipated negative coefficient and 
administration change has the expected positive coefficient, both with statistical 
significance. However, we do not find the statistically significant coefficient for 
divided government with significant orders that we saw in earlier studies. The 
economy is also statistically significant here, as is the days variable. 
Looking at the same kind of simplified model for critical orders shows that the 
size of the congressional majority has a statistically significant negative coefficient at 
conventional levels and with all else constant. A partisan change in the White House 
has a positive coefficient that approaches statistical significance with a one-tailed test. 
The number of days is also instructive here for the basic critical model. At first blush, 
then, I have two observations: that presidents appear to be influenced by some of 
these political dynamics and that we see differences between the significant and 














Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Regression Models for Significant and 







Original Variables   












Expanded Variables   








Timing Variables   








N of cases 76 76 
Log likelihood -189.455 -109.577 
Pseudo-R2 .296*** .272*** 
The dependent variable in Model 1 is a count of critical executive orders within 
a president-Congress dyad. The dependent variable in Model 0 is a count of 
significant executive orders within a president-Congress dyad for comparison. 
Values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, 
**p≤.01, ***p≤.001, one-tailed (except for constant and presidential fixed 
effects). Statistics for presidential fixed effects are not presented here for space 
but can be found in Table A4.3 of the appendix. 
 
 When I move to an expanded model that also includes the variables for 
polarization, presidential approval, and other timing variables related to the political 
environment in which presidents operate, we see a change in results and a large 
increase in the explanatory power of the model. Divided government, polarization 
under divided government, the economy, presidential lame ducks, and congressional 
lame ducks all help explain the number of critical executive orders issued by 
presidents. Divided polarization and the misery index have a direct relationship with 




relationships with the number of critical orders issued by presidents. Table 4.3 
displays the results of this expanded negative binomial regression model.28 
Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regression Models for Critical and 







Original Variables   












Expanded Variables   




   Polarization under 

















Timing Variables   




















N of cases 76 76 
Log likelihood -95.851 -174.998 
Pseudo-R2 .363*** .345*** 
The dependent variable in Model 2 is a count of critical executive orders within 
a president-Congress dyad. The dependent variable in Model 3 is a count of 
significant executive orders within a president-Congress dyad for comparison. 
Values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, 
**p≤.01, ***p≤.001, one-tailed (except for constant, timing variables, and 
                                                
28 This table also provides results for a full negative binomial regression model on significant executive 





presidential fixed effects). Statistics for presidential fixed effects are not 
presented here for space but can be found in Table A4.3 of the appendix. 
 
Based on the results in this model, it does not appear that the size of the 
congressional majority (Hypothesis 1a) or a change in partisanship in controlling the 
White House (Hypothesis 1b) have an effect on the number of critical orders that a 
president issues. While both of these coefficients have the signs that we would expect 
from the hypotheses, they lack statistical significance at conventional levels. I reject 
the null hypothesis for divided government (Hypothesis 1c) with results that comport 
to other findings about the negative relationship between divided government and 
executive orders in general. The results from this model show that divided 
government leads to fewer critical executive orders with all else constant. Predicted 
counts estimate that a period with divided government will have, on average, .7 fewer 
critical executive orders. 
Polarization also appears to have no statistically significant effect on the 
number of critical orders (Hypothesis 2a) based on the results of this model, but 
separate testing of critical domestic and foreign orders below may provide an 
explanation for this finding. However, I do find a positive coefficient for polarization 
under divided government (Hypothesis 2b). Higher polarization when the president’s 
party does not control both legislative chambers tends to lead to fewer critical 
executive orders with all else equal. These results run confirm my hypotheses on the 
interaction between arrangement of government and polarization. As expected, the 
model suggests that presidents turn to orders that will prove critical more when they 




able to get the votes they need from the opposition party when legislation would 
otherwise be the preferred method of policy change. 
Why does polarization change the sign for divided government? It may be the 
case that presidents think through this combination of political dynamics differently 
than they would as the simple product of two separate parts. For the president who 
must decide how to pursue a policy change, higher polarization under unified 
government may lead the president to decide that enacting change via legislation is 
the preferred route to dispel the notion that he or she is acting extra-legally to avoid a 
tough fight with a vocal opposition. It may be harder to accomplish the policy goal 
through legislative means, but the process may be part of the president’s calculus in 
deciding how to move forward. However, when the president faces at least one 
chamber controlled by the other party and high polarization, he or she may determine 
that policy change is out of reach through the legislative process. Without a majority 
in one or both houses of Congress, the president faces a tough fight on the Hill. At the 
same time, increased polarization means that the majority opposition in the Capitol 
will be less willing to compromise and more ardent in its opposition. Therefore, the 
president may determine that policy via executive order is the easier (and only real) 
option for moving forward. Other studies of divided government have concluded that 
divided government and unified government are not different in terms of legislative 
productivity (Mayhew 1991, Binder 1999), but these studies miss periods of 
particularly high polarization that is more present today. 
There is little statistical evidence here for the role of presidential approval 




coefficient has the expected sign from the hypothesis (positive), this factor lacks 
statistical significance in the results. However, like the results for polarization, this 
result may also be explained below in the results of the different policy type models. 
I find a positive coefficient with statistical significance for my economic 
variable (Hypothesis 4). That is, as the misery index (again, inflation and 
unemployment) rises, the number of critical executive orders also raises. This 
relationship may reflect that the president is acting in response to economic concerns 
of the country as the economy struggles. Case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 exemplify 
times when presidents issue executive orders to target a troubled economy, such as 
Kennedy’s first Executive Order 10914 to provide assistance to those in need or 
Carter’s Executive Order 12188 on international trade functions. When the economy 
is in better shape with lower inflation and unemployment numbers, the president does 
not need to issue as many orders to address these kinds of problems. This factor is 
particularly enlightening for a discussion on the extent to which presidents can yield 
unilateral action of their own volition without their context determining their ability 
to act. In this case, in particular, the economy seems to create additional opportunities 
for presidents to unilaterally govern. On average, a one standard deviation increase in 
the misery index leads to an increase of more than one critical executive order per 
observation. 
The presence of war, however, does not tie a president’s hands (Hypothesis 
5). Without statistical significance for the coefficient, there is not support to believe 
that war has a consistent impact on the number of critical executive orders that 




of critical orders regardless of whether or not American troops are involved in 
conflicts around the world. However, we will see some nuance to this result in the 
policy type models that follow. 
Finally, regarding other timing variables that describe the environment in 
which the president is an actor, I find negative coefficients with statistical 
significance at conventional levels for presidential and congressional lame duck 
periods. Once the president or a Congress – regardless of the number of terms in the 
case of the former, and regardless of what party is to take the reins of government 
next in the case of the latter– is headed out of office, we see presidents issuing fewer 
critical executive orders. They tend to respond to the impending change with 
decreased unilateral activity in the closing months. In this aggregate model for all 
critical executive orders, I do not find statistical significance for the variable related 
to new partisan control of one or both chambers. However, these variables might be 
standing in for the fact that they are only used in relatively short periods of time in the 
first place.29 The presidential lame duck variable is only applied for a total of about 
two and a half months per president. The congressional lame duck variable is only 
applied for about two months per dyad. It may be the case that presidents are issuing 
fewer critical orders at these times in response to their circumstances, but it may also 
be the case – at least in part – that we see lower numbers here as a result of the fact 
that these are shorter time periods in which presidents have fewer days to be as 
prolific with their unilateral actions in the first place. Presidential and congressional 
                                                
29 I provide an additional model in the appendix (Table A4-6) that removes these additional control 
variables. When I do so, the control variable for the number of days increases in statistical 
significance. While this model is somewhat cleaner with fewer variables included, they also lose some 
of their explanatory power for the number of critical executive orders issued. I stick with my fuller 




lame duck periods are associated with average decreases of 1.8 and 3.5 critical 
executive orders with all else held constant. 
These results only shed light on part of the research question at hand. While it 
is instructive to know what factors affect critical executive orders overall, I am also 
interested to see if there is a difference in the factors that influence domestic versus 
foreign orders. Turning to the question of how critical domestic and foreign orders 
may differ (Hypothesis 6), I run negative binomial regression models where the 
dependent variable is a count of critical executive orders by policy type so that I can 
speak to the question posed by Wildavsky and others about how presidents may act 
differently (and achieve their goals differently) by domestic and foreign policy 
objectives. Using the same variables and models as my full model of critical orders, 
these policy type models produce different results, as shown in Table 4.4. 
Among critical domestic orders, six variables demonstrate statistical 
significance in the model, as detailed in Table 4.4. While the average size of 
congressional majorities (Hypothesis 1a) and administration party change (Hypothesis 
1b) continue to not hold statistical significance, I find a negative coefficient for 
divided government (Hypothesis 1c). On average, periods of divided government see 
presidents issuing one fewer critical executive order than periods of unified 
government with everything else constant. 
This model also still fails to produce a statistically significant coefficient for 
polarization (Hypothesis 2a) while producing a positive coefficient for polarization 
under divided government (Hypothesis 2b). Polarization by itself does not appear to 




polarization under times of divided government is instructive. It leads to more critical 
domestic orders when all else is held constant because presidents find themselves 
unable to get the legislative support they would need from members of the majority 
party in whatever chambers are controlled by the opposition party. With high 
polarization and another party in charge of one or both chambers, presidents must 
demonstrate more self-reliance with some of their policy goals and exercise their 
unilateral actions to make progress. 
In support of Hypothesis 3, the results show a positive relationship between 
presidential approval ratings and the number of critical domestic orders that 
presidents issue. When presidents are more popular among the public, they may be 
able to convert this approval rating into political capital that they can expend to act 
without Congress. An increase of one standard deviation in presidential approval 
leads to an average increase of about .6 critical domestic executive orders per period. 
Again, I also find evidence to support Hypothesis 4 that higher levels of inflation and 
unemployment lead to higher numbers of critical domestic orders. Here especially, it 
appears to be the case that presidents issue some of their most impactful orders 
focused on domestic policy when the economy is struggling. In this way, we can see 
some of these orders as likely responses to these problems with presidents attempting 
to use the tools at their disposal to affect the policies that will put more people back to 
work and rein in inflation rates. An increase of one standard deviation in the misery 
index leads to an increase of over .8 critical domestic executive orders, on average. 
The critical domestic order model also provides a statistically significant result for 




With an inverse relationship between war and critical domestic orders, it would 
appear that American troops involved elsewhere in the world means the president will 
be paying issuing fewer orders related to the home front. Two possible explanations 
for this trend are that presidents’ attentions are focused abroad with less consideration 
of domestic issues or that costly military engagements elsewhere leave less in the 
federal budget and public appetite for the president to be as prolific with domestic 
initiatives at the same time. Regardless, presidents seem to do less at home when they 
have troops abroad. 
Regarding other timing variables, the critical domestic model produces a 
negative coefficient for congressional lame ducks. During these times, presidents will 
tend to issue fewer critical orders related to domestic policy concerns. When 
Congress is on its way out the door, presidents are finding this opportunity less 
conducive to their critical orders for domestic issues, and so they are issuing fewer of 
them. Periods that represent a lame duck period for Congress are associated with 
nearly 1.95 fewer critical domestic orders, on average. Presidential lame duck periods 
and the beginning of a new majority party in Congress do not produce statistically 
significant coefficients that would appear to clearly shape the opportunities available 
to presidents. Given the large number of variables that have a role in predicting the 
number of critical orders for presidents, I argue that presidents are very bound in their 
actions when it comes to domestic policy prerogatives. They do not have great 
authority here to act as they might otherwise like and find limits placed on them by 
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N of cases 76 76 
Log likelihood -65.165 -70.463 
Pseudo-R2 .413*** .370*** 
The dependent variable in these models is a count of critical executive orders 
of the given policy type within a president-Congress dyad. Values are 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, **p≤.01, 
***p≤.001, one-tailed (except for constant, timing variables, and presidential 
fixed effects). Statistics for presidential fixed effects are not presented here for 
space but can be found in Table A4.4 of the appendix. 
 
However, the model for critical foreign orders produces different results. 
Again, congressional majorities and a change in partisan control of the White House 




foreign orders issued. Like the full model for critical orders and the domestic model, 
divided government (Hypothesis 1c) has an inverse relationship with the number of 
critical foreign orders that presidents issue. These results are consistent across the full 
model for critical executive orders and both policy type models, though the 
substantive significance is much smaller here than in other models. Presidents will 
tend to order only about .1 fewer critical foreign orders when they face divided 
government. 
Polarization (Hypothesis 2a) has a negative coefficient with statistical 
significance at conventional levels for critical foreign orders. As the government 
becomes more polarized, presidents issue fewer critical orders with defense or 
international implications. With these foreign orders, in particular, polarization makes 
presidents less likely to issue orders that get the most attention and have the biggest 
impacts. The ideological distance between the parties effectively constrains the 
likelihood of presidents to issue more foreign orders during these times. However, 
this result is largely driven by polarization during times of unified government. In 
evaluating Hypothesis 2b on the role of polarization under divided government, we 
see a direct relationship with critical foreign orders. Divided government lowers the 
number of critical foreign orders, and polarization lowers the number of critical 
foreign orders. But polarization under divided government tends to increase the 
number of critical foreign orders. 
From a mathematical point-of-view, this finding makes sense: a negative 
times a negative equals a positive. The dynamics, however, are interesting in practice. 




foreign orders. Similarly, we see polarization by itself leading to fewer critical foreign 
orders. These results are likely driven by cases in which we see the individual 
characteristic by itself (i.e. periods of divided government where polarization is low 
and periods of high polarization where government is unified). However, in cases 
where we see both dynamics at the same time, we see an increase in the number of 
critical foreign orders. As ideological polarization increases under divided 
government, presidents may see additional opportunities to act in setting defense or 
foreign policy. 
Presidential approval (Hypothesis 3) loses its statistical significance in the 
foreign orders model. The president’s ability to issue critical orders related to foreign 
policy does not seem affected by his or her approval ratings from the public, giving 
the president a freer hand on such issues. The economy (Hypothesis 4), on the other 
hand, maintains its negative relationship for critical foreign orders. As inflation and 
unemployment go up, we see more critical foreign orders. Specifically, an increase of 
one standard deviation in the misery index leads presidents to issuing approximately 
.6 more critical foreign orders, on average and all else constant. 
Somewhat surprisingly, war (Hypothesis 5) does not appear to have a 
relationship with the number of critical foreign orders issued by presidents. However, 
two explanations arise. First, it otherwise appears to be the case that presidents 
always have foreign policy prerogatives that they pursue regardless of the 
engagement of American troops. In some cases, some of these orders may even be 
issued to maintain international relations in the active pursuit of avoiding war. In such 




executive order may not be the tool that presidents use when it comes to war and 
armed international conflicts. Instead, we may see an increase in other presidential 
tools, including national security directives and direct orders to the Pentagon, but the 
executive order may not be the appropriate or expedient tool for presidents when 
American troops are otherwise engaged.30 While the executive order does offer the 
president expediency over legislation, this particular tool may not be the one best 
suited to these situations. And as commander-in-chief with a more clear authority 
over the military than in other types of policy issues, the president may simply not 
need executive orders to achieve military aims in war.  
Finally, I find the same negative coefficient with statistical significance for 
lame duck periods. The presidential lame duck lacks statistical significance for the 
foreign model, but this result may largely be driven by the fact that outgoing Carter 
issued several critical foreign orders in his lame duck period to deal with the hostage 
crisis in Iran. With relatively few presidential lame duck sessions in the data, one 
particularly prolific period may skew the results. Like the domestic model, 
congressional lame duck periods are inversely related to the number of critical foreign 
orders, and the number of days appears insignificant to the number of critical orders 
issued. Congressional lame duck periods see an average of 1.4 fewer critical foreign 
orders than do non-congressional lame duck observations. Again with the Carter 
example, we see an issue where the president issued several critical foreign orders 
                                                
30 Unfortunately, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, these other unilateral tools from the president on 
such subjects are not widely public or available. Time spent at a presidential library to investigate the 
communications from the Oval Office to the Pentagon to see where and when such policy-laden 




targeted at frozen Iranian assets in his last full day in office. Having a short window 
in which to operate did not limit Carter’s ability to sign several orders of importance. 
In comparing the results for the critical domestic and foreign orders models in 
Table 4.4, we see differences in the dynamics that are significant in one but not the 
other. These results provide some reason to believe that Wildavsky’s theory for two 
presidencies may still be present in the American presidency when it comes to 
unilateral tools like the executive order. I discuss these findings more in the next 
section. 
Discussion 
 The question at the heart of the dissertation is to determine what factors 
influence the ability of presidents to move policies on their own and the extent to 
which they are actually making these decisions on their own. In this section, I start to 
answer that question given these findings. These results generate some discussion 
about the environmental conditions under which presidents may sign their most 
significant executive orders. Here, I discuss the differences between Howell’s 
Unilateral Politics Model and my models for critical executive orders and what we 
learn about critical executive orders and presidential governance more broadly. 
Unlike Howell’s original work, I find no statistically significant impact for the 
size of congressional majorities or new parties in the White House when studying the 
factors that tend to influence critical executive orders. Such a finding does not, on its 
own, negate Howell’s findings. Instead, it could be that congressional majorities are 
useful in predicting counts for significant executive orders, but they do not tend to be 




types. At the level of critical executive orders, congressional majorities and 
administrative party changes do not determine the president’s ability to issue more or 
fewer of these kinds of orders. Conforming to Howell’s work and the studies of many 
others, however, we see that divided government leads to more critical executive 
orders from presidents across the board. In all three models, divided government 
appears to be a dynamic that keeps presidents from issuing more critical orders. At 
the same time, polarization under divided government leads to more critical executive 
orders in all three models and further influences the ability of presidents to use their 
unilateral tools. 
Table 4.3 also contains the results of running my full model on Howell’s 
numbers of significant executive orders. Such a model shows the ways in which 
presidents’ critical orders differ from the larger body of significant orders in terms of 
external political dynamics. In the expanded model, congressional majorities still 
have some level of impact on the number of significant executive orders issued (in the 
historically inverse direction), presidential approval is statistically significant for 
determining the number of significant executive orders (in a positive direction), and 
the number of days in a dyad is statistically significant (with a positive coefficient) 
among significant orders. 
This last factor may be one of the most telling as a difference between 
significant executive orders and critical executive orders. The number of critical 
orders (in aggregate and by policy type) appears to not be influenced by the number 
of days in the observation. Presidents can have nearly two-year periods in which they 




issue relatively high numbers of executive orders. Presidents issue the orders that 
become critical orders based on the other dynamics that shape their opportunities – or 
at least how they perceive their ability to work unilaterally within particular 
constructs – regardless of how long these periods are. For us, the amount of time is 
less instructive in the number of critical orders because we are focused on something 
that is rare and more randomly distributed in the first place. While a baseline 
assumption would be that longer observations have more critical orders because the 
president has more time to issue such orders, that assumption does not appear to be 
the case with critical orders. 
However, the number of days in an observation is still important in knowing 
how many significant executive orders will come at a given time because they are 
more plentiful across the data. Shorter periods tend to have fewer significant orders, 
and longer periods tend to have more significant orders. The length of time itself is 
significant to the number, and it appears that simply giving presidents more time 
means they will likely have more of these orders regardless of how truly impactful 
they are in gathering attention and setting or changing policy. 
Similarly, approval tells us much more about significant executive orders than 
it does critical executive orders. As presidents become more popular, they are able to 
issue more significant executive orders regardless of some other political dynamics 
they face. While this is true of presidents’ critical domestic orders, it is not true across 
the board for critical orders. Specifically, popularity seems to have very little 
correlation with the number of critical foreign orders that presidents are able to issue. 




foreign orders and some very unpopular presidents who issue high numbers of critical 
foreign orders. 
 So what do we learn in looking at the results for the numbers of critical 
executive orders in the aggregate and by policy type? Presidents are effectively 
constrained when it comes to the use of their unilateral tools. Just as Howell (2003) 
writes of presidents who issue more significant executive orders when they enjoy 
unified government because they anticipate fewer challenges from Congress and 
courts that will defer to Congress’s approval of their actions, I argue that these 
contextual dynamics give presidents clues about how their unilateral actions will be 
interpreted and accepted. When presidents want to enact substantive policy change 
via executive order, the opportunities available to them to do so depend on whether 
their co-partisans control Congress, the level of polarization (particularly when their 
co-partisans do not control Congress), the economy, and whether they or the 
Congress are lame ducks. Based on these several factors, presidents will adapt their 
strategies and actions to issue fewer or more opportunities impactful orders that set 
new directions for policy, create new programs, or allocate federal resources to tackle 
national problems. 
 We see that these external factors are particularly influential among critical 
orders that set domestic policy. Here, additional factors like presidential approval and 
war influence presidents’ ability to issue critical executive orders. Presidents need the 
backing of the people in order to sign their executive orders. In times of war, we see 
that they are likely to issue fewer critical domestic orders. This may be because they 




conflict means that they have fewer resources (particularly funding in the budget) to 
allocate to domestic initiatives at the same time. The message is one of presidents 
issuing orders based on circumstances outside of their direct control. 
Divided government, polarization, polarization under divided government, 
approval ratings, the economy, war, presidential lame ducks, and congressional lame 
ducks all have an impact on presidential critical orders in at least one of the three 
models presented here. All of these factors are therefore influences that help 
determine the president’s ability to use unilateral tools like executive orders to 
achieve significant policy change. Even with a higher bar for presidential action by 
looking at critical executive orders instead of total orders or significant orders, 
presidents’ contexts are still important and instructive. Presidents face effective limits 
from the political context in which they operate. 
 The results also provide interesting material for discussion in returning to 
Wildavsky’s question about two presidencies: one connected to domestic policy and 
another connected to foreign policy. Wildavsky’s premise was that presidents were 
more independent when it came to foreign policy because they have an informational 
advantage, are recognized as the chief diplomat and negotiator of the country to deal 
with foreign affairs, have the authority as commander-in-chief, and could move with 
more speed and efficiency on matters often demanding quick responses. Do the 
results from the separate policy type models provide any indication that Wildavsky’s 
thesis still holds true and that political dynamics affect presidents differently in terms 




 The critical domestic order model identifies six variables that have (or 
approach) statistical significance in predicting the number of critical executive orders 
that presidents will issue. These eight variables are de facto limitations to presidential 
action because they help shape the ability of the president to be successful in using 
tools that will have a greater impact. However, the critical foreign model only 
identifies five such variables that influence the number of critical executive orders 
that a president issues. The variable that loses its statistical significance (presidential 
approval) is a characteristic that no longer determines and predicts the president’s 
ability to issue critical orders related to foreign policy. These restrictions do not 
encumber a president dealing with international priorities in the same way that they 
influence the president’s ability to move on domestic policy concerns. At the same 
time, polarization gains statistical significance in the critical foreign order model that 
it did not have in the critical domestic order. 
Three variables from the model demonstrated null results in the aggregate 
model but have statistical significance in one of the policy models. Approval (with a 
positive coefficient) and war (with a negative coefficient) are both statistically 
significant in the critical domestic order model. Polarization is statistically significant 
(with a negative coefficient) in the critical foreign order model. However, a lack of 
statistical significance in the complimentary policy type model means that the effects 
are obscured in the aggregate model. Among these, the coefficients for polarization 
and war have opposite signs between the two policy type models. While each variable 




models helps explain why these factors may lack statistical significance for the 
aggregated model. 
There are four dynamics (divided government, polarization under divided 
government, the economy, and congressional lame ducks) that hold statistical 
significance in their relationships with critical executive orders across all three 
models. There are three more factors (polarization, approval, and war) that prove 
instructive in some of the policy models but not in both policy models and therefore 
are not significant in the aggregate model, but these are three more variables that help 
us better understand the cases in which presidents want to shape policy without 
legislation from Congress. Additionally, there is one factor (presidential lame ducks) 
that lacks statistical significance in either policy type model but holds statistical 
significance in the aggregate model. These are factors that help us better understand 
when presidents make their mark on the political process and achieve policy impacts 
with executive orders and unilateral governance more broadly. 
In the chapters that follow, I provide a qualitative analysis of some critical 
executive orders issued by presidents that help bring to life these political 
circumstances under which presidents operated and issued critical executive orders. 
To demonstrate some of the findings in this chapter, I turn to some of the periods in 
which presidents issued relatively high numbers of critical domestic and foreign 
orders and illustrate how the contextual factors from their administrations helped 
justify unilateral governance. In Chapter 5, I assess how we observe these findings in 




present the case for observing these findings in action in the critical foreign orders of 




Chapter 5: Critical Domestic Orders 
Wildavsky wrote that “[t]he United States has one President, but it has two 
presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs, and the other is concerned with 
defence and foreign policy” (448). This conclusion is based on the fact that presidents 
are less constrained by Congress and the public when it comes to making and leading 
foreign policy because the president can act quickly, historically has better 
information than Congress and the public, and does not compete with as many 
interest groups who set the foreign policy agenda. Canes-Wrone (2006) similarly 
finds presidents enjoy different levels of success based on their ability to raise 
salience and lead the public for domestic versus foreign policy issues. My findings in 
the previous chapter support the notion that presidents are differently abled when 
trying to influence foreign versus domestic policy. A great many factors effectively 
constrain chief executives in the realm of domestic policy opportunities, and political 
context itself explains less about the number of orders that presidents issue when it 
comes to their foreign policy objectives. 
 This chapter explores the factors that lead to larger numbers of critical 
domestic orders as presidents assess their respective political contexts and find the 
room to engage in unilateral actions. These are not theoretical chapters but rather 
serve as illustrations of the political dynamics highlighted in the quantitative 
empirical analysis. I demonstrate the influence of the political context with 
illustrations of John F. Kennedy (during the 87th Congress, 1961-1963) and George 
W. Bush (during the 107th Congress, 2001-2003). Though separated by four decades 




reveal a glimpse of how and when these factors can matter. I have chosen these two 
cases as examples of periods that have relatively high numbers of critical domestic 
orders.31 
John F. Kennedy and the 87th Congress 
 Kennedy moved to the White House after a razor-thin win in the 1960 
Election. The most dominant issues of that contentious campaign were the economy, 
the ongoing Cold War, and civil rights (DeGregorio 1993). With his election, 
Kennedy came to office at such a time that the political dynamics provided the 
opportunities for him to be quite prolific, particularly during the 87th Congress. 
During that time, Kennedy issued eight critical domestic orders that spoke to many of 
these issues.32 Eight such orders is well above average for critical domestic orders 
issued by a president and presents a rich opportunity to look at how factors aligned 
for Kennedy to take action. 
 The Kennedy administration represented a partisan change in the White House 
with the defeat of Republican Eisenhower’s Vice President Nixon. While Democrats 
had controlled both houses of Congress for the preceding six years, they had been out 
of power in the Executive branch. Kennedy’s election ushered in unified government 
with Democrats controlling both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue for the new president 
to address national problems. With such unity, the president could sign more 
                                                
31 I only include examples of time periods with relatively high numbers of critical executive orders in 
this chapter and the next chapter to show how related political dynamics encourage presidents to issue 
such orders. It may additionally be interesting to choose a case with few (or no) critical executive 
orders to similarly show how the political dynamics discouraged unilateral action. 
32 During this same time period, Kennedy also issued three critical foreign/defense orders. Just a month 
and a half into office, he issued Executive Order 10924 to create the Peace Corps. In July 1961, he 
issued Executive Order 10952 to provide the Secretary of Defense with authority to provide for the 
civil defense of Americans during the Cold War. In April 1952, he issued Executive Order 11016 for 




executive orders with the expectation that the legislature would back him up and 
codify laws when most needed. With Democrats retaking the White House and 
having unified government, it is not surprising that Kennedy signed several critical 
domestic orders during his first two years in office. The young president likely saw 
the opportunity to be able to move quickly with a Congress that could pass similar 
legislation for support. By Howell’s argument, Kennedy would find his chance to act 
by unilateral action relatively safe because a court hearing a challenge to Kennedy’s 
executive orders would evaluate such actions against the will of the Congress, which 
would likely be supportive of their own party’s leader. Having a powerful former 
senator as Kennedy’s vice president may have helped further present that image of a 
Congress that would support the administration. 
 Kennedy also enjoyed high approval ratings during his first Congress. Gallup 
averages show the new president enjoying approval ratings of 72% in his first weeks 
in office, and he peaked at 83% in late April and early May of 1961. In fact, 
Kennedy’s Gallup approval rating did not dip into the 60s until late June and early 
July of 1962, more than a year and a half into his first term. By the time of the 1962 
Midterm Elections, the young and charismatic president did not see approval ratings 
below 60%. Figure 5.1 tracks these approval ratings over the course of the Kennedy 
administration and shows the popularity the president enjoyed. He may have seen this 
approval and support from the public as a license to continue on his path of making 
the changes he believed were needed. This was also a productive Congress, according 




engaging in some unilateral policy making at the same time with the support of the 
public (Grant and Kelly 2008). 
Figure 5.1: Kennedy Approval Ratings from Gallup Averages 
Kennedy approval rating. Image from American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara. 
 
Kennedy remained very popular throughout his short term in office. The 
levels of support he enjoyed during his tenure were well above the data set average 
and seem difficult to fathom today. His average approval rating during the period 
from the start of his administration until the 1962 Elections was 73.4%, providing the 
president with a great deal of credit to expend while in office. While some of this 
capital surely went to his legislative efforts, it also may have proven useful to him as 
a resource he could tap in using his unilateral tools as well. 
 Finally, Kennedy took office among a time of economic torpor. While 
inflation and unemployment had remained relatively low during the first term of the 




When Kennedy took office, the misery index rating was 8.31, below the data set 
average of 9.733 but relatively high at the time. As evidenced by the first executive 
order Kennedy signed when he became president, the economy also may have 
provided the setting in which he could act without Congress immediately to affect 
some policy change. 
 With all of these factors, Kennedy was able to sign 146 total executive orders 
during the 87th Congress. Among these, 68 orders were significant orders, and eleven 
of those orders were critical orders. Retaking the White House from the Republicans 
to achieve unified government, high presidential approval ratings, and a sluggish 
economy, all provided a context in which Kennedy could sign several orders of 
significant importance. 
 By comparison, during the rest of the 87th Congress (from the time of the 1962 
Elections until the start of the 88th Congress), Kennedy had a congressional lame 
duck, in which presidents tend to issue fewer critical orders.34 By the 88th Congress, 
Kennedy’s approval rating consistently fell for the rest of his time in office (after 
spiking around the midterm elections). A slightly improving economy over the 
following months similarly may have provided him fewer opportunities to create 
policy change on his own. During the lame duck session of the 87th Congress, 
Kennedy issued just one critical (domestic) order. 
What orders did Kennedy sign his name to during the 87th Congress? 
Consistent with his campaign pledge to “get America moving again,” Kennedy 
                                                
33 The data set average is skewed up because of high levels of inflation and unemployment in 1948, 
1951, and 1973-1985. 
34 This relationship may also be related to the fact that all lame duck periods are, by design, shorter 
observations that last no more than two months. Though the variable for observation length is not 




sought to provide relief to citizens who were affected by the sluggish economy. On 
the morning of his first full day in office, he signed Executive Order 10914 (his first) 
to provide for an expanded food distribution program to families in need. Citing 
authority first given the president during the Great Depression, this Executive Order 
expanded food programs within the Department of Agriculture to include more 
Americans and provide a wider array of foods that provided a more nutritional diet to 
those recipients. The order helped establish the perception that in its earliest hours, 
“the White House was bustling with action ... as the new President took over” 
(Lawrence 1961). 
At his first press conference on January 25, 1961, the press corps asked 
President Kennedy about the state of the economy and the assistance that some 
families required. They recognized a need for help and acknowledged his executive 
order of days earlier to do just that. In answering a question about helping those in 
need, Kennedy indicated that he would be sending “a message to the Congress right 
after the State of the Union address [scheduled for the following week] on what steps 
we think the Government could profitably take to provide protection for the 
unemployed and also to stimulate the economy” (New York Times 1961). We see, 
then, that Executive Order 10914 was a more immediate way to provide relief to 
unemployed families until the White House could provide legislative 
recommendations for the 87th Congress’s consideration in the coming days. In this 
light, Executive Order 10914 was not an effort to subvert a recalcitrant Congress but 




Executive Orders 10919 and 10921 established boards and panels to settle 
problems between airline companies (including Pan American Airways) and airline 
employees. Similar executive orders were common in the 1940s and 1950s to resolve 
disputes between the transportation industries (air, trains, and water) and their 
employees, but similar orders did not gather as many New York Times stories as these 
two particular orders. During a time of economic stagnation that brought about 
tensions in the transportation industry, the new president acted quickly to avoid 
strikes while solutions to management-labor disputes could be found. 
 Executive Order 10925, signed in early March of 1961, created the President’s 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity to address race-based employment 
practices with government contractors. This Executive Order was a precursor to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and revoked four different Eisenhower 
executive orders.35 With still fewer than two months in office at the time he signed 
this order, EO 10925 serves as an example of a president who steps in to quickly and 
effectively address an issue and change practices from previous presidents. More than 
two years later, Kennedy would amend the order, and Johnson also amended it in the 
summer of 1964. Not until the fall of 1965 did Johnson sign another executive order 
to abolish the committee once the order’s provisions had otherwise been codified into 
law via legislation. Once again, then, this particular executive order also served as a 
first step toward more permanent legislation. 
 Kennedy signed Executive Order 10934 in April of 1961 to create an 
administrative conference for the federal departments and agencies of the United 
                                                
35 Executive Order 10925 revoked Executive Order 10479 (August 13, 1953), Executive Order 10482 





States government. This order aimed to enhance and improve government 
regulations. Kennedy likely saw this as an opportunity to reshape the government and 
increase efficiency and efficacy under the new administration with a unified 
government behind it. 
 In May, Kennedy signed Executive Order 10940 to organize the President’s 
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime. The executive order created 
two bodies. The first group was a committee comprised of representatives from the 
Departments of Justice; Labor; Health, Education, and Welfare; and representatives 
of the Judicial branch to coordinate information and programs from among these 
different agencies, find ways to improve related programs, collaborate across 
different levels of government and stake holders, and find ways to more effectively 
handle problems related to youth crime and incarceration. The second group was a 
council of experts and citizens related to the field for providing testimony and advice 
to the committee. This program, which was later revoked through executive order by 
Nixon, reflects a program that comes from trying to find new ways to address 
problems related to the economy and the unrest taking place across the country. 
  Just before his one-year anniversary in office, Kennedy signed Executive 
Order 10988 to encourage employee-management cooperation within the federal 
government. The Executive Order provided rights for federal employees to form 
unions or similar employee organizations and protect them in doing so. Again, the 
new president had the opportunity to reshape aspects of the federal government that 




 Finally, Kennedy signed Executive Order 11053 at the end of September 
1962. This order targeted “unlawful obstructions of justice in the State of 
Mississippi” in conjunction with the enrollment of James Meredith as the first African 
American student at the University of Mississippi. The Supreme Court had handed 
down its decision to desegregate schools in the Brown v. Board of Education decision 
more than eight years earlier, and the fight for civil rights was being fought all over 
the country. When Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett and Lieutenant Governor Paul 
Johnson refused to follow court orders by a U.S. district court and then the appellate 
court, Kennedy sought to involve the Executive branch of the government. The order 
granted authority to the Secretary of Defense – and through him the Secretaries of the 
Army and Air Force – to call up the Mississippi Army and Air Force National Guards 
to escort and protect Meredith in registering at the school and attending classes.  
 This case shows how a president used the executive order to move quickly 
when a legislative approach may have taken too much time. The University of 
Mississippi rejected Meredith twice before filing suit based on his military service 
and exemplary marks from years of study at another institution. Without protection 
for Meredith, chaos broke out on campus with angry white rioters destroying the city 
of Oxford and the university campus. After the Kennedy administration – through 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy – had numerous conversations with Barnett, Order 
11053 allowed the President to step in and start to bring order back to the state while 
also fulfilling the order of the appellate courts to admit Meredith. Asking Congress to 
pass a similar resolution may have taken more time than needed at the point that 




context of the civil rights battles flaring up across the country, this situation was a 
locus of activity that drew the nation’s attention and provided a crisis to which 
Kennedy could respond with swift and unilateral action. 
 All of these orders reflect circumstances under which the president could react 
to events and take action where he saw fit because of the political context in which he 
was operating. With a divided government, Kennedy may not have had the cover he 
needed for protecting civil rights with the Equal Employment Opportunity committee 
and the enrollment of black students in the South or protecting the labor rights of 
federal employees. Without strong approval numbers on which he could rely, he may 
not have been able to effectively step in to sort out problems between airline carriers 
and their employees or calling together conferences to improve efficiency of the 
government. Without economic struggles, there would have been less need for him to 
ensure food assistance to Americans being left behind in a stagnant economy or 
address issues of juvenile delinquency and crime. These orders reflect instances when 
the White House wanted to address policy changes more quickly than it might have 
otherwise been able to legislate policy changes, though Kennedy’s Democrats held 
the majority in both houses of Congress as well. Instead, the president could react to a 
situation more quickly to bring attention and resources to address a given problem. In 
some of these cases, Kennedy was leading the way on new policy, and in others, 
Kennedy was responding to the situations presented to him within his given context. 
George W. Bush and the 107th Congress 
 George W. Bush shares many similarities with Kennedy. Like Kennedy, Bush 




taking office, Republican Bush took over the federal reins from the other party, 
though Republicans had already controlled Congress for the six preceding years. 
However, the 107th Congress that started in 2001 was a peculiar Congress in its own 
right. A look at this relationship will shed additional light on just how important the 
president’s governing circumstances are on his or her ability to wield power through 
unilateral tools. 
 The 107th Congress gaveled into session in early January 2001 with 50 
Democrats and 50 Republicans. Outgoing Vice President Al Gore, who had just lost 
the previous year’s election to succeed Bill Clinton, cast the organizational tie-
breaking vote in favor of the Democrats, but this control was short-lived. When Bush 
took office a few weeks later, the new Vice President Dick Cheney changed the 
balance of the chamber and thereby locked in unified government for the fledgling 
Bush administration. In the months that followed, Democrats looked for Republicans 
they could persuade to cross the aisle and change parties. They found their senator – 
and the opportunity to persuade him – in Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont. Jeffords 
continuously clashed with his party as it became more conservative in Washington. 
He also clashed with the new administration and left the party based on 
disagreements over the new president’s tax cuts in late May of 2001. 
With his decision to leave the Republican Conference and instead serve as an 
independent senator who would caucus with Democrats, Jeffords single-handedly 
switched the balance of power in the Senate and lost Bush his unified government. 
While Republicans regained a majority of the Senate at the end of 2002, the chamber 




108th Congress. The 107th Senate was therefore a Democratic Senate for just two and 
a half weeks, followed by a Republican Senate for some four and a half months, 
followed by a Democratic Senate again for the next nineteen months. The House was 
Republican during this entire time. 
This case study will focus on Bush’s relationship with the four-month 
Republican majority 107th Congress. It provides an interesting example of how 
political dynamics shape the opportunities available to a president. While Bush’s 
congressional Republican majorities were slim in his first months in office, they gave 
him an edge in the policy process. 
Bush also enjoyed relatively supportive approval ratings during these first 
months in office. Gallup averages show his approval resting comfortably in the high 
50s and low 60s for most of these first months. Not until Jeffords left the party and 
attention was drawn to the new administration’s policymaking through bad press did 
Bush’s approval numbers consistently slip into the low and mid 50s for much of the 
summer. Of course, history would see his numbers surge after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 and slowly fall off by the time he left office in 2009. While Bush 
eventually left office with divided government and low approval ratings in the high 
20s and low 30s, such was not the case in his first months as president. Figure 5.2 












Figure 5.2: Bush II Approval Ratings from Gallup Averages 
 
Bush II approval rating. Image from American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara. 
 
During this initial period, the United States was also not at war. While this 
would change for the next part of Bush’s time with the 107th Congress, it was not the 
case in his first months in office. Therefore, Bush did not have international events 
that would pull his attention from domestic issues at hand or limit his ability to 
unilaterally govern due to budgetary constraints. He could instead focus on domestic 
policies that he wanted to change with unilateral action. 
During Bush’s honeymoon phase with the country and the 107th Congress, he 
issued eighteen total executive orders. Of these orders issued in just his first four and 
a half months, eight orders were significant, and five of them were critical. All five of 
these orders were domestic orders in which the President set policy with the stroke of 




nineteen months of the 107th Congress. Of those orders, two were foreign or defense-
related orders in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. In the next six years that 
Bush spent in the White House, he only issued an additional four critical executive 
orders as Republicans lost control of the Congress, the president’s approval ratings 
eventually fell, and war dominated his administration and focus. 
Just a few weeks into office, Bush signed Executive Orders 13201 and 13202. 
The former required notifications to employees about their rights to not join unions or 
pay union dues and provided provisions for the Department of Labor to enforce such 
regulations. The latter removed preferential treatment of the government in granting 
contracts and awards to those contractors who only used unionized workforces. 
Additionally, Bush signed Executive Order 13205 in early March of 2001 to create an 
investigatory board to mediate a dispute between Northwest Airlines and its aircraft 
mechanics union just days before union members otherwise walked off the job. The 
President’s board sided with the airline company. Together, these executive orders 
represented hits to labor unions and workers’ rights in the beginning of the Bush 
administration. 
Many observers believed that Bush was seeking political retribution for the 
lack of union support seen during the 2000 campaign with many national unions 
backing Democratic Gore and failing to support Republican Bush (Greenhouse 2001). 
One New York Times story noted that the Senate had rejected the paycheck measure 
as an amendment to a bill with several Republicans in either chamber owing their 
elections to union groups. “Some of the president’s actions have upset some 




voice fears that organized labor might grow so angry at the Republicans that unions 
might back their Democratic opponents in 2002” (Greenhouse 2001). In early March, 
several Republican legislators in the House sent a letter to Bush “to protest his 
executive orders barring [this] type of agreement on federally financed building 
projects,” the objective of Executive Order 13202 (Greenhouse 2001). Though Bush 
enjoyed unified government at this time, members of his party believed it would hurt 
their re-election chances and lead to unions supporting more Democratic challengers 
in the 2002 Midterm Elections if they supported such actions. In that case, the 
President saw the opportunity to still accomplish his goals by simply circumventing 
the Congress. These early executive orders are examples of a president subverting a 
recalcitrant Congress that had considered but not passed some of his policy 
objectives. 
Notably, Orders 13201 and 13202 revoked executive orders that had been 
issued in the opening weeks of the Clinton administration, and both were later 
revoked in the first weeks of the Obama administration.36 In all three administrations, 
the respective presidents moved fairly quickly to issue these actions as executive 
orders even though they had unified governments with their respective co-partisans in 
control of both houses of Congress. Still, they moved these policies via executive 
order. In Bush’s case, he lacked the support of those co-partisans because some of 
them relied on union support in their own elections regardless of union support for the 
president. In the cases of Clinton and Obama, they may have had alternative reasons 
to move these policies by executive order rather than legislation. 
                                                
36 Executive Order 13201 repealed Executive Order 12836 (of February 1, 1993) and was later 
repealed by Executive Order 13496 (of January 30, 2009). Executive Order 13202 repealed Executive 




In May of his first year in office, Bush signed Executive Orders 13211 and 
13212, both related to energy. Order 13211 required reports to be written and 
submitted by agencies engaging in any regulation or rule making related to 
“significant energy actions.” If an agency was going to write or finalize rules that 
would affect the supply, distribution, or use of the nation’s energy supply, they would 
first be required to write a report in which they detailed the effects of said regulations 
for analysis by the Office of Management and Budget. Order 13212 prioritized 
federal projects that would increase the production, transmission, and storage of 
energy for future use. In so doing, Bush sought to develop strategies for growing and 
protecting the American energy supply. With these two actions both taken on the 
same day, Bush – a former oil businessman – sought to shape energy policy by 
unilateral action. 
Stories that discussed the issuance of these orders reference an element of 
timing to explain why Bush used executive orders to change these policies. Much of 
the language for Order 13212 is similar to language provided by the American Gas 
Association, whose leaders “were thrilled to learn that their proposed legislation had 
been adopted by the president as an executive order, bypassing the much more time-
consuming process of trying to get the provision passed as part of the energy bill 
being considered by the Senate” (Natta 2002). Jehl (2001) notes that the president 
sought to circumvent the actions of a Congress that might otherwise not give him the 
policies he wanted for exploring oil reserves in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge (ANWR).  He also wrote about Bush wanting to signal a change in policy 




administration when it comes to environmental impacts and concerns, a policy change 
that the President would want to announce loudly while directing his government to 
take appropriate steps for implementing such policy. 
At the same time, Natta and Banerjee (2002) wrote about how Bush may have 
used the executive order to refocus federal agency attention on regulations already in 
law but not enforced. If this is the case, Bush may not have seen the need for a 
duplicative law but would see the ability to help reshape – or at least reassert – energy 
policy by simply drawing attention to it once again. In such a case, the executive 
order would serve as an agenda-setting tool with which the president can encourage 
the bureaucracy to reorganize priorities. In this way, these energy orders also may 
have been useful to Bush as opportunities to do some messaging to federal agencies 
and the rest of the country. Sanger (2001) notes that the President announced these 
orders at renewable energy facilities and insisting that we could be stewards of the 
energy supply and the environment at the same time. “Perhaps mindful of the polls 
that show many Americans worrying that his administration is too attuned to the 
desires of the oil and gas industries from which several cabinet members have sprung, 
he has waxed on about the wonders of renewable energy” (Sanger 2001). 
In some of these executive orders, then, we may see several different reasons 
why Bush chose to employ some of his unilateral tools rather than accomplishing 
policy change through other modes. We see some indication of a timing element in 
which the president wanted to be able to move quickly without waiting for the many 
stages of the legislative process. We see evidence of the president wanting to bypass 




still wanted to influence policy related to unions and energy production. We see 
opportunities for the president to establish himself as a messenger using policy 
positions to draw attention to particular issues and existing laws. In these particular 
cases, Bush created the appearance of being more environmentally friendly with an 
emphasis on renewable energy while creating policies very similar to those requested 
by the gas and petroleum industries. 
 These case studies provide insight into how political dynamics shape 
opportunities for presidents to use their unilateral tools. We see in a case like Bush 
with the 107th Congress how starkly unilateral prolificacy can change when the 
president’s circumstances change. Bush had five critical orders in just the first four 
and a half months of his presidency. When he lost control of the Senate, however, he 
was only able to produce another five critical orders for the rest of the 107th Congress. 
 Unlike the full model for critical executive orders, we see a role for 
presidential approval ratings when it comes to domestic policy orders. Kennedy and 
Bush both enjoyed some favorable approval ratings that they were able to use in order 
to issue higher numbers of critical domestic orders. Presidents tend to like their odds 
of being able to issue such orders. When they have the support of the public and with 
other factors in place, presidents are more likely to issue unilateral orders. And unlike 
the updated model for significant executive orders, we do not see a role for 
congressional majorities in these models. Kennedy enjoyed large congressional 
majorities, and Bush enjoyed narrow congressional majorities. Still, each was able to 
be quite prolific and successful with critical domestic orders in their respective times. 




observation. While Kennedy’s observation is quite long (at nearly two years) and 
Bush’s observation is relatively short (at just four and a half months), but both 
presidents found a way to be successful with their unilateral actions. Bush’s period, 
while short, still contains more critical domestic orders than many other periods that 
are longer because the political dynamics gave Bush the opportunity to try his hand at 
unilateral action while his party controlled Congress. When Jeffords switched parties 
and took Republican control from the Senate, he narrowed Bush’s opportunities to be 
as successful with critical orders. Bush, seeing that change in his political context, 
responded appropriately. 
The circumstances in which presidents operate shape the opportunities 
available to presidents and influence their use of unilateral powers by coloring the 
president’s assessment of his or her political context. In this chapter, I laid out the 
factors that have such an impact on critical domestic orders with some illustrative 
case studies that demonstrate the model’s findings. In the next chapter, I will lay out 
similar case studies for factors that influence the numbers of critical foreign orders 
that presidents issue. Based on the results of the policy type models, I provide some 
narrative about the effective constraints under which presidents can single-handedly 





Chapter 6: Critical Foreign Orders 
 
 In this chapter, I turn to my chosen case studies of foreign critical orders 
issued by presidents to provide snapshots of how political dynamics influence the 
actions of presidents when it comes to demonstrating unilateral actions. It appears 
from the results that presidents’ political contexts affect them differently in their use 
of unilateral actions when it comes to their domestic and foreign policy interests. 
Consistent with Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, we see that presidents may have 
slightly more control in turning to their executive orders whenever they want to 
achieve foreign or defense-related objectives. Though unified government and the 
misery index are still significant, the other variables that factor into presidents’ 
domestic critical orders do not appear as relevant to the issuance of foreign critical 
orders. Polarization, on the other hand, becomes more significant when it comes to 
how presidents evaluate their circumstances and choose to issue such orders. 
 To highlight these policy type differences in this chapter, I provide four case 
studies. Again, these examples were chosen as times for which we see a relatively 
high number of critical foreign orders from presidents. First, I discuss the case of 
President Truman and the 82nd Congress from 1951 to 1952. During this time period, 
Truman saw an economy slightly better than average across the series with low 
polarization and low approval ratings as the country tired of the presence of war in 
their lives. Second, I detail the circumstances of President Eisenhower and the 83rd 
Congress. Like Truman, Eisenhower had unified government in the years 1953 to 
1954. These first years of the Eisenhower administration also enjoyed a good 




ratings across this time period than did Truman. Third, I provide observations about 
President Carter and the 96th Congress from 1979 to 1980. Here, we see a president 
with unified government, a bad economy, higher polarization, and very low approval 
ratings. Still, he was able to issue a relatively high number of foreign critical orders 
during that period. Finally, I look at the very brief overlap of the Carter 
administration and the 97th Congress to show how, in the face of crisis with the 
Iranian hostage situation, the outgoing president was able to issue several critical 
foreign orders on his last days in office. I conclude with discussion about what we 
may learn from these cases. 
Harry S Truman and the 82nd Congress 
 President Truman was re-elected in the close Election of 1948 to the position 
he had inherited. His second term represented a fifth straight term for Democrats in 
the White House, and many expected the incumbent president to lose. Newspapers 
famously reported “Dewey Defeats Truman” before the counting concluded, and even 
the President was surprised to wake up the next morning and learn that his time in the 
White House was extended for at least another four years. This election included 
southern Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond, who won four southern states in the election. 
Truman did not decide to not seek a third term in office until the spring of 1952 so the 
82nd Congress was the last full Congress with which he served.37 
 Truman’s co-partisan Democrats, who were only entering their third year of 
control of both chambers after Republicans briefly held majorities in the 80th 
Congress, controlled the 82nd Congress from 1951 to 1953. Democrats held slim 
                                                
37 The Twenty-Second Amendment stipulating term limits for presidents did not apply to the current 
president. Truman was, therefore, the last president who could have run for a third term after already 




margins during this Congress, especially in the Senate. Of 96 seats, Democrats only 
controlled a maximum of 50 at one time, otherwise tending to hold just 47 or 48 of 
the seats. The lame duck 82nd Congress actually had a Republican majority, though 
the Senate never reorganized. The second session of the Congress had instead ended 
in July of 1952 and never reconvened. While Truman’s party had the advantage, it 
was a tenuous majority. 
 During the course of the 82nd Congress, the U.S. economy fluctuated greatly. 
In the initial months of the new Congress, the misery index reached a high of 12.76% 
inflation and unemployment. In fact, the average misery index for the year 1951 was 
11.17%, above the data set’s average. During 1952, however, the average misery 
index dropped to an average 5.31%, thereby lowering the overall average for the two 
years of the 82nd Congress. The average for the Truman-82nd Congress from January 
of 1951 until November 1952 is therefore 8.65%. We see that many of Truman’s 
critical foreign orders for this period are actually issued in 1951 when the misery 
index was higher with inflation being particularly problematic at the time. 
 The country also experienced low levels of polarization with the end of World 
War II. The relative ideological proximity of the parties in Congress matched the 
relatively narrow majorities held by the Democrats at the time. Thurmond and the 
southern Dixiecrats represent the looser ideological consistency of the parties in 
Congress during this era. With liberal Republicans, particularly in the Northeast, and 
conservative Democrats in the South, there was great overlap in the parties and their 




 In addition to low polarization, Truman also saw what would become his final 
two years in office as a period of low approval ratings from the country. The vast 
majority of Truman’s second term saw approval ratings below 50%. By October of 
1949 (not even a year into his second term), they dipped below 50% and never 
recovered. In the second half of his second term, his numbers were particularly bad. 
In early February of 1951, his average approval stood at just 25%. From there, he 
waffled in the 20s for much of the rest of his administration, only breaking back into 
the low 30s in his final weeks in office. The average approval rating during this 
period of his presidency was 26.63%. These numbers may reflect at least part of why 
he chose to not seek a third term in the White House and instead sought retirement 
back in Missouri. Figure 6.1 shows Truman’s approval rating over time. 
Figure 6.1: Truman Approval Ratings from Gallup Averages 
 





 All together, then, we see Truman with unified government and a somewhat 
high misery index score during his final two years in office. He also enjoyed low 
polarization but suffered from low approval ratings, both characteristics that would 
tend to lead to lower numbers of critical domestic orders. However, Truman issued 
seven critical foreign orders during most of the 82nd Congress. Descriptions of these 
critical foreign orders and the political context in which they were issued follows. 
 In the opening days of the 82nd Congress, Truman issued Executive Order 
10202 to amend the Selective Service program. He would do so again with Executive 
Order 10230 just two and a half months later. Both orders affected who could register 
for the selective service and how to do so, and these regulations defined people with 
exemptions and penalties for not registering at the appropriate time. When Truman 
signed these orders, the United States and countries around the world were still 
deliberating the end of World War II and simultaneously seeing combat take place in 
Korea. It would be September and October of 1951 when the United States signed 
final peace treaties to officially declare an end to hostilities with Japan in the Pacific 
and Germany in Europe, respectively.  In the meantime, troop placements were 
maintained in Japan and parts of Europe with increasing numbers of troops also sent 
to the Korean peninsula. In these cases, Truman found it necessary to employ 
executive orders based on his role as commander-in-chief to affect the supply and 
preparedness of troops. 
 Among these two orders in particular, Order 10202 drew enough attention 
from Truman and other presidents to warrant amendments by 14 future executive 




an additional two orders that amended Order 10202. Kennedy and Johnson similarly 
managed two amendments each during their combined eight years in office, and 
Nixon then issued five more executive orders that would amend parts of Order 10202 
before Reagan finally revoked it with Executive Order 12553 in 1986. Truman also 
amended Executive Order 10230 with one future executive order before Reagan also 
revoked it with Executive Order 12553. 
Later in January of 1951, Truman issued Executive Order 10207 to create the 
President’s Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. This body was 
responsible for prescribing ways in which the federal government could avoid and 
deter acts of treason, sabotage, or espionage against the country and its citizens while 
simultaneously ensuring the protection of people’s constitutional rights. The intent 
behind this order appears rooted in the emerging Cold War that followed the 
conclusion of World War II as the U.S. and its communist former allies began 
viewing each other with great suspicion and prepared for decades of continued 
tensions. Congress addressed its concerns with communism and espionage at the 
same time under the leadership of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-
American Activities Committee. Such concerns were prescient at the times with spies 
like the Rosenbergs being convicted and sentenced to death just two months after this 
order for espionage.  
In March, the President signed Executive Order 10224 to establish the 
National Advisory Board on Mobilization Policy. In August, Truman signed 
Executive Order 10281 regarding the supply and purchase of defense-related 




which the president could move the country toward a position of preparedness. Order 
10224 created a board to advise on adequate preparation and mobilization policy and 
be comprised of people representing labor, management, and agriculture. Order 
10281 created a position in the Executive branch that would procure needed assets 
and materials for the proper defense of U.S. interests and provide regulations for 
loans to private corporations and enterprises so that they could increase their capacity 
to produce materials that would be needed for a mobilization effort. Both orders came 
at a time when the country was preparing to plunge into another period of war as 
tensions with the communist USSR mounted. In this context, we see Truman’s 
actions to build the nation’s defensive efforts as the reaction of a commander-in-chief 
making preparations based on events of international posturing. 
In September, Truman signed Executive Order 10290 regarding the 
classification and handling of secret information related to national security. With this 
executive order, the President established base standards and definitions for levels of 
classification, processes for classification and declassification of documents, and the 
proper handing of classified materials related to national security and the defense of 
the country. Again, this executive order came among a time of national security 
concerns just months after the Rosenberg trial in March and execution in June. As the 
country moved into a new technological era with increasing nuclear power and the 
threat of nuclear weapons and found itself virtually at war with a former ally, the 
President saw the need to make sure that state secrets were adequately protected. As 




information, he found it within his authority to establish the rules and regulations that 
would apply to such matters. 
Finally, the President signed Executive Order 10340 in April of 1952 to take 
control of the Steel industry in the name of both the economy and national security 
during a time of war. In the executive order, Truman cited the state of 
“national emergency which requires that the military, 
naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be 
strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we 
may be able to repel any and all threats against our 
national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the 
efforts being made throughout the United Nations and 
otherwise to bring about a lasting peace.” 
 
In the order, the Secretary of Commerce is ordered to take over those steel factories in 
which workers and management were unable to find agreement in their disputes. 
Truman sought to avoid strikes that would cripple the steel industry during a time 
when national security and a faltering economy necessitated the production of steel 
that could be used to build armaments and provide jobs. Of course, the Supreme 
Court later declared this seizure unconstitutional in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co 
v. Sawyer (1952) decision, but not before Truman first started to influence policy, the 
economy, national security, and the global war effort. 
 It is worth noting that Truman’s action with Executive Order 10340 is one of 
the three cases of command to which Neustadt points in describing the relative 
weakness of presidents who must rely on such orders rather than persuasion. For 
Neustadt, this is a case where the president resorted to such action when he was 
unable to bargain with others to avoid a strike and save the steel industry. However, 




of economic and military crisis. Among Truman’s critical executive orders described 
here, this particular order received the most media attention in The New York Times 
with some ten stories about the president’s order and actions via Commerce Secretary 
Charles Sawyer. 
 From among Truman’s critical foreign orders, we see examples where the 
President acted in cases dealing with military policy, took unilateral actions in the 
name of national security, or sought to move quickly when necessitated by times of 
national emergency. The President took all of these actions in response to particular 
events that required quick action without time for legislature to act, though Congress 
was operating on a parallel track regarding many of these cases as well (such as 
rooting out communism and protecting the country from espionage at the same time 
that Truman issued critical executive orders to the same effect). Truman did all of this 
with unified government, a struggling economy, and relatively low polarization while 
also remaining fairly unpopular throughout this period. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and the 83rd Congress 
 President Eisenhower was elected in a landslide election in 1952. He carried 
39 of the 48 states against Democratic Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, who only 
carried states in the Democratic Solid South. Eisenhower was elected comfortably 
with over 55% of the popular vote, and Republicans gained majorities in both 
chambers of the 83rd Congress. Though Republican majorities were relatively narrow 
(one seat in the Senate, eight seats in the House), they represented an overall swing of 
some two-dozen seats and provided Eisenhower with a unified government for the 




president in 20 years since Hoover had left office, so too was this the first time that 
Republicans controlled both branches of government since Hoover and the 72nd 
Congress ended their terms in 1933. 
 Eisenhower enjoyed an economy with low unemployment and very low 
inflation during his first two years in office. Starting with a low 2.97% misery index 
score, the number only went as high as 6.83% during his first two years (and only 
crept above that number in the final December 1956 and January 1957 at the very end 
of his first term). Eisenhower also saw relatively low polarization during his time in 
office, especially during the 83rd Congress with the parties relatively close together. 
During this time, the Congress contained several liberal Republicans and conservative 
(largely southern) Democrats that kept their parties ideologically diverse. 
 Eisenhower enjoyed remarkably high approval ratings throughout his term, 
especially during his first term and during his first two years in office. Initial polls 
showed Eisenhower with an approval rating of 68% within his first few weeks in 
office. By the spring, the new President’s approval ratings climbed into the 70s until 
the fall. The President’s approval ratings only fell below 60% once during the 83rd 
Congress, dipping to 57% in mid-November of 1954 after Democrats reclaimed the 
majority in both houses of the 84th Congress. Even then, however, Eisenhower’s 
approval numbers returned to the 60s and 70s for another several years until dipping 
again around the fall of 1957. If approval ratings can be equated to capital on which a 
president can trade to accomplish his or her goals, Eisenhower certainly had high 




from Congress to do so each time he wanted something. Figure 6.2 shows these 
approval averages over time. 
Figure 6.2: Eisenhower Approval Ratings from Gallup Averages 
 
Eisenhower approval rating. Image from American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara. 
  
In summary, Eisenhower’s first two years in office found the new Republican 
president with his co-partisans in the majority in both houses of Congress. He saw a 
much healthier economy than the end of the Truman administration with low 
unemployment and low inflation rates. Polarization was also low during these first 
two years of the Eisenhower administration, allowing parties to still work together 
without divisive ideologies holding them apart. Eisenhower also had favorable 
approval ratings with the support of the people behind him. They had comfortably 




terms in office, during which he saw the opportunity to sign four critical executive 
orders related to foreign policy. 
 What four critical foreign orders did Eisenhower sign? In early February of 
1953, the President signed Executive Order 10434 to suspend wage controls related to 
the defense industry. The Defense Production Act of 1950 had frozen wages of 
workers in certain defense-related industries to stabilize prices of the war effort. 
Collective bargaining agreements were suspended at this time, but Order 10434 ended 
these practices. Acting to address the health of the economy, Eisenhower’s executive 
order noted that a return to collective bargaining activities for workers and the 
resumption of normal supply and demand prices would strengthen the economy. The 
president acted at a moment when he saw less need to execute orders that were rooted 
in a war-time economy and while also seeing need to protect the economic growth 
that had been achieved. The action allowed the president to act under the authority 
given to him by Congress in regulating particular aspects of the economy when the 
provisions were no longer necessary without voiding the entire law. The law is still in 
effect today and provides each president the opportunity to act under the authority 
derived from it as they see fit for their respective political and world contexts. 
Eisenhower’s action also provided expediency that would otherwise be 
lacking in the legislative process. The very text of the order states, “the earliest 
possible return to freedom of collective bargaining in the determination of wages will 
serve to strengthen the national economy and thereby the national security” (Order 
10434). In the two years in which the Defense Production Act had been in effect, 




when willing to pay their workers more, were unable to do so. Instead, petitions were 
submitted to review agencies that would make determinations on a case-by-case 
basis. By the time Eisenhower signed Order 10434, these review agencies had a 
backlog of some 11,000 cases (Loftuss 1953). Eisenhower’s executive order removed 
the government from the process and returned that part of business management to 
business owners and workers, allowing them to begin negotiating salaries and 
benefits without the involvement of federal agencies. 
 In June, Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10459 related to the handling and 
transmission of classified information to the United Nations. This order amended an 
order signed by Truman regarding personnel records and investigations for anyone 
considered for a job with the relatively new United Nations. The order amended the 
provisions surrounding the creation of a Civil Service Commission that would 
investigate Americans under consideration for UN jobs and provide written 
statements about those citizens and any suspicious activity to the Secretary General of 
the UN via the U.S. Secretary of State. This order came at the height of American 
fears about subversive communist-sympathizers among them fueled by McCarthy’s 
crusades against the same. At a time when people inside and outside of the 
government were afraid of who had intelligence and what they were doing with it – 
and with the Rosenbergs still in recent memory – this order helped shape the process 
by which Americans were vetted for their “loyalty” to the country and the ability to 
work in the international sphere of the UN. 
 The next month, Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10469 to amend 




classification in Class III-A, also known as a dependency deferment, based on their 
service placing a hardship on their families. Under the order, expectant fathers would 
only be covered if a doctor could attest to the baby likely being born within the 
following six weeks and only if the father maintained “a bona fide family relationship 
in their home” (Order 10469). However, such deferments would end after August 25 
of that year because too many men were using multiple deferments to avoid military 
service altogether (NYT 1953). With this action, Eisenhower sought to address the 
decreasing number of registrants in the selective service system given the military 
status of the country and our engagements at the time. This order was very much a 
case of a commander-in-chief using the tools at his disposal to affect the military 
readiness of his troops in a time of armed conflict. 
 In November of 1953, the President signed Executive Order 10501 regarding 
the protection of classified information necessary for the safety of the United States. 
This order detailed the levels of secrecy available for ratings, the officials responsible 
for assigning such ratings, and how different pieces of information could be 
transmitted based on the type of document and level of security ranking. This order 
revoked Truman’s Executive Order 10290 of September 1951 on the same subject 
and replaced those provisions with Eisenhower’s set of regulations on the 
classification and transmission of such documents. While Truman’s order had granted 
classification powers throughout federal government departments and agencies, 
regardless of whether or not they were in a defense-related field, Eisenhower’s order 
sought to draw a tighter circle around which departments actually needed the ability 




within those agencies who had the authority to grant security classifications to 
documents. This was, therefore, an action taken to directly reverse the policy of a 
previous administration and apply stricter standards for classifying information and 
keep it from the public. This history makes Executive Order 10501 interesting as a 
critical executive order that was used to revoke another critical executive order. 
 Similar to other presidents, we see Eisenhower taking advantage of his 
political circumstances to issue critical executive orders when they called for 
expediency in addressing military preparedness and the economy, when they were 
matters of national security during times of heightened suspicions given McCarthy’s 
actions in the Senate to root out communism, or when they dealt with directly 
contradicting the policy of a previous administration. Eisenhower used tools from his 
unilateral toolbox in these situations because they would allow for changes that might 
otherwise take too long to legislate with Congress, were firmly within his purview as 
commander-in-chief, were sensitive topics of national importance, or did not require 
legislation when a new executive order to revoke a previous one would be enough to 
do the trick. Eisenhower did all of this with unified government (like Truman), a 
healthy economy (unlike Truman), and relatively low polarization (like Truman) 
while maintaining strong approval ratings throughout his administration (unlike 
Truman). 
Jimmy E. Carter and the 96th Congress 
 
 President Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976. He lost a majority of 
the states (Carter’s 23 states and DC to Ford’s 27 states), held a narrow 50.1% to 48% 




to Ford’s 240 (one electoral vote was awarded to Reagan). This election was a close 
one in which a lesser-known former governor of Georgia barely beat an incumbent 
president who was mired in the scandal of and subsequent pardon of his predecessor. 
The nation elected a solidly Democratic 95th Congress, but it was more hesitant in 
electing a Democratic 39th President of the United States.  
 The 96th Congress of 1979-1981 was less Democratic than the preceding 
Congress under Carter. Democrats held strong majorities in both houses, but they 
started the new legislative session with fewer seats than they had held at the close of  
the 95th Congress. Still, the Senate had 58 Democrats, and the House had 277 
Democrats. They provided a plentiful co-partisan base for the midterm first-term 
President. 
 Carter faced a difficult economy with high unemployment and inflation during 
his entire time in office. When he entered the White House, the misery index stood at 
12.72%, well above the data set average. The only month with a lower misery index 
was April of 1978 with an index score of 12.6%. Otherwise, the rest of the Carter 
administration faced higher numbers. During the 95th Congress, Carter’s average 
misery index was 13.5%. By the 96th Congress, the index had risen to 18.82% and as 
high as 19.94% in the closing days months of his administration. Republican 
presidential nominee Ronald Reagan talked at great length about the economic 
problems the country faced during the Carter presidency, and this issue became a 
major one in the election (DeGregorio 1993). Carter’s and the Democratic platform 




deliver on this and many other promises contributed to Carter losing his 1980 
reelection bid. 
 Carter also saw a rise in polarization during his time in office. Polarization 
slowly crept up over the course of Carter’s four years in office. Near the end of his 
term, Carter found a Congress in which the Republicans and Democrats were moving 
ideologically farther apart from each other. They shared less ideological space with 
fewer liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats in the chambers and – by 
extension – less common ground on which to operate. Some of this change is 
reflected in shift of electoral results from 1976 to 1980. In his first election, Carter 
held most of the Solid South. He was the last Democrat to do so. In 1980, he only 
carried his native Georgia. Only Clinton, taking four southern states in each of his 
elections, has done moderately well in the South since this time. 
 Carter suffered from low approval ratings for most of his administration. 
Though he entered office with ratings in the mid- to upper-60s and rose into the 
lower- to mid-70s during his first few months in office, this support soon ebbed with 
ratings that sank to around 50 by the end of his first year in office and continued to 
fall from there. By the summer of 1978, his approval rating was dipping into the 30s, 
and he stood at 50 during the midterm elections of that year. Though Democrats won 
back some of the seats they lost throughout the 95th Congress, the president struggled 
to maintain favorable approval ratings for himself. As the 96th Congress began its first 
session, Carter’s approval ratings continued to trend downward until hitting a floor of 
high 20s to low 30s from mid-May through October of 1979. Though the President 




months of the hostage crisis at the Iranian embassy, this nominal support eventually 
faded as people became frustrated and saw Carter as an ineffective arbiter in returning 
the captured Americans safely home. By the time he sent American military forces 
into Iran to retrieve the hostages by force in late April, his approval ratings had 
dipped back into the low 40s and high 30s, never to recover. The second half of 
Carter’s term, therefore, was one mired in international conflict and paltry approval 
ratings from the public, as shown in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3: Carter Approval Ratings from Gallup Averages 
 
Carter approval rating. Image from American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara. 
 
 In summary, Carter enjoyed some of the same benefits as other presidents 
discussed in this chapter. He had a unified government with even larger margins than 
either Truman or Eisenhower. He also faced a struggling economy, related to greater 




his predecessors, Carter saw higher levels of polarization at the end of his 
administration than did Truman or Eisenhower, who both served during less polarized 
times where the parties were ideologically closer than they were at the end of the 
1980s. Similar to Truman, Carter suffered from very low approval ratings during the 
96th Congress. Under these circumstances, Carter managed to issue four executive 
orders on foreign policy that would become critical executive orders. 
 In November of 1979, Carter signed Executive Order 12170 to freeze property 
of the Iranian government in the U.S. The action came just ten days after Iranian 
militants had overtaken the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and began holding 60 hostages. 
To punish the Iranian government and force the return of the Americans, Carter 
signed the executive order to pressure Ayatollah Khomeini to have his followers 
release the hostages. Refusing to bow to the Ayatollah’s demands for the Shah of 
Iran, Carter sought to inflict economic penalty to end the standoff by freezing Iranian 
bank accounts and assets. This order demonstrates a time when the President wanted 
to act quickly to respond to a particular situation when congressional action may have 
taken too much time. A crisis emerged, and the president did what he could to 
influence policy and affect the situation at hand. 
 In January of 1980, the President signed Executive Order 12188 regarding 
international trade. The order bolstered the office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
with additional responsibilities related to advising the President on issues of 
international trade and the Secretary of Commerce with additional responsibilities 
related to promoting American exports and enforcing import laws. In signing this 




the expectation that the order would also be codified later into law. “This trade 
reorganization Executive order, which I will sign this afternoon, is the result of a 
tremendous amount of work. It’s the 13th reorganization plan that my administration 
has presented to the Congress, and all 13 of them have been passed by the Congress 
(Carter 1980),” he said in the moments before signing the order. This is a case where 
unified government likely helped the president pass an order rooted in expediency 
and using presidential powers in an attempt to lower inflation and unemployment, 
two problems with which the country struggled at the time.  In this case, the executive 
order was not the only solution that the president pursued, as he also worked with 
Congress to address the problems at hand. However, the executive order allowed him 
the chance to start action sooner than the legislative process may have otherwise 
allowed. 
 In April, Carter signed Executive Order 12205 to prohibit certain transactions 
with the nation of Iran. It outlawed commercial relationships and the transportation of 
non-food and non-medical goods from Americans to the people or government of 
Iran. Five months after Iranians had taken hostages in the American Embassy in 
Tehran, Carter still sought an end to the crisis by trying new tactics to force Iran’s 
hand in releasing the trapped Americans. In an escalation of tactics to try to force the 
Iranian government to secure the release of the Americans, this order appears as the 
next step in responding to a crisis situation that required fast movement in response to 
new information. 
 In June, the President signed Executive Order 12218 regarding the export of 




the other coming in April 1978. In this case, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
ruled that the nuclear materials could not be shipped to India and refused to issue the 
licenses needed to do so. Carter’s order overrode such decisions in the name of 
national security. He recognized that sharing nuclear technologies and components 
would help with worldwide non-proliferation goals by not encouraging India to sell 
the nuclear resources it had already obtained to other countries without American 
consent. Continuing to send nuclear fuels to India under a 1963 agreement would also 
bolster positive relations with an ally in an otherwise tumultuous region for the 
United States given the ongoing hostage crisis in nearby Iran and the Cold War with 
the Soviet Union (Taubman 1980). According to one story in The New York Times, 
Carter administration “officials maintain that, in the wake of the Soviet thrust into 
Afghanistan, the United States cannot afford political strains with Mrs. [Indira] 
Gandhi’s government” (Burt 1980). Carter was therefore weighing bigger picture 
considerations related to geopolitical concerns in approving the sale of nuclear 
products to India at the time. This case provides a particular snapshot of the president 
having and using additional information at his disposal to make decisions in the name 
of national security. 
 We see here an instance where a president with unified government, a bad 
economy, and very low approval ratings is still able to issue a relatively high number 
of critical foreign orders. These orders were instances where the President sought to 
act quickly to avoid legislative blocks to programs and move with fast and 
determined action toward particular policy goals. In some cases, he also sought 




unilateral authority to make immediate changes in responding to the crisis situation in 
Iran or a faltering American economy where unemployment and inflation were 
running particularly high. 
Jimmy Carter and the 97th Congress 
 Carter ran for re-election in 1980 but lost to Ronald Reagan in a landslide. 
Though still facing a Democratic House, Reagan was able to pick up a Republican 
Senate for the first six years of his administration. Carter suffered from the poor 
economy and an inability to bring home the Americans being held hostage in Tehran. 
These circumstances led to Carter having dismal approval ratings on the eve of the 
election, in which he only carried six states and D.C. In the weeks before he left 
office, his approval rating rose slightly, but the economy became slightly worse. As 
he prepared to leave office, Carter signed several executive orders, including eleven 
orders on his last full day in office. Nine of these dealt directly with the hostage 
situation in Iran (with seven using the word “Iran” or “Iranian” in the title) and 
represented Carter’s final attempt at having an impact. By this time, a deal had 
already been reached whereby the hostages would be released at noon the following 
day as the Reagan administration took office, and Carter helped enact part of this 
negotiation with his executive orders.  Six of Carter’s outgoing executive orders were 
critical orders. 
 On January 19 of 1981, Carter signed Executive Orders 12277, 12278, 12279, 
12280, 12281, and 12282. The first five all dealt Iranian assets that had been held or 
frozen by the American government and private institutions over the preceding years. 




domestic banks, by non-banking institutions, but they all ordered the transfer of these 
assets. Order 12282 revoked portions of Carter’s former Order 12205 to re-open 
business transactions between Americans and Iranians. With the stage set, Carter left 
office with a situation in which the Iranian militants could then hand over their 
hostages as Reagan was sworn into office. 
 These orders represent an interesting exception in the data set wherein the set 
of five orders affecting Iranian assets were referred to as a group in The New York 
Times. The stories by which this set of orders became critical did not distinguish 
between the individual orders issued but instead discussed the orders as packages of 
the outgoing administration. Unlike other orders in the data set, where orders were 
unique and distinguishable and dealt with a relatively narrow set of effects that could 
be tracked in news coverage, this set of orders was meant to act together and all 
addressed different facets of the same issue. Therefore, the media coverage of them is 
consistent with the intent of the orders themselves in working together to set the stage 
for the return of the American hostages on January 20 as the Carters’ belongings were 
packed up and moved out of the White House. 
Discussion 
 The results from my model show that political context explains less of the 
variance for critical foreign orders than they do for similar domestic orders. While 
unified government and the economy are still helpful indicators, we see that many 
approval and war are no longer as relevant to the number of critical foreign orders 
issued by a president. With a relatively low number of observations, we must be 




numbers of critical foreign orders when they have divided government (such as 
Truman and the 80th Congress from 1947-1949) or strong economies (such as 
Eisenhower and the 83rd Congress from 1953-1955, described above). 
 However, here we have seen that presidents can produce relatively high 
numbers of critical foreign orders regardless of approval ratings. Truman and Carter 
dealt with very low approval ratings during their respective administrations, but 
Eisenhower was held in very high regard. Unlike the model for domestic orders, we 
also see some significance to polarization in the model, though two examples 
presented here still show periods of several critical orders despite high polarization 
for Carter. 
The results for this model and demonstrated in these illustrations also show 
differences from the expanded model for significant executive orders. Unlike that 
model, the size of congressional majorities is not significant here (and again, neither 
is presidential approval). Similar to the critical domestic model, we also do not see an 
effect here for the length of the observation. This result is particularly interesting in a 
discussion of how political context influences the ability of presidents to use their 
unilateral actions with impunity. While effectively constrained by the dynamics in 
which they operate, one such factor is not the length of time. We have just as many 
(and in many cases, more) critical foreign orders issued in some particularly short 
periods of time (like Carter’s final day in office) as we have in periods of time that 
are nearly two years long. While there is a positive relationship between the amount 
of time and the number of significant executive orders issued by presidents, whereby 




the case for the critical executive orders where presidents are making their biggest 
marks through unilateral action. In these cases, presidents are responsive to their 
context and look for opportunities when they can issue orders based on when they 
think they will be easiest to issue and most successful, but a longer period of time 
does not necessarily mean more of these orders. 
 Foreign policy may present executives with more opportunities to issue 
critical executive orders when they want to respond to issues quickly and avoid a 
lethargic legislative process. The nature of international relations may present more 
opportunities by which presidents are inspired to act more quickly to issues that are 
seen as more within their purview in the first place. In these cases, the findings in 
Chapter 4 and illustrated in the case studies here fit. 
 However, in nearly all of the situations presented here, the respective 
presidents are still reacting to external circumstances outside of their control. 
Truman’s orders to influence the selective service regulations and mobilization policy 
are based on the fact that the United States had troops engaged in Korea while on the 
precipice of another world war against the Soviet Union. His well-known decision to 
have the Commerce Department take control of steel mills was in response to an 
impasse in negotiations between management and workers. Eisenhower’s orders to 
lift wage controls were about responding to economic conditions. His orders related 
to the classification of documents came during the height of the Red Scare when 
people were concerned about documents with the trial of the Rosenbergs fresh in their 
memory. Carter’s orders came as a response to a violent takeover of an American 




 This observation fits with Lincoln’s famous quotation from a letter to 
newspaper editor Albert Hodges. “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess 
plainly that events have controlled me” (Lincoln 1864). These presidents did not 
(directly) create these circumstances, but they were the leaders sitting in the Oval 
Office when such circumstances demanded response, especially from American 
citizens. The critical foreign orders described in this chapter are not orders intended to 
set new directions for American foreign policy. Very few of them open new markets 
for the sake of economic expansion or create new programs in the name of 
exploration and global assistance. 
 President Kennedy’s order to create the Peace Corps program is such an 
example in which a brand new program was created with an original intent to provide 
the monetary and human resources for going to other countries and help build. But it 
stands apart from so many of the orders described here in which presidents were 
mostly reactive to situations. Many of these critical executive orders were not 
proactive pieces of new policy. In this light, then, presidents still seem somewhat 
effectively constrained by their overall circumstances and the dynamics in which they 
find themselves. It may just be that fewer of these dynamics are purely political 





Chapter 7: Presidential Memoranda and Other Unilateral 
Tools 
 
“Through executive orders, memorandums, 
proclamations, regulations, and other flexing of 
presidential power, Mr. Clinton has already put in effect 
a host of measures concerning the environment, health 
care and civil rights. And with the presidential 
campaign in high gear, and the Republican-controlled 
Congress not inclined to give Democrats any boost, Mr. 
Clinton’s aides intend to continue making policy by 
decree – putting federal land off limits to development, 
reorganizing government agencies, tightening pollution 
control rules and pushing other measures that would 
otherwise stand little chance of congressional passage.” 
-Marc Lacy, New York Times writer, 5 July 2000 
 
In the previous chapters, I analyze the factors that influence presidential 
unilateralism as exemplified by (critical) executive orders. However, the executive 
order is one of just many tools in the president’s unilateral toolbox. More interesting 
than the study of just one such tool is an understanding of wider presidential 
unilateral power. In this chapter, I explore another timely and prominent unilateral 
tool: the presidential memorandum. The memorandum has gained popularity among 
recent presidents as a way for advancing a policy agenda similar to executive orders 
but with different legal requirements that may make them more attractive in some 
situations. Compared to the executive order and several other unilateral tools, the 
memorandum has significantly less literature already written. 
 In this chapter, I lay out a number of different unilateral tools before 
discussing in more depth the presidential memorandum so that we may better 
distinguish it among other unilateral actions. Memoranda have received less academic 




receive special attention here. I then provide a review of what we already know about 
these memoranda and examples of them. Finally, I present a research agenda about 
how we can learn more about presidential memoranda and keep the larger set of 
unilateral powers employed by presidents to achieve policy objectives. 
Unilateral Tools 
  We know that presidents have many different unilateral tools available to 
them. In addition to well-documented and oft-studied executive orders, we also see 
presidential proclamations, directives of different kinds (such as national security 
directives), presidential determinations, presidential memoranda, and executive 
agreements.38 All of these options are methods by which presidents can achieve 
policy objectives as the head of the Executive branch. The first four tools are akin to 
laws passed by Congress in their scope and intent. The last option is similar to a 
treaty wherein the president may lead the discussions or negotiations with other 
countries but still requires the advice and consent of the Senate once the president has 
concluded talks. 
 The nuances among these several actions vary, and some of the distinction 
among them is at the discretion of the president. Executive orders – by law – must be 
numbered and published in The Federal Register and deal with all manner of actions 
from non-policy actions to policies with tangible consequences and budgetary 
                                                
38 Other unilateral tools ascribed to the presidency include veto statements, signing statements, 
appointments, and pardons. They are not considered here as tools for measuring unilateral governance 
for several reasons. Veto and signing statements are presidential reactions to congressional action. 
While they can serve as important policy statements from the president, they are – by definition – areas 
in which the president is a second-actor in the legislative process. Appointments and pardons are a 
separate set of important actions that presidents take, but they constitute a separate universe of 
constitutionally delegated responsibilities unlike the other actions addressed in the dissertation and 
within this chapter. While some of these appointments and pardons can be used to signal policy 
statements, they ultimately serve a separate purpose and are different from the unilateral actions 




implications. Among these other unilateral tools, some options are sequentially 
numbered while others are not. Some tools require publishing while others do not, 
though individual presidents have chosen to publish them as they see fit. Some can be 
used to affect policy change in both domestic and foreign policy areas while others 
are predominantly tools of international relations. I take them each in turn before 
focusing in on the presidential memorandum. 
Proclamations are published statements from the president with a more 
external audience than the Executive branch. Like other unilateral tools, they range 
from the ceremonial (like annual Thanksgiving Day proclamations) to policy-laden 
devices that signal or initiate policy change. The quintessential example of an 
important proclamation is Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 to free 
slaves in Confederate states. Such an action has a clear policy implication but is not 
directed at just officers of the Executive branch of the federal government. In fact, 
this proclamation was specifically aimed at states that had rebelled from the Union 
and did not consider themselves to be part of the United States at the time of 
Lincoln’s proclamation. 
Obama used some 1,226 proclamations during his time in the White House. 
Some of them garnered great news attention and became matters of political debate. 
In his closing weeks, for example, he issued two orders to designate lands in Utah 
(Proclamation 9558) and Nevada (Proclamation 9559) as national monuments, 
initiating a conservation process that would restrict development on the lands and 
preserve them for the native populations that most valued them (Davenport 2016, 




million acres of new land to be preserved for future generations but irked members of 
Congress who wanted to legislate on the issue in the process. Despite unsuccessful 
efforts at legislation, they still reacted negatively to the issuance of unilateral 
governance to address the issue. This action also raises the question of how easily 
future presidents can rescind the proclamations of their predecessors in the same way 
in which they are able to revoke the executive orders of their predecessors. 
Proclamations are also a field ripe for exploration when it comes to 
presidents’ foreign policy objectives. Many important international actions have been 
taken via presidential proclamations from the White House. Eisenhower issued 
Proclamations 3355 and 3383 in 1960 about Cuban sugar exports once Fidel Castro 
had taken charge of Cuba. While Eisenhower limited specific products of trade from 
Cuba, his successor followed suit by embargoing all trade with Cuba in 1962 via 
Proclamation 3447. Like the executive order, proclamations can be an important tool 
for achieving foreign policy goals, especially given their more external audience in 
the first place. These proclamations become an important way for the White House to 
declare its policy objectives when it comes to trade, security, and relations with other 
nations around the world. 
 National security directives are another category of executive action that 
would almost exclusively fall into the category of international relations and national 
security or defense. While an important tool for pursuing policy objectives, this one is 
difficult to study because they are not published on the grounds that they deal with 
sensitive topics. Presidents have discretion in this category to issue orders of which 




and study because political scientists cannot document the orders that are not released 
to the public, and the public also does not otherwise know that the orders exist in the 
first place. The presumption is that such orders cover secretive topics, but the 
president need not defend the decision to issue something as a directive in the first 
place. By nature, however, these orders target agencies and bureaus within the 
Executive branch to make the policy changes that are needed to keep Americans safe 
and protected from threats evaluated within the intelligence community. 
 Presidential determinations fall under the category of reports that the president 
delivers regarding topics of national importance and research. Such determinations 
establish a policy or position for the Executive branch. They are written as 
memoranda from the president and directed to Executive department and agency 
heads, and they are numbered and published in The Federal Register. Unlike other 
tools like the executive order, determinations are not mandates for action from the 
president. Rather, they help define a policy or the scope of a policy. An example of a 
presidential determination is Determination 98-13, which Clinton issued to facilitate 
the renewal of a trade agreement with the People’s Republic of China. The relatively 
short determination states, “I have determined that actual or foreseeable reductions in 
United States tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade resulting from multilateral 
negotiations are being satisfactorily reciprocated by the People’s Republic of China” 
(Determination 98-13). The President goes on to tell the U.S. Trade Representative 
that he identified “a satisfactory balance of concessions in trade and services.” The 
only order contained in the memorandum is that the Office of the Trade 




was a step in moving policy. Before the United States could engage in a new round of 
talks to update its trade agreement, the White House needed a determination on 
whether such an agreement had been successful thus far. The American Presidency 
Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara records some 919 
determinations from June of 1977 to December 2016. 
 Executive agreements are akin to treaties that the president might otherwise 
negotiate with foreign leaders and then present to the Senate for ratification. These 
agreements, however, are not subject to congressional approval because the effect of 
the treaty is something that falls under the purview of the president’s control of the 
Executive branch in the first place. There is an additional assumption that such 
agreements comply with existing laws, and some may even extend from legislation 
passed by Congress. Based on talks with other world leaders, the president may 
determine that he or she does not need congressional ratification to achieve the policy 
aims of the agreement if he or she can instead accomplish these ends through other 
executive tools. Even if the president seeks congressional approval to facilitate or pay 
for the conditions of the agreement, such congressional approval only requires a 
majority vote from both chambers of Congress rather than a two-thirds vote in the 
Senate. An example of an executive agreement is the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) negotiated by Clinton with the leaders of Canada and Mexico. 
While Clinton then took the agreement to Congress for approval and support because 
it changed then-status quo laws, it started as an agreement that a president arranged 




majority of the Senate to put the agreement into effect. Other executive agreements, 
such as military base agreements, do not require such approval. 
 Presidential memoranda are similar to the executive order in intent, scope, and 
longevity. Presidents issue them to set policy within the Executive branch and can use 
them to send signals on priorities to those within and outside of their purview. Unique 
to memoranda, presidents are the arbiters of which memoranda are published in The 
Federal Register. Unlike executive orders, which all must be published, presidents 
choose which memoranda to publish and which ones to quietly issue without public 
attention and scrutiny. While the Obama administration has made a concerted effort 
in the name of transparency to publish all of its 331 memoranda on the White House 
website,39 such publication is not mandated by law and has not always been the case 
in previous administrations. Unlike orders or proclamations, they are not numbered. 
Conceptually, the presidential memorandum appears to be an executive order in all 
but name and publication requirements, especially when elevated to such prominence 
and transparency under Obama (Korte 2014). The Trump administration, for now, 
appears to be upholding the standard and precedent set by Obama, but it would 
simply take a decision by the new President to change course. 
 Lowande (2014) argues that presidential memoranda have replaced the 
executive order, which is seeing a decline in usage since World War II. Lowande’s 
findings indicate that the same factors that influence executive orders also influence 
the number of memoranda issued with patterns that mirror each other. At the same 
time, however, the number of memoranda issued over time has steadily increased at 
about the same rate that the number of executive orders has decreased. Because 
                                                




memoranda are less well known and can escape the attention of the public easily if 
the administration simply chooses to not publish the memorandum, memoranda may 
be the presidents’ response to scrutiny and criticism that they otherwise face with 
executive orders such that they “may be a less politically costly means of action” 
(Lowande 2014, 725). On mounting negative attention and charges of an “imperial 
presidency” waged by some like Paul Ryan, Lowande writes 
“The accumulation of this kind of media attention, 
together with the potential for legal challenge, places 
strong incentives on presidents to find new, more 
innovative and obscure means of acting alone. In this 
case, the present obscurity of presidential memoranda 
may allow presidents to claim credit for policy change, 
while avoiding the charges of ‘imperial overreach’ 
likely to be levied by critics.” (739) 
 
 Also similar to executive orders, memoranda can be replaced by a new 
memorandum from the current or a future president. A prime example of the 
presidential memorandum is the so-called Mexico City Policy, the international gag 
order whereby federal policy prohibits non-government organizations from 
performing or promoting abortion procedures. Under this policy, federal funds cannot 
go to such organizations that provide or discuss such procedures. The Reagan 
administration first implemented the policy in 1984 when sending a delegation to the 
United Nations International Conference on Population in Mexico City. Presidential 
memoranda became the vehicle by which administrations would then rescind the 
policy of the previous administration on this topic. In his first days in office, Clinton 
issued a memorandum to rescind the Reagan-era policy, citing “excessively broad 
anti-abortion conditions” (1993). Bush II (2001) rescinded the Clinton memorandum 




Obama (2009) in his first days in office. Following suit, Trump (2017) revoked the 
Obama order and re-instated the Bush II memorandum to withhold federal funding 
from non-government organizations that engaged in such procedures or discussions 
and permitted the secretary of State to enforce the provisions of such a policy with 
legal ramifications for those health service providers that disregarded such funding 
stipulations. 
 Unfortunately, it is difficult to delineate a more concrete definition for the 
presidential memorandum. Much like an executive order, it can provide instructions 
to administration officials, advance or reverse policies from previous administrations, 
or be more ceremonial or routine in nature. They are easily overturned by future 
memoranda. Some memoranda are published by the White House and enter the public 
conscience, but others are never known outside of the administration. Because of this 
fact, many of these memoranda are difficult to classify and study in the same kind of 
systemic approach as executive orders.40 Lowande is clear throughout his article that 
his research is based only on published memoranda because we cannot study what we 
do not have available. The American Presidency Project contains records for 1,567 
memoranda in its digital archives, but only fifteen are attributed to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, a president otherwise very prolific with other unilateral actions like the 
executive order (3,466 issued). 
                                                
40 Even for all of its effort to publish its presidential memoranda, the Obama administration could be 
withholding some of its memoranda without a way for observers and researchers to know. While we 
may be able to get at some of these records in the future as presidential documents are declassified in 
presidential libraries, this delayed access to records could delay a wider study of this particular 
unilateral tool. For previous administrations that were not as forthcoming with their memoranda, it 
may still be the case that total memoranda outpaced executive orders. What we can say is truly unique 




 The nature of presidential memoranda is also such that presidents and 
administrations themselves do not fully understand them upon entering office. News 
sources reported on the first actions via memorandum of the Trump administration to 
freeze all pending regulations until review by the new administration (Restuccia and 
Juliano 2017, Kopan 2017, Wheeler 2017). The action was achieved by a White 
House memorandum authored by Chief of Staff Reince Priebus (Priebus 2017). Since 
its issuance, the memorandum has appeared on the White House website under the 
“Presidential Memoranda” section, making it seem as if the new administration itself 
does not entirely know how these executive actions function. Other presidential 
memoranda appearing on the White House website fit the more conventional 
understanding of memoranda signed by the president and directed to departments and 
agencies within the Executive branch to outline and detail policies, but this first 
example from the first day of the Trump administration shows the ambiguity and 
misunderstanding of some of these very tools. 
Broader Understandings of Unilateral Governance 
 More interesting than just the study of executive orders is a wider study of 
presidential unilateral action as a whole. Presidential scholars can use individual tools 
to exemplify and operationalize a broader sense of unilateral action, but a more 
holistic approach provides a better sense of how presidents achieve their policy goals 
and to what extend they are constrained by the environment in which they operate. 
The themes studied in my quantitative chapter – the role of partisan majorities, party 
changes, divided government, polarization, approval, the economy, war, and other 




issuance of impactful executive orders. But how do these elements affect other 
actions of presidents in both unilateral and bilateral actions?  
 A true study of presidential unilateral governance should include all types of 
unilateral action. As Lowande (2014) writes, “understanding unilateral presidential 
action may require some degree of aggregation” (739). We should look for ways in 
which we can consider several (ideally all) tools in a president’s toolbox to capture 
what he or she does to affect policy. As such, it is important to look at executive 
orders and presidential memoranda and proclamations and executive agreements and 
more in concert with each other. Especially when it comes to executive orders and 
presidential memoranda – two tools that have the same types of goals and work 
effectively the same way – it is helpful to know about both so that researchers capture 
the full picture of presidential actions. Across all unilateral tools, the same tests may 
not be relevant and appropriate for all of these tools, but we should take them all into 
account when discussing presidential governance and unilateral action so as to not 
leave out any piece of the puzzle. 
 These other tools are not included in my analysis of executive orders for 
several reasons. First, we do not have complete lists of all of these tools. While this is 
particularly clear for the more secretive national security directives, there is also some 
ambiguity to tools like the presidential memorandum. Second, my work with 
executive orders starts with an already established list of identified significant 
executive orders, providing the opportunity to then find additional information about 
each of those orders for the purpose of narrowing the list. Without such lists of 




there is not an origin to such work. Such an enterprise would be a useful contribution, 
though, for the purpose of allowing us to study more than just one tool and how 
political dynamics (may) affect the president in a more rounded exercise of unilateral 
tools. 
Future Testing 
 As noted, the executive order and the presidential memorandum are very 
similar. In fact, the only difference is really the words that appear at the top of the 
document to indicate whether the document is an order or a memorandum. These 
tools otherwise approach similar types of issues with similar types of strategies, and it 
is therefore useful to consider them in tandem. 
 Because of the similarity of these two tools, it is possible to do the same kind 
of testing used for significant (and now critical) executive orders. Researchers can 
cull presidential records and identify presidential memoranda issued by presidents 
and identify those that we would consider significant, policy-based memoranda that 
have garnered scrutiny in the media, in Congress, or in the courts.41 We can then test 
the factors that influence the number of memoranda issued under different political 
dynamics, including the size of congressional majorities, changes in the partisanship 
of the White House, unified government, polarization, presidential approval, the 
economy, war, and other aspects of political timing. This work would allow us the 
chance to see how these factors affect a president’s use of another tool and, by 
                                                
41 However, a list of significant presidential memoranda does not currently exist as a starting point for 
such study. As the starting point for my analysis of critical executive orders is Howell’s list of 
significant executive orders, such a similar study of memoranda should start by searching for each 
memorandum in newspapers, congressional proceedings, and court cases before then establishing a 
threshold for critical presidential memoranda. This lack of an established list is why memoranda are 




extension, the degree to which presidents’ hands are tied when it comes to utilizing 
other tools that may be available to them to affect policy change. 
 One way to approach this work would be to conduct such work separately 
from executive orders and compare the results. We may find that a different set of 
factors influence the number of memoranda than influence the number of executive 
orders, allowing researchers to detail the story of how presidents make strategic 
decisions. Given the possibility that some of these memoranda are issued to avoid the 
scrutiny currently associated with formal executive orders, it may be the case that 
presidents turn to memoranda with less reliance on public-facing factors (i.e. 
popularity does not matter because the people are less likely to find out about it 
anyway) or with opposite relationships to public-facing factors (i.e. presidents issue 
more memoranda with low popularity because they can get things done without 
receiving further criticism from the public). Either story would be interesting for 
better understanding the calculations and decisions in which presidents engage when 
they want to more directly shape public policy. 
 Given Lowande’s findings on the degree to which the executive order and the 
presidential memoranda are similar tools used interchangeably by presidents, and that 
the latter may be increasingly used to replace the former, it may also be worth 
combining the counts of these tools in the same data set (especially if we see similar 
results for executive orders and memoranda). Rather than counting significant 
executive orders separately from significant memoranda, it may be worthwhile to 
explore aggregating these measures into a president’s significant executive actions to 




observation of decreasing executive orders and significant executive orders over 
time? Do we observe presidents that are just as active as they have always been with 
no discernible trends or patterns over time? 
 Of course, one factor that makes this line of research difficult is the reporting 
requirements associated with presidential memoranda. Because presidents are not 
required to publish these documents, finding them all so that we can properly count 
and draw conclusions on usage of this particular tool may prove difficult or even 
impossible. We may start with records and documents in presidential libraries to look 
for indications of when administrations used such tools. We may be able to find 
traces of most memoranda from internal documents that can help suggest when 
memoranda were used for any purpose and particularly those times when they were 
used with policy objectives in mind. 
 The particular difficulty associated with researching presidential memoranda, 
however, may be the truest sense of unilateral governance and decision-making. In 
previous chapters, I argue that presidents are effectively constrained by the political 
environment in which they find themselves because they want to exercise unilateral 
governance when it will be most useful and effective. Many factors beyond the 
president’s direct control, both inside and outside the Beltway, shape the 
circumstances available to him or her and the ability to issue the most significant 
executive orders. Presidents may be able to create change with the stroke of a pen, but 
there are external factors that determine whether or not a pen is available to the 
president in the first place. In this sense, presidents are constrained political actors 




 But the fact that presidents have found another unilateral tool that may be 
unobservable – or at least less observable – to the public may be an indication of a 
way in which presidents have found more options for themselves when they want to 
use unilateral tools with less contextual constraint. In the face of a more present news 
cycle that can bring constant scrutiny to the president’s actions and decisions, 
developing a new method of making change that is harder to criticize may be an act 
of new presidential power. Especially if research bears out that fewer political 
dynamics are associated with the issuance of something like the presidential 
memorandum, we will have found that presidents created a new method of affecting 
change wherein they truly have a free hand to do what they want without public 
scrutiny. Such a finding would be an unabashed demonstration of unilateral power. 
Short of this finding, however, there is still significance to presidents finding alternate 
means to achieve their policy objectives. 
 The fact that presidents have found or created a new way to implement change 
when the traditional (or more traditionally studied) tools no longer meet their needs is 
the very reason that political scientists should seek a more complete picture of 
unilateral power. If presidents have another tool, we cannot continue to only look at 
the executive order to represent everything that presidents do. It is important that we 
find a way to look at all of these options together, especially when they are so similar 
in the first place, so that we can see how they interact and the larger picture that they 
reveal about the extent to which presidents can make the changes they want without 





Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
The dissertation starts with an example of President Obama’s unilateral action 
on the minimum wage. In his 2013 State of the Union address, the President said, 
“Tonight, let’s declare that in the wealthiest nation on Earth, no one who works full-
time should have to live in poverty, and raise the federal minimum wage to $9.00 an 
hour. We should be able to get that done” (Obama 2013). Despite his efforts and 
appeals, the Republican House and Democratic Senate made no progress on such a 
law. When he spoke before Congress and the nation a year later, he changed his 
approach to ensure results on this issue. In a direct appeal to state and local leaders, 
he said, “You don’t have to wait for Congress to act; Americans will support you if 
you take this on” (Obama 2014). He then outlined his intentions to move his policy 
forward with unilateral action. “In the coming weeks, I will issue an executive order 
requiring federal contractors to pay their federally-funded employees a fair wage of at 
least $10.10 an hour” (Obama 2014). 
Exactly one year after he asked Congress for such a law in his 2013 State of 
the Union address, Obama signed Executive Order 13658. With that order, federal 
contractors became responsible for raising the salaries of those employees who were 
being paid the national minimum wage with funds the contractors received from their 
federal government contracts. Starting with the next calendar year, any federal 
contractor earning a new contract or renewing a contract with the federal government 
would need to raise the wages of employees who were doing the work of that contract 
or whose work was necessary for supporting that work. In rules published by the 




both the workers who built the goods specified in the contract and the security guards 
who monitored and secured those goods. The Department of Labor’s statistics 
indicated that some 200,000 workers would see raises as an effect of the Obama 
order.   
When he saw his policy objective going nowhere but wanted to make the 
issue salient and provide the opportunity for others to follow suit, he reached into the 
metaphorical toolbox of presidents and issued an executive order. With the stroke of 
his pen, federal contractors became responsible for paying their minimum wage 
employees more on federally contracted projects. Cities around the country followed 
suit with their own bills, and many states saw similar ballot measures in their 
upcoming elections. While not a policy that applied to all people across the country, 
Obama took the first step toward policy success and accomplishing this goal for 
thousands of Americans by issuing an executive order. 
Similarly, Trump took office with a pledge to fix Obama’s healthcare law, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. As soon as he took office, the new 
President signed an executive order that signaled the first step in dismantling 
Obamacare. “It is the policy of my Administration to seek the prompt repeal of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” (Executive Order 13765). The order goes 
on to mandate Executive branch departments and agencies to “take all actions 
consistent with law to minimize the unwarranted economic and regulatory burdens of 
the Act, and prepare to afford the States more flexibility and control to create a more 
free and open healthcare market” (Executive Order 13765). In this case, Trump was 




of taking the presidential oath, he instead sought to signal the direction of his White 
House and administration to repealing a faulty healthcare law. He then worked with 
congressional leaders of his party, the majority in both houses of Congress, to craft a 
bill that would formally repeal Obama’s landmark legislation. 
As demonstrated in these cases with Obama and Trump, the executive order 
appears to provide a great deal of power to presidents who want to move policy. But 
are they always able to do so on whatever issues they would like? In this chapter, I 
review the findings from the dissertation, discuss the lessons that can be learned from 
this work, expand the conversation to the salience of this topic at this precise moment 
in time, and provide some thoughts on continuing to move forward with studies of 
presidential power in the future. 
Critical Executive Orders 
Why do we study executive orders in the first place? Executive orders are a 
fruitful demonstration of unilateral governance and provide great insight into how 
presidents act within their political environment to achieve policy change. Unilateral 
acts such as the signing of executive orders and the issuance of presidential 
memoranda demonstrate a president’s ability to move on his or her own without first 
awaiting a bill from Congress. While some of these actions may be routine in nature, 
others can be quite transformative with great capacity to create policy change. These 
actions are the very embodiment and enactment of unilateral governance, the belief 
that presidents can be solo actors in the political space with the singlehanded ability 
to make change. In the literature, presidential power is rooted in the ability to 




she wants. But what are the circumstances surrounding the president’s ability to move 
policy through unilateral means when he or she wants? 
At times, presidents may use these powers to circumvent an uncooperative 
Congress or move policy they would otherwise not be able to move. Political 
scientists tend to discuss executive orders and other unilateral tools as second-best 
options that presidents employ only when they fail to achieve their policy objectives 
by other means, but I argue here that these options can also serve as preferred tools in 
several cases. The legislative process is a cumbersome one that does not lend itself to 
fast action when it is sometimes required. Executive actions then present an 
opportunity for fast action when the situation – including military or economic crisis 
– requires such speed and decisive action. In some of these cases, we would not want 
to rely on a sluggish legislative process that would be unable to provide the kind of 
quick response that may be necessary. There may also be times when presidents 
merely mean to set the policy agenda and provide an opportunity for states, 
municipalities, and Congress to follow suit with their relatively limited orders. 
Toward this end, political scientists have made studies of executive orders by 
focusing on significant orders that embody a policy change and garner attention from 
the press and other branch actors.  Analysis of the previously established set of 
significant executive orders shows that the list still contains several routine, non-
policy, and low-impact orders alongside more consequential and costlier (in terms of 
budget implications and a president’s resources) orders that create new programs. 
Focusing more closely on a group of the most significant executive orders that have 




amount of attention from the public gives us a new way to conceptualize and analyze 
presidential power. With a smaller set of executive orders, we can more accurately 
ask the questions: what actions from presidents truly stand out as demonstrations of 
unilateral governance, and what factors influence the presidents’ abilities to issue 
such orders? Based on the level of effective constraints placed on presidents by their 
political contexts, we can then determine whether our understandings of presidential 
action have been underestimating or overestimating the degree of freedom that 
presidents have to be most impactful. 
This dissertation proposes a method for identifying critical executive orders, 
the subset of significant executive orders that have been the most impactful and 
important based on the number of New York Times stories that mention them. Using 
this new classification for critical executive orders, I assess the political dynamics 
that influence the number of critical executive orders that a president issues. With this 
information, we can determine the extent to which presidents have the freedom to act 
unilaterally and to what extent they appear effectively bound by the circumstances in 
which they find themselves, issuing fewer orders because the political context does 
not lend itself to unilateral prolificacy. 
My analysis shows that several factors account for the prevalence of critical 
executive orders that presidents issue. Specifically, divided government, polarization, 
polarization under divided government, approval ratings, the economy, war, and 
several aspects of timing within the administration influence the number of critical 
executive orders that presidents issue. As presidents observe their surroundings and 




achieve their policy goals, these different characteristics tend to impact the 
president’s assessment.  
What do we learn from these results? First and foremost, we learn that 
presidents are constrained in the options available to them. They cannot use their 
executive powers at will to rewrite public policy or reshape the face of American 
government. They cannot continue to issue executive orders with impunity whenever 
it suits their needs. While previous studies had already told us that such was the case 
with total executive orders and significant orders, we now see this result with critical 
executive orders as well. Even when presidents are making their greatest unilateral 
marks on history, their political circumstances shape their opportunities to do so. 
Even on their most substantive actions when it might matter most, presidents are still 
responsive to the political contexts in which they find themselves. 
Given the several dynamics that play a role in the prevalence of critical 
executive orders, we may have routinely overestimated the amount of latitude that 
presidents have when it comes to unilateral tools. A lack of statistically significant 
results would have indicated that presidents could do those things they wanted most 
whenever they wanted. Their exercises of unilateral governance would have been 
connected to only the desire to act and not dependent on the structure of government, 
the president’s resources, the economy, or timing. But instead, the results tell us that 
even the most critical actions can be partially explained by external circumstances to 
which the president largely responds. If even in these cases, the president’s hands are 
tied, we have an effectively constrained executive when it comes to both shared and 




This finding also refutes Mayer’s (2009) expectation that presidents would 
build upon a precedent of unfettered access to their unilateral powers. In looking at 
the executive order as just a snapshot of unilateral governance, we do not find 
presidents issuing greater numbers of such orders while they turn simultaneously 
pursue fewer pieces of legislation to attain their policy goals. Instead, we see 
decreasing numbers of executive orders by president and still relatively low numbers 
of critical executive orders.42 Aside from partisan and ideological posturing by 
congressional parties when the president is of a different party, we do not see 
“troubling” power grabs with “a steady expansion of presidential power.” Presidents 
do not find themselves in situations that are conducive to increasing numbers of 
(critical) executive orders to achieve desired policies.  
Furthermore, we find additional support for a classic debate within the 
presidency literature about differences between domestic and foreign policy. 
Wildavsky famously posed the question of whether presidents face different rates of 
legislative success based on whether they are trying to move domestic or foreign 
policy. My findings suggest that, like presidents’ differing abilities to be successful in 
their legislative efforts, presidents see a difference in their ability to be successful in 
issuing critical executive orders as well. The difference in this case is not about the 
rates of success but instead related to the factors that influence the prevalence of 
critical executive orders. While some political dynamics affect the issuance of both 
                                                
42 Despite overall recent trends, Trump is on track to hit a relatively high number of total executive 
orders and critical executive orders. Only time will tell, but such an observation for Trump could 
comport with Neustadt’s conception of a president who turns to orders when he is otherwise weak. 
Despite weeks of build-up and an executive order targeting Obamacare for death on his first day in 
office, Trump stumbled with the legislative process of repealing his predecessor’s healthcare law. 
After delaying the vote by one day from its originally scheduled date, the vote was then pulled entirely 




types of policy orders, they vary in magnitude. We also see that some dynamics only 
influence one type of policy order without being statistically significant in the other 
policy type model. This finding reflects the similar finding by Wildavsky in his study 
of legislative politics and the two presidencies thesis. Based on the number of factors 
that influence critical foreign orders and the amount of variance explained by the 
respective models, it seems to continue to be the case that presidents enjoy a bit of an 
advantage when it comes to both unilateral and shared power focused on foreign 
policy concerns. 
 Also interesting and worth noting from these results is the fact that presidents 
are effectively constrained by more than just events inside the Beltway. Older 
accounts of presidential power really focused their studies and analysis on happenings 
within Washington, DC. Even in Neustadt’s analysis of the presidential power to 
persuade, his conception of the president’s prestige is not directly a measure of 
presidential approval so much as it is a sense of how members of Congress think the 
people feel about the president. And Howell’s analysis focuses on majorities in 
Congress, changes in partisanship of the White House, and whether the same party 
controls the Oval Office and the Capitol. These are apparent realities that exist and 
matter most within Washington.  
 In a departure from previous studies, I include national dynamics that 
certainly make their way to the capital but do not live there. The economy, the 
president’s approval rating, and the engagement of American troops overseas all 
influence the number of critical executive orders issued by presidents during their 




districts with implications for people’s jobs and lives. Similarly, presidential approval 
moves such evaluations out of the hands of legislators who interpret how their 
constituents view the president and instead operationalizes this sentiment in the hands 
of the actual people. And American troops on the ground may be a decision that 
originates in Washington, but it has effects outside of Washington in a way that 
impacts people and their view of the world. All of these factors influence how our 
presidents wield their unilateral tools to affect change and so should be included in 
such analysis. 
A Question of Means 
Just as the dissertation starts with the story of Obama and Executive Order 
13658 on raising the minimum wage for federally funded contractor employees, it 
also starts with a rebuke by Republican House Leader Cantor and congressional 
Republicans for Obama’s use of unilateral powers. In the current political climate of 
high polarization, the use of executive orders is an incredibly salient topic. Inherent in 
this conversation is a normative question on the use of unilateral tools and 
presidential actions. When Cantor labeled Obama an “imperial president” based on 
unilateral actions, he was making an argument about extralegal uses of such tools that 
he found inappropriate and unconstitutional. Republicans objected to Obama’s 
executive orders on the charge that they should not be permitted and were not legally 
defensible under laws passed and the Constitution. 
Democrats object to many of President Trump’s executive orders in his first 
60 days in office on the same grounds. While some of his orders have been fairly 




campaign promises to weaken and eventually eliminate the Affordable Care Act, 
enshrining the notion of ethics in the Executive branch, or creating panels to study 
issues of interest for the incoming administration – there have been other executive 
orders that are more unconventional. In what has been viewed as a war on immigrants 
and members of a religion, some of Trump’s first executive orders dedicated 
resources to building a wall between the United States and Mexico (Executive Order 
13767), adding more immigration officers to investigate and deport undocumented 
immigrants (Executive Order 13768), and banning visas and entry to citizens of 
majority Muslim countries (Executive Orders 13769 and 13780). Legal challenges to 
some of these orders came within hours with some court cases already finished 
(striking down Executive Order 13769) and others still in the works (a decision on 
Executive Order 13780).  
Republicans, however, defend the new presidents’ use of executive orders to 
accomplish his policy objectives. The New York Times noted some of these reversals 
in Republican evaluations, a change of tune from their complaints when Obama sat in 
the Oval Office. “Also notable is the Republicans’ acceptance of something they have 
despised: the use of the executive pen to make policy. Several House Republicans 
dismissed the notion that Mr. Trump would abuse his power to issue executive orders 
in the way they complained that Mr. Obama did during his second term” (Steinhauer 
2017). These appraisals of the executive order as a policy mechanism appears 
connected to the partisanship of the president and the observer in polarized times, an 





Such charges and accusations raise questions about the demonstrations of such 
power through unilateral action. The question becomes one of whether or not 
presidents should have these powers and be able to use them as they do. Part of this 
response may be a symptom of our intense ideological polarization whereby the 
parties do not grant presidents of the opposition party any latitude in running the 
country and enforcing the law as the president sees it. For conservatives and 
Republicans, Obama’s actions may be more egregious offenders of the principles of 
divided powers, checks and balances, and constitutionality, but liberals and 
Democrats may see it the other way. One way or another, however, these actions 
emanate from a guiding document that does not explicitly create them (or even 
contain the term “executive order”) in the first place. 
Lacey (2000) seems to raise this question in an article written in the final 
summer of the Clinton administration. “Congress appears intent on denying President 
Clinton major legislative victories in his final months of office, but White House 
officials say they will continue drafting and carrying out policies, Congress or no 
Congress, until Mr. Clinton’s final day.” One of Clinton’s domestic policy advisers 
claimed, “This president will be signing executive orders right up until the morning of 
January 20, 2001” (Lacey 2000). While such was not the case, the article was written 
to highlight the difference of partisanship and ideology between the White House and 
the Capitol Building and how the man in the Oval Office would go around a 
recalcitrant Congress to establish his legacy in the closing months of his 




his way out of office, decried his unilateral actions when they believed the people had 
elected a Republican Congress to slow Clinton’s agenda. 
Executive orders could likely continue to be an intense battle of political 
power and means in the future as we see increasing polarization and longer periods of 
divided government. While previously a somewhat uncommon occurrence that tended 
to signal a change of party change and renewed partisan control of the institutions of 
government, divided government is now a much more common occurrence. In the last 
40 years, we have had only 12 ½ years of unified government with 27 ½ years of 
divided government. The longest stretches of unified government during that time 
were the four years of the Carter administration from 1977 to 1981 and four years of 
unified government for Bush II from 2003 to 2007. Otherwise, these patches of 
unified government tend to be very short periods that last just the length of one 
Congress before ushering in a new period of divided government. If this trend 
represents a new political reality, we can expect to see a battle over the use of these 
unilateral tools continue into the future. The “uncontrollable and sinister” collection 
of power may not be the future reality that Mayer (2009, 443) predicted, but 
ubiquitous allegations of such may be. 
Future directions for research 
Of course, the executive order is just one of several executive tools that 
presidents use during their time in the Oval Office. They also use proclamations, 
executive agreements, presidential determinations, national security directives, and – 
with increasing frequency – the presidential memorandum. The executive order 




and published and therefore easy to track. These other options available to presidents 
can be issued under more secretive terms with less publicity given to them. But the 
memorandum is gaining attention and notoriety because of the efforts by President 
Obama to improve transparency in the Executive branch. Under the last 
administration, the White House published all of its memoranda and put them on par 
with executive orders, providing observers and political scientists the ability to have 
another aspect of unilateral governance that can be tracked and studied. 
As we move forward, we should consider executive orders in the broader 
context of unilateral governance. Critical orders – and the larger body of significant 
executive orders they represent – are just a part of the picture. With the findings here 
about the influences on and limits to the exercise of such actions, political science 
should continue looking for a way to better aggregate these different tools (and 
especially the most significant of these different tools) so that we can build a more 
comprehensive model of how presidents affect policy change. With improved 
methods for including all of a president’s different unilateral actions, we can continue 
to derive better and more accurate tests for the political dynamics that influence the 






Chapter 3: Critical Executive Orders 
Table A3.1: Search Terms for Howell’s List of Significant Executive Orders 





9538 4/13/45 Truman 
Auth cert. for probational appt of persons who lost 
opportunity b/c of entry into armed forces 1 
probational 
appointment 
9539 4/13/45 Truman 
Reinstating Avra M. Warren in the Foreign Service of the 
United States 1 Avra Warren 
9540 4/17/45 Truman 
Auth the Petroleum Admin to take possession/operate the 
plants and facilities of Cities Service Refining 




9541 4/19/45 Truman 
Transfer Off of Surplus Property of Procurement Div of 
the Dept of Treas to the Dept of Comm 2 
treasury and 
commerce 
9547 5/2/45 Truman 
Providing for rep of the US in preparing/prosecuting 
charges of atrocities and war crimes 3 
atrocities and war 
crimes 
9548 5/3/45 Truman 
Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior To Take 
Possession of and To Operate Certain Coal Mines 2 
secretary of the 
interior, coal 
mine* 
9562 6/4/45 Truman Termination of the Office of Civilian Defense 0 
Office of Civilian 
Defense, terminate 
OR termination 
9567 6/8/45 Truman 
Amending EO 9095, as amended by EO 9193, to Define 
further the functions/duties of the Alien Property 
Custodian as to property of Germany and Japan and 





9568 6/8/45 Truman Providing for the Release of Scientific Information 2 
scientific 
information 
9572 6/15/45 Truman 
Possession, Control, and Operation of Toledo, Peoria & 
Western Railroad 2 
Toledo and Peoria 
and Western and 
railroad 
9575 6/21/45 Truman 
Declaring the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health 
Service to be a military service  1 
Commissioned 
Corp* OR Public 
Health Service 
9577 6/29/45 Truman 
Terminating the War Food Administration and 
transferring its functions to the Sec of Ag 1 
War Food 
Administration 
9577-A 7/1/45 Truman 
Auth the Petroleum Admin to take possession of/operate 
the plants/facilities of the Texas Company Located in or 




9585 7/4/45 Truman 
Auth the Sec of Navy to take poss of/operate the 
plants/facilities of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 
Inc., 3 Goodyear Tire 
9586 7/6/45 Truman Medal of Freedom 1 Medal of Freedom 
9597 8/14/45 Truman 
Amending EO 9240 Entitled ``Regulations Relating to 
Overtime Wage Compensation'' 2 
overtime wage 
compensation 
9599 8/18/45 Truman 
..for the orderly mod of wartime controls over prices, 
wages, materials, and facilities 14   
9600 8/18/45 Truman 
Amending EO 9240 Entitled ``Regulations Relating to 
Overtime Wage Compensation'' 1 amend*, 9240 
9601 8/21/45 Truman 
Revocation of EO 9240, as amended, entitled ``Regs 
Relating to Overtime Compensation'' See note   
9602 8/23/45 Truman 
Possession, Control, and Operation of the Transportation 
System, Plants, and Facilities of the Illinois Central 
Railroad Company 0 
Illinois Central 
Railroad 
9603 8/25/45 Truman 
Termination of Possession of Certain Property Taken by 









(Extension and Amendment of EO 9568) information 
9605 8/29/45 Truman 
Revokes Paragraph 4 EO 9279 of 12/5/1943, to permit vol 




9608 8/31/45 Truman 
Providing for the Termination of the Office of War 
Information, and for the Disposition of Its Functions and 




Office of War 
Information OR 
OWI 
9613 9/13/45 Truman 
Withdrawing/reserving for the use of the US lands 
containing radioactive minerals 1 
radioactive 
minerals 
9617 9/19/45 Truman 
Transfer of Certain Agencies and Functions to the 
Department of Labor 4 
Department of 
Labor OR Labor 
Department, 
transfer* 
9621 9/20/45 Truman 
Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and 
Disposition of its Functions 3 
Office of Strategic 
Services OR OSS 
9620 9/20/45 Truman 
Abolishing the Office of Economic Stabilization and 
Transferring its Functions to the Office of War 




Office of War 
Mobilization and 
Reconversion 
9626 9/24/45 Truman 
Appointment of the Member and Alternate Member for 
the United States of the International Military Tribunal 
Established for the Trial and Punishment of the Major 
War Criminals 0 
international 
military tribunal 
OR major war 
criminals 
9630 9/27/45 Truman 
Redist of foreign economic functions and functions wrt 





9635 10/1/45 Truman 







9638 10/4/45 Truman 
Creating the Civilian Production Administration and 





Board, create OR 
terminate 
9639 10/4/45 Truman 
Auth the Sec Navy To Take Possession of and Operate 
Certain Plants and Facilities Used in the Transportation, 





9643 10/19/45 Truman 
Transferring Certain Personnel, Records, Property, and 
Funds of the Department of Commerce, with Respect to 











9646 10/25/45 Truman 
Coat of Arms, Seal, and Flag of the President of the 
United States 1 flag 
9651 10/30/45 Truman 
Amend EO 9599, Providing for Assistance to Expanded 
Production and Continued Stabilization of the National 
Economy During the Transition from War to Peace, 7 
economy, 
transition from 
war to peace 
9658 11/21/45 Truman 
Poss, control, & op of transportation sys, plants, & 
facilities of the Capital Transit Company 0 
Capital Transit 
Company 
9665 12/27/45 Truman 
Transfer of the Functions of the Small War Plants 
Corporation to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
and the Department of Commerce 1 













9666 12/28/45 Truman 






9669 12/28/45 Truman 
Transfer of Air-Navigation Facilities and Functions in 
Iran From the War Department to the Administrator of 





9672 12/31/45 Truman 
Establishing the National Wage Stabilization Board and 




War Labor Board 
9674 1/4/46 Truman Liquidation of War Agencies 1 
liquidation OR 
liquidate, war 
agency OR war 
agencies 
9679 1/16/46 Truman 
Amend EO 9547, Entitled ``Providing for Representation 
of the United States in Preparing and Prosecuting Charges 
of Atrocities and War Crimes Against the Leaders of the 
European Axis Powers and Their Principal Agents and 
Accessories'' 3 
atrocities and war 
crimes 
9682 1/18/46 Truman 
Providing for the Furnishing of Information and 
Assistance to the Joint Anglo-American Committee of 




9683 1/19/46 Truman 
Restores limits on punishments for certain violations of 
Articles of War 58, 59, 61 and 86 0 
punishment*, 
violation* 
9685 1/24/46 Truman 
Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture To Take 
Possession of and Operate Certain Plants and Facilities 
Used in the Production, Processing, Transportation, Sale 






livestock OR meat 
9689 1/31/46 Truman Consolidation of Surplus Property Functions 2 surplus property 
9691 2/4/46 Truman 
Directing the Civil Service Commission To Resume 
Operations Under the Civil Service Rules, and 
Authorizing the Adoption of Special Regulations During 
the Transitional Period 0 
Civil Service 
Commission 
9693 2/5/46 Truman 
Poss, Control, and Operation of the Transportation 
Systems, Plants, and Facilities of Certain Towing and 
Transportation Companies Operating in NY Harbor and 
Conti Waters 1 
Conti Waters, NY 
Harbor OR New 
York Harbor 
9697 2/14/46 Truman 
Providing for continued stabilization of the nat'l econ the 




9698 2/19/46 Truman 
Designating Public International Organizations Entitled to 








9701 3/4/46 Truman 
Providing for the Reservation of Rights to Fissionable 
Materials in Lands Owned by the US 1 
fissionable 
material* 
9702 3/8/46 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Alton Railroad Company and Other Carriers, 




9710 4/10/46 Truman 
Terminating the Office of Inter-American Affairs and 
Transferring Certain of Its Functions 1 
Office of Inter-
American Affairs 
9711 4/11/46 Truman 
Providing Reemployment Benefits for Federal Civilian 
Employees Who Enter Civilian Service With the War or 
Navy Departments in Occupied Areas 1 
reemployment 
benefits 
9715 4/23/46 Truman Death of Harlan Fiske Stone 2 Harlan Stone 
9716 4/24/46 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Railway Express Agency, Inc., and Certain 
of Its Employees 1 
Railway Express 
Agency 






War, terminate OR 
termination 
9719 5/7/46 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate Disputes 
Between the Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., and 
Other Carriers, and Certain of Their Employees 3 
Transcontinental 
& Western Air 
9722 5/13/46 Truman 
Reassignment of the Functions of Supply Command and 
the Commanding General, Services of Supply 2 services of supply 
9723 5/14/46 Truman Termination of the President's War Relief Control Board 1 
War Relief 
Control Board 
9725 5/16/46 Truman 
Designates the Alien Property Custodian To Administer 
the Powers/Authority Conferred Upon the President by 
Sections 20 and 32 of the Trading With the Enemy Act 1 
Alien Property 
Custodian 
9727 5/17/46 Truman Possession, Control, and Operation of Certain Railroads 4 
railroad*, 
possession, control 
9728 5/21/46 Truman 
Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior To Take 
Possession of and To Operate Certain Coal Mines 10 
coal mine*, 
Secretary of the 
Interior OR 
Interior Secretary 
9729 5/23/46 Truman 
Further Defining the Functions and Duties of the Office 
of Defense Transportation 2 
Office of Defense 
Transportation 
9731 5/29/46 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Company 




9734 6/6/46 Truman President's Certificate of Merit 1 
merit, certificate 
OR award 
9735 6/11/46 Truman 
Establishing a Cabinet Committee on Palestine and 
Related Problems 1 
cabinet committee, 
Palestine 
9736 6/14/46 Truman 
Possession, Control, and Operation of the Transportation 
System, Plants, and Facilities of the Monongahela 
Connecting Railroad Company 1 Monongahela 
9745 6/30/46 Truman 
Providing for the Interim Administration of Certain 
Continuing Functions of the Office of Price 
Administration 2 
Office of Price 
Administration 
OR OPA, interim 
9760 7/23/46 Truman 
Conferring Certain Authority Upon the Secretary of State 
With Regard to Diplomatic and Consular Property of 
Germany and Japan Within the United States 1 
Germany OR 
Japan, property 
9762 7/25/46 Truman 
Transferring the Functions of the Office of Economic 









9763 7/27/46 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Pullman Company and Certain of its 
Employees 1 Pullman 
9764 7/29/46 Truman 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared Value 
Excess-Profits, and Capital Stock Tax Returns by the 
Special Committee Established Pursuant to Senate 
Resolution 71, Seventy-Seventh Congress To Investigate 




9770 8/22/46 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a dispute 
Between the Long Island Railroad Company and Certain 
of its Employees 2 
Long Island 
Railroad 




9781 9/19/46 Truman Establishing the Air Coordinating Committee 1 
Air Coordinating 
Committee 
9791 10/17/46 Truman 
Providing for a Study of Scientific Research and 
Development Activities and Establishing the President's 
Scientific Research Board 2 
Scientific 
Research Board 
9801 11/9/46 Truman 
Removing Wage and Salary Controls Adopted Pursuant 
to the Stabilization Act of 1942 3 
wage and salary 
controls 
9803 11/16/46 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company and 
Certain of its Employees 1 
Lehigh Valley 
Railroad Company 




Employee Loyalty Commission on 
Employee Loyalty 




9810 12/12/46 Truman 
Excusing Federal Employees From Duty One-Half Day 
on December 24, 1946 0 
federal employee, 
December 24 OR 
December 
Twenty-Four 
9809 12/12/46 Truman 
Providing for the Disposition of Certain War Agencies 




9812 12/19/46 Truman 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, and Declared Value 
Excess-Profits Tax Returns by the Committee on Naval 
Affairs, House of Representatives 1 
Committee on 
Naval Affairs OR 
Naval Affairs 
Committee 
9813 12/20/46 Truman 
Appointment of the Members and the Alternate Member 
of a Military Tribunal Established for the Trail and 
Punishment of Major War Criminals in Germany 1 




9814 12/23/46 Truman 
Establishing an Amnesty Board To Review Convictions 
of Persons Under the Selective Training and Service Act 
of 1940 and To Make Recommendations for Executive 
Clemency With Respect Thereto 1 amnesty board 
9816 12/31/46 Truman 
Providing for the Transfer of Properties and Personnel to 
the Atomic Energy Commission 2 
Atomic Energy 
Commission 
9817 12/31/46 Truman 
Regulations Governing Awards to Federal Employees for 
Meritorious Suggestions and for Exceptional or 
Meritorious Service 1 merit* 
9820 1/11/47 Truman 
Segregation of the Functions of the Housing Expediter 





9822 1/13/47 Truman 
Disposal of Certain Finnish Merchant Vessels to the 




9828 2/21/47 Truman 
Transferring the Surplus Property Office of the 
Department of the Interior to the War Assets 
Administration 1 
Surplus Property 
Office, War Assets 
Administration 
9830 2/24/47 Truman 
Amending the Civil Service Rules and Providing for 
Federal Personnel Administration 1 
Civil service rule* 
OR rule*, Federal 
Personnel 
Administration  
9832 2/25/47 Truman 
Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of the 




9835 3/22/47 Truman 
Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an 
Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of 









9842 4/23/47 Truman 





9844 4/28/47 Truman 
Designating the United States Mission to the United 
Nations and Providing for its Direction and 
Administration 1 
United States 
Mission to the 
United Nations 
9843 4/29/47 Truman 
Authorizing the Secretary of the Navy To Transfer 
Certain Vessels and Material and To Furnish Certain 
Assistance to the Republic of China 1 China 




9857 5/22/47 Truman 
Regulations for Carrying Out the Provisions of the Act 
Entitled "An Act To Provide for Assistance to Greece and 
Turkey" 3 Greece, Turkey 




9857-B 5/23/47 Truman 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 9734 of June 6, 
1946, Establishing the President's Certificate of Merit 0 
Certificate of 
Merit OR merit 
certificate 
9860 5/31/47 Truman 
Restoring Certain Land, and Granting an Easement in 
Certain Other Land, to the Territory of Hawaii 0 Hawaii 
9861 5/31/47 Truman 
Restoring Certain Lands of the Fort Armstrong Military 




9862 5/31/47 Truman 
Providing for the Transfer of Personnel to the American 
Mission for Aid to Greece and the American Mission for 
Aid to Turkey 1 Greece, Turkey 
9864 5/31/47 Truman 
Regulations for Carrying Out the Provisions of the Joint 
Resolution Entitled "Joint Resolution Providing for Relief 
Assistance to the People of Countries Devastated by War" 0 relief assistance 
9858 5/31/47 Truman 
Appointment of the Members and the Alternate Member 
of a Military Tribunal Established for the Trial and 
Punishment of Major War Criminals in Germany 1 




9865 6/14/47 Truman 
Providing for the Protection Abroad of Inventions 
Resulting From Research Financed by the Government 1 
invention*, 
protection* 
9874 7/18/47 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate Disputes 
Between the Southern Pacific Company (Pacific Lines), 
the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company, and the San 
Diego & Arizona Eastern Railway Company, and Certain 






9875 7/18/47 Truman 
Providing an Interim Administration for the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands 1 
trust territory OR 
territorial trust 
9877 7/26/47 Truman Functions of the Armed Forces 2 Armed Forces 
9883 8/11/47 Truman 
Revoking Executive Order No. 9172 of May 22, 1942, 
Establishing a Panel for the Creation of Emergency 
Boards for the Adjustment of Railway Labor Disputes 1 
railway labor 
disputes 
9891 9/15/47 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Railway Express Agency, Inc., and Certain 
of its Employees 1 
Railway Express 
Agency 
9896 10/2/47 Truman 
Display of the Flag of the United States at Half-Mast To 
Honor the Return of World War II Dead from Overseas 1 flag 
9904 11/13/47 Truman 
Amending Paragraph 8 of Executive Order No. 9635 of 
September 29, 1945, Prescribing the Order of Succession 
of Officers Authorized To Act as Secretary of the Navy 1 
Secretary of the 
Navy 
9912 12/24/47 Truman 
Establishing the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Scientific Research and Development 4 
Interdepartmental 
Committee 
9914 12/26/47 Truman 
Providing for the Administration of the Foreign Aid Act 
of 1947 2 Foreign Aid Act 
9915 12/30/47 Truman 
Delegating to the Secretary of Agriculture the Authority 
Vested in the President by Section 4 (b) of the Joint 





9919 1/3/48 Truman 
Delegating Authority and Establishing Procedures Under 
the Joint Resolution Approved December 30, 1947 2 
delegate OR 
delegating 
9925 1/17/48 Truman 
Establishing Airspace Reservations Over Certain 




9934 3/5/48 Truman 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on a Labor Dispute 
Affecting the Operation of Atomic Energy Facilities 1 
atomic energy, 
labor 
9935 3/16/48 Truman 
Directing the Transfer of Certain Vessels to the 
Government of Italy 1 Italy 
9939 3/23/48 Truman 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on a Labor Dispute 




9944 4/9/48 Truman 
Auth the Dept of State to Admin certain Functions Under 
the Foreign assist Act of 1948 0 
Foreign Assistance 
Act 
9943 4/9/48 Truman 




9957 5/10/48 Truman Possession, Control, and Operation of Railroads 6 
railroad*, 
possession, control 
9958 5/15/48 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the National Airlines, Inc., and Certain of its 




9964 6/3/48 Truman 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on Certain Labor 
Disputes Affecting the Maritime Industry of the United 
States 0 maritime industry 
9966 6/4/48 Truman 
Exemption of Carroll Miller From Compulsory 
Retirement for Age 2 Carroll Miller 
9979 7/20/48 Truman 
Prescribing Portions of the Selective Service Regulations 
and Authorizing the Director of Selective Service To 
Perform Certain Functions of the President Under the 
Selective Service Act of 1948 0 Selective Service 
9981 7/26/48 Truman 
Establishing the President's Committee on Equality of 





9980 7/26/48 Truman 
Regulations Governing Fair Employment Practices 
Within the Federal Establishment 2 
fair employment 
practices 
9987 8/17/48 Truman 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on Certain Labor 
Disputes Affecting the Maritime Industry of the United 
States 1 maritime industry 
9988 8/20/48 Truman Prescribing Portions of the Selective Service Regulations 2 Selective Service 
9991 8/26/48 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railway 
Company and Certain of Its Employees 1 
Pittsburgh & West 
Virginia Railway 
9992 8/28/48 Truman Amending the Selective Service Regulations 1 Selective Service 
10003 10/4/48 Truman 
Providing for the Investigation of and Report on 
Displaced Persons Seeking Admission into the United 
States 1 displaced persons 
10004 10/5/48 Truman 
Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program 5 
reciprocal trade 
agreements 
10007 10/15/48 Truman Organization of the Reserve Units of the Armed Forces 5 
reserve units, 
armed forces 
10008 10/18/48 Truman Amending the Selective Service Regulations 1 Selective Service 
10009 10/18/48 Truman 
Revoking in Part Executive Orders No. 589 of March 14, 
1907, and No. 1712 of February 24, 1913 0 589, 1712 
10010 10/18/48 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate Disputes 
Between the Akron & Barberton Belt Railroad Company 







10013 10/27/48 Truman 
Establishing the President's Committee on Religious and 





10016 11/10/48 Truman 
Coat of Arms, Seal, and Flag of the Vice President of the 
United States 1 
flag OR coat of 
arms, Vice 
President 
10019 12/2/48 Truman 
Excusing Federal Employees From Duty One-Half Day 




10021 12/14/48 Truman 
Further Exemption of Harry B. Mitchell From 
Compulsory Retirement for Age 0 Harry Mitchell 
10028 1/13/49 Truman 






10029 1/19/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Northwest Airlines, Inc., and Certain of its 
Employees 1 Northwest Airlines 
10030 1/26/49 Truman 
Administration and Supervision of the District of 
Columbia National Guard 1 National Guard 
10032 1/28/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railroad 
Company and Other Carriers, and Certain of Their 
Employees 1 railroad carriers 
10038 2/15/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate Dispute 
Between the Carriers Represented by the Eastern Carriers' 
Conference Committee and Southeastern Carriers' 











10045 3/15/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Wabash Railroad Company and the Ann 
Arbor Railroad Company and Certain of Their Employees 1 
Wabash Railroad 
OR Ann Arbor 
Railroad 
10050 4/9/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Railway Express Agency, Inc., and Certain 
of its Employees 1 
Railway Express 
Agency 
10051 4/15/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Aliquippa and Southern Railroad Company 




10056 5/12/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Union Railroad Company (Pittsburgh) and 




10057 5/14/49 Truman 
Transferring to the American Battle Monuments 
Commission Functions Pertaining to Certain United 





10062 6/6/49 Truman 
Establishing the Position of United States High 
Commissioner for Germany 1 
United States High 
Commissioner for 
Germany 
10067 7/8/49 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and 
Certain of its Employees 1 
Missouri Pacific 
Railroad 
10068 7/13/49 Truman 
Revoking Executive Order No. 2458 of September 20, 
1916, Establishing an Inter-Departmental Board on 
International Service of Ice Observation, Ice Patrol, and 
Ocean Derelict Destruction 1 
ice observation 
OR ice patrol 
10077 9/7/49 Truman 
Transfer of the Administration of the Island of Guam 
from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the 
Interior 1 Guam 
10092 12/17/49 Truman 
Establishing an Airspace Reservation Over Certain Areas 
of the Superior National Forest in Minnesota 2 Minnesota 
10095 1/3/50 Truman 





10099 1/27/50 Truman 
Providing for the Administration of the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act of 1949 1 
Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act 
10101 1/31/50 Truman 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 9746 of July 1, 1946, 
Relating to the Panama Canal  
2 
Panama Canal  
10102 1/31/50 Truman 
Transfer of Certain Business Operations, Facilities and 
Appurtenances From the Panama Canal to the Panama 
Railroad Company Panama Canal  
10106 2/6/50 Truman 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on a Labor Dispute 
Affecting the Bituminous Coal Industry of the United 
States 5 bituminous coal 
10114 3/3/50 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis 
and Certain of its Employees 1 
Terminal Railroad 
Association 
10117 3/20/50 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Carriers Represented by the Western 
Carriers' Conference Committee and Certain of Their 




10120 4/11/50 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Carriers Represented by the Eastern Carriers' 
Conference Committee, the Western Carriers' Conference 





10122 4/14/50 Truman 
Regulations Governing Payment of Disability Retirement 
Pay, Hospitalization, and Re-Examination of Members 







10129 6/3/50 Truman 




10130 6/6/50 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Boston & Albany Railroad Company (New 
York Central R.R. Company, Lessee) and Certain of its 1 
Boston & Albany 
Railroad OR New 





10131 6/16/50 Truman 
Providing for the Investigation of and Report on 
Displaced Persons and Persons of German Ethnic Origin 




10132 6/17/50 Truman 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 
Returns by the Senate Special Committee To Investigate 
Crime in Interstate Commerce 1 
interstate 
commerce, crime 
10141 7/8/50 Truman 
Possession, Control, and Operation of the Transportation 
System of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad 
Company 1 
Rock Island & 
Pacific Railroad 
10145 7/27/50 Truman 
Extension of Enlistments in the Armed Forces of the 
United States 1 
extension, 
enlistments 
10137 7/30/50 Truman 
Amending Executive Order No. 10077 of September 7, 
1949, Entitled "Transfer of the Administration of the 
Island of Guam From the Secretary of the Navy to the 
Secretary of the Interior" 0 Guam 
10146 8/2/50 Truman 
Exemption of William J. Patterson From Compulsory 
Retirement for Age 1 William Patterson 
10152 8/17/50 Truman 
Regulations Relating to the Right of Members of the 
Uniformed Services to Incentive Pay for the Performance 
of Hazardous Duty Required by Competent Orders 1 incentive pay 
10155 8/25/50 Truman Possession, Control, and Operation of Certain Railroads 3 
railroad*, 
possession, control 
10159 9/8/50 Truman 
Providing for the Administration of the Act for 




10160 9/9/50 Truman 
Providing for the Preservation of Records for Certain 




10161 9/9/50 Truman 
Delegating Certain Functions of the President Under the 
Defense Production Act of 1950 12 
delegating certain 
functions 
10167 10/11/50 Truman 
Prescribing or Amending Portions of the Selective 
Service Regulations 2 
Selective Service 
regulations 
10171 10/12/50 Truman 
Transferring Occupation Functions in Austria to the 
Department of State 0 Austria 
10173 10/18/50 Truman 
Regulations Relating to the Safeguarding of Vessels, 





10178 10/30/50 Truman 
Reserving Certain Real and Personal Property in Guam 
for the Use of the United States 1 Guam 
10180 11/13/50 Truman 
Establishing Special Personnel Procedures in the Interest 





10182 11/21/50 Truman 
Providing for the Appointment of Certain Persons Under 
the Defense Production Act of 1950 and Prescribing 
Regulations for Their Exemption From Certain Conflict 
of Interest Statutes 0 
Defence 
Production Act, 
conflict of interest 
10186 12/1/50 Truman 
Establishing the Federal Civil Defense Administration in 
the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive 




10193 12/16/50 Truman 
Providing for the Conduct of the Mobilization Effort of 
the Government 4 
mobilization, 
defense 




10202 1/13/51 Truman 
Prescribing or Amending Portions of the Selective 
Service Regulations 4 
amend*, selective 
service 
10207 1/23/51 Truman 
Establishing the President's Commission on Internal 





10208 1/25/51 Truman 
Providing for the Administration of the Yugoslav 
Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950 1 Yugoslav 
10214 2/8/51 Truman 








10219 2/28/51 Truman 
Defining Certain Responsibilities of Federal Agencies 
With Respect to Transportation and Storage 1 
transportation, 
storage 
10224 3/15/51 Truman 
Establishing the National Advisory Board on 





10226 3/23/51 Truman 
Regulations Relating to the Safeguarding of Vessels, 
Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront Facilities in the Canal 
Zone 1 canal zone 
10230 3/31/51 Truman Amending the Selective Service Regulations 6 
amend*, selective 
service 
10233 4/21/51 Truman 
Amending Executive Order 10161 With Respect to Wage 
Stabilization and Settlement of Labor Disputes 8 
wage stabilization, 
labor dispute* 
10241 4/28/51 Truman 
Amending Executive Order No. 9835 Entitled 
"Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an 
Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of 
the Government" 2 9835 
10245 5/17/51 Truman 
Establishing a Commission for the Commemoration of 
the One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the 
Signing of the Declaration of Independence 2 
Declaration of 
Independence 
10250 6/5/51 Truman 
Providing for the Performance of Certain Functions of the 




10251 6/7/51 Truman 
Suspension of the Eight-Hour Law as to Laborers and 
Mechanics Employed by the Department of Defense on 
Public Work Essential to the National Defense 1 
defense, 8 OR 
eight, hour 
10263 6/29/51 Truman 
Transfer of the Panama Canal (the Waterway), Together 
With Facilities and Appurtenances Related Thereto, and 
Other Facilities and Appurtenances Maintained and 
Operated by the Panama Canal (the Agency), to the 
Panama Railroad Company 1 
Panama Canal OR 
Panama Railroad 
Company 
10264 6/29/51 Truman 
Transfer of the Administration of American Samoa From 
the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior 0 American Samoa 
10270 7/6/51 Truman 
Extension of Enlistments in the Armed Forces of the 
United States 1 
enlistments, 
Armed Forces 
10271 7/7/51 Truman 
Delegating Authority of the President To Order Members 
and Units of Reserve Components of Armed Forces Into 
Active Federal Duty 2 active federal duty 
10276 7/31/51 Truman 
Administration of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as 
Amended, and Termination of the Office of the Housing 
Expediter 1 
Office of the 
Housing Expediter 
10281 8/28/51 Truman 







10283 8/30/51 Truman 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on Certain Labor 




10284 9/1/51 Truman 
Extension of Time Relating to the Disposition of Certain 
Housing 1 extension, housing 
10290 9/24/51 Truman 
Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards 
for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by 
Department and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of 
Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the 




10291 9/25/51 Truman 
Establishing an Airspace Reservation Over the Savannah 








10303 11/6/51 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between Certain Transportation Systems Operated by the 




10304 11/12/51 Truman 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 







10308 12/3/51 Truman 
Improving the Means for Obtaining Compliance With the 
Nondiscrimination Provisions of Federal Contracts 6 
nondiscrimination 
provisions 
10314 12/17/51 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 




10318 1/3/52 Truman Establishing the Missouri Basin Survey Commission 1 Missouri 
10321 1/24/52 Truman 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 




10323 2/5/52 Truman 
Transferring Certain Functions and Delegating Certain 




10327 2/20/52 Truman 




10332 3/7/52 Truman 
Prescribing the Order of Succession of Officers To Act as 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of 
the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force 1 
order of 
succession 
10339 4/5/52 Truman 
Extensions of Time Relating to the Disposition of Certain 
Housing 1 extension, housing 
10340 4/8/52 Truman 
Directing the Secretary of Commerce To Take Possession 




10342 4/12/52 Truman 
Restoring Lands of the Sugar Loaf Military Reservation 
and Right-of-Way Thereto to the Jurisdiction of the 
Territory of Hawaii 1 Hawaii 
10343 4/12/52 Truman 
Inspection of Tax Returns by Committee on the Judiciary, 
House of Representatives 1 tax returns 
10346 4/17/52 Truman 
Preparation by Federal Agencies of Civil Defense 
Emergency Plans 2 
civil defense, 
emergency 
10345 4/17/52 Truman 
Extension of Enlistments in the Armed Forces of the 
United States 1 
enlistments, 
Armed Forces 
10365 6/24/52 Truman 
Suspension of Certain Provisions of the Officer Personnel 
Act of 1947, as Amended, Which Relate to Officers of the 
Marine Corps 0 
officers, Marine 
Corps 
10366 6/26/52 Truman Amending the Selective Service Regulations 2 
amend*, selective 
service 
10371 7/9/52 Truman 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 




10377 7/25/52 Truman 




10379 8/2/52 Truman 
Suspension of the Operation of Certain Provisions of the 
Officer Personnel Act of 1947 Applicable to the 
Retirement of Colonels of the Regular Army and the 
Regular Air Force 1 
retirement, Army 
OR Air Force, 
colonel* OR 
officer* 
10382 8/9/52 Truman 
Providing for the Liquidation of the Affairs of the 
Displaced Persons Commission 1 
displaced persons, 
commission 
10386 8/20/52 Truman 
Inspection of Files Covering Compromise Settlements of 
Tax Liability 1 tax liability 
10392 9/4/52 Truman 
Establishing the President's Commission on Immigration 




10397 9/25/52 Truman 
Continuing in Effect Certain Appointments as Officers 
and Warrant Officers of the Army and Air Force 1 
officers OR 
warrant officers, 
army OR air force, 
appointment* 
10401 10/14/52 Truman 
Prescribing Procedures for Periodic Review of Escape-





10408 11/10/52 Truman 
Transfer of the Administration of the Portion of the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands Which Includes the Islands 
of Tinian and Saipan From the Secretary of the Interior to 
the Secretary of the Navy 1 Tinian OR Saipan 





10421 12/31/52 Truman 
Providing for the Physical Security of Facilities Important 
to the National Defense 1 security, facilities 
10422 1/9/53 Truman 
Prescribing Procedures for Making Available to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations Certain 
Information Concerning United States Citizens Employed 
or Being Considered for Employment on the Secretariat 




10426 1/16/53 Truman 
Setting Aside Submerged Lands of the Continental Shelf 
as a Naval Petroleum Reserve 13 
Naval Petroleum 
Reserve 
10432 1/24/53 Eisenhower 
Establishing the President's Advisory Committee on 





10433 2/4/53 Eisenhower 
Further Providing for the Administration of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950, as Amended 1 
Defense 
Production Act 
10434 2/6/53 Eisenhower 
Suspension of Wage and Salary Controls Under the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended 4 
Defense 
Production Act 
10435 2/6/53 Eisenhower 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 




10440 3/31/53 Eisenhower Amendment of Civil Service Rule VI 0 
civil service, rule 
6 OR rule vi 
10443 4/7/53 Eisenhower 
Suspension of the Eight-Hour Law as to Laborers and 
Mechanics Employed by the Atomic Energy Commission 
on Public Work Essential to the National Defense 1 
atom, 8 OR eight, 
hour 
10449 4/24/53 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the New York, Chicago, & St. Louis Railroad 
Company and Certain of its Employees 1 
emergency board, 
railroad 




10452 5/1/53 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Performance by the Chairman of the 
Civil Service Commission of Certain Functions Relating 
to Personnel Management 1 
civil service, 
chair* 
10459 6/2/53 Eisenhower 
Amend of EO 10422, Prescribing Procedures for Making 
Available to the Secretary General of the United Nations 
Certain Information Concerning United States Citizens 
Employed or Being Considered for Employment on the 




10460 6/16/53 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Performance by the Director of Defense 
Mobilization of Certain Functions Relating to 
Telecommunications 0 telecommunicat* 
10463 6/25/53 Eisenhower Amendment of Section 6.4 of Civil Service Rule VI 3 
civil service, rule, 
6 or six 
10467 6/30/53 Eisenhower 
Further Providing for the Administration of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950, as Amended 0 
Defense 
Production Act 
10469 7/11/53 Eisenhower Amending the Selective Service Regulations 3 selective service 
10472 7/20/53 Eisenhower 






10476 8/1/53 Eisenhower 





10477 8/1/53 Eisenhower 
Authorizing the Director of the United States Information 
Agency To Exercise Certain Authority Available by Law 
to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Foreign 
Operations Administration 0 
information 
agency 




10483 9/2/53 Eisenhower Establishing the Operations Coordinating Board 2 
operations 
coordinating board 
10486 9/12/53 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Establishment of the Advisory 







10489 9/26/53 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Administration of Certain Loan and 
Loan Guarantee Functions Under the Defense Production 
Act of 1950, as amended 1 loan 
10490 10/1/53 Eisenhower 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on Certain Labor 
Disputes Affecting the Maritime Industry of the United 
States 1 labor, maritime 
10491 10/13/53 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 





10494 10/14/53 Eisenhower 
Disposition of Functions Remaining Under Title IV of the 
Defense Production Act 1 
defense production 
act (wq) 
10497 10/27/53 Eisenhower 
Amendment of the Regulations Relating to 
Commissioned Officers and Employees of the Public 




10498 11/4/53 Eisenhower 
Delegating to the Secretaries of the Military Departments 
and the Secretary of the Treasury Certain Authority 




10501 11/5/53 Eisenhower 
Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the 
Defense of the United States 8 
information, 
safeguard* 
10505 12/10/53 Eisenhower Amending the Selective Service Regulations 1 selective service 
10511 12/28/53 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate Disputes 
Between the Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railroad 




10521 3/17/54 Eisenhower 
Administration of Scientific Research by Agencies of the 
Federal Government 1 
scientific research, 
foundation 
10523 3/26/54 Eisenhower 
Designating March 31, 1954, as the Day For Dedication 
of the Memorial to Major General George W. Goethals 
and Excusing Federal Employees on the Isthmus of 
Panama From Duty on That Day 1 goethals 
10530 5/10/54 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Performance of Certain Functions 




10539 6/22/54 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Administration of Functions Respecting 
Rubber, Tin, and Abaca Heretofore Administered by the 




10556 9/1/54 Eisenhower 
Authorizing Regulations for the Permanent Promotion 
and Reassignment of Federal Employees 1 
employ*, promot* 
OR reassign* 
10557 9/3/54 Eisenhower 
Approving the Revised Provision in Government 




10560 9/9/54 Eisenhower 
Administration of the Agricultural Trade Development 
and Assistance Act of 1954 1 
agricultural trade 
development (wq) 
10561 9/13/54 Eisenhower 
Designating Official Personnel Folders in Government 
Agencies as Records of the Civil Service Commission and 
Prescribing Regulations Relating to the Establishment, 




10562 9/20/54 Eisenhower Amending the Selective Service Regulations 1 selective service 
10569 10/5/54 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10334 of March 26, 
1952, Exempting Frederick C. Mayer From Compulsory 
Retirement for Age 1 mayer 
10570 10/16/54 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Pullman Company and Certain of Its 
Employees 1   
10577 11/22/54 Eisenhower 
Amending the Civil Service Rules and Authorizing a New 
Appointment System for the Competitive Service 1 
civil service, 
competit* 
10580 12/4/54 Eisenhower 
Excusing Federal Employees From Duty on December 
24, and for One-Half Day on December 31, 1954 0 employ*, duty 
10582 12/17/54 Eisenhower 
Prescribing Uniform Procedures for Certain 
Determinations Under the Buy-American Act 12 
buy-american OR 
buy american 
10585 1/1/55 Eisenhower 
Designating the Date of Termination of Combatant 
Activities in Korea and Waters Adjacent Thereto 1 korea 
10587 1/13/55 Eisenhower 
Administration of Section 32(h) of the Trading With the 
Enemy Act 1 
trading with the 





10590 1/18/55 Eisenhower 
Establishing the President's Committee on Government 






10594 1/31/55 Eisenhower Amending the Selective Service Regulations 0 
selective service 
(wq) 
10602 3/23/55 Eisenhower 
Designating the Secretary of the Interior as the 
Representative of the President To Approve the 
Obligation and Expenditure of Certain Moneys by the 
Government of the Virgin Islands 1 virgin 
10607 5/3/55 Eisenhower 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared-Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital-Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 
Returns by the Committee on Government Operations, 
House of Representatives 1 
government 
operations 
10608 5/5/55 Eisenhower United States Authority and Functions in Germany 1 germany 
10610 5/9/55 Eisenhower Administration of Mutual Security and Related Functions 2 mutual security 
10606 5/3/1955 Eisenhower 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared-Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital-Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 




10616 6/21/55 Eisenhower 
Suspension of Certain Provisions of the Officer Personnel 
Act of 1947, as Amended, Which Relates to Officers of 
the Marine Corps of the Grade of Brigadier General 1 
marine, brigadier 
general (wq) 
10627 8/5/55 Eisenhower 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared-Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital-Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 
Returns by the Committee on Un-American Activities, 
House of Representatives 2 
un-american 
activities (wq), tax 
10629 8/13/55 Eisenhower 
Authorizing Enlistments in the Ready Reserve of the 
Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve 1 
reserve, army OR 
marine 
10631 8/17/55 Eisenhower 
Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the 
United States 5 
conduct, armed 
forces 
10634 8/25/55 Eisenhower 
Providing for Loans To Aid in the Reconstruction, 
Rehabilitation and Replacement of Facilities Which Are 
Destroyed or Damaged by a Major Disaster and Which 
Are Required for National Defense 2 
loan*, disaster* 
OR defense 
10635 9/1/55 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board to Investigate a Dispute 




10637 9/16/55 Eisenhower 
Delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury Certain 
Functions of the President Relating to the United States 
Coast Guard 1 coast guard 
10636 9/16/55 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10000 of September 
16, 1948, Prescribing Regulations Governing Additional 
Compensation and Credit Granted Certain Employees of 




abroad OR outside 
10638 10/10/55 Eisenhower 
Authorizing the Director of the Office of Defense 
Mobilization To Order the Release of Strategic and 
Critical Materials From Stock Piles in the Event of an 
Attack Upon the United States 0 
office of defense 
mobilization (wq) 
10639 10/10/55 Eisenhower 
Amendment of the Tariff of United States Foreign Service 
Fees 0 tariff 
10640 10/10/55 Eisenhower 
The President's Committee on Employment of the 




10645 11/22/55 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 9 of January 17, 
1873, To Permit an Officer or Employee of the Federal 
Government To Hold the Office of Member of the State 
Board of Agriculture of the State of 0 agriculture 
10647 11/28/55 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Appointment of Certain Persons Under 
the Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended 3 
defense production 
act 
10650 1/6/56 Eisenhower 
Prescribing Regulations Governing the Selection of 
Certain Persons Who Have Critical Skills for Enlistment 




10651 1/6/56 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Screening of the Ready Reserve of the 
Armed Forces Established Under the Provisions of Part II 
of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as Amended 1 
ready reserve 
(wq), armed forces 
reserve (wq) 
10653 1/6/56 Eisenhower 
Designating the Honorable A. Cecil Snyder To Act, 
Under Certain Circumstances, as Judge of the United 
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 
During the Year 1956 1 snyder 
10656 2/6/56 Eisenhower 
Establishing the President's Board of Consultants on 




10660 2/15/56 Eisenhower 
Providing for the Establishment of a National Defense 




10659 2/15/56 Eisenhower Amending the Selective Service Regulations 1 selective service 
10670 6/12/56 Eisenhower Establishing a Flag for the United States Army 2 flag, army 
10681 10/22/56 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10152, Prescribing 
Regulations Relating to Incentive Pay for the 
Performance of Hazardous Duty 1 
pay, incentiv* 
(including 10152) 
10689 11/22/56 Eisenhower 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on Certain Labor 
Disputes Affecting the Maritime Industry of the United 
States 2 
board of inquiry 
(wq) 
10691 12/5/56 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway 
Company and Certain of Its Employees Represented by 
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 1 rail*, board 
10693 12/22/56 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate Disputes 
Between the Akron & Barberton Belt Railroad and Other 
Carriers and Certain of Their Employees 1 rail*, board 




10702 3/12/57 Eisenhower Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd 1 byrd 
10703 3/17/57 Eisenhower 
Inspection of Income, Excess-Profits, Declared-Value 
Excess-Profits, Capital-Stock, Estate, and Gift Tax 
Returns by the Select Committee of the Senate 
Established by Senate Resolution 74, 85th Congress, To 
Investigate Improper Activities in Labor-Management 
Relations, and for Other Purposes 1 
labor, 
management 
10705 4/17/57 Eisenhower 
Delegations of Certain Authority of the President Relating 
to Radio Stations and Communications 1 radio 
10714 6/13/57 Eisenhower Amending the Selective Service Regulations 2 selective service 
10721 8/5/57 Eisenhower The Honorable Walter F. George 1 george, walter 
10723 8/6/57 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the General Managers' Association of New York 
Representing the New York Central Railroad…. 1 
rail*, board OR 
dispute 
10724 8/12/57 Eisenhower Establishing a Career Executive Committee 1 
career executive 
committee (wq) 
10728 9/6/57 Eisenhower 
Establishing the President's Committee on Fund-Raising 
Within the Federal Service 1 fund-rais* 
10730 9/24/57 Eisenhower 
Providing Assistance for the Removal of an Obstruction 
of Justice Within the State of Arkansas 3   
10735 10/17/57 Eisenhower Amending the Selective Service Regulations 0 
selective service 
(wq) 
10737 10/29/57 Eisenhower 
Further Providing for the Administration of Disaster 
Relief 2 disaster 
10739 11/15/57 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10152, Prescribing 
Regulations Relating to Incentive Pay for the 
Performance of Hazardous Duty by Members of the 
Uniformed Services 1 hazard* 
10741 11/25/57 Eisenhower Establishing the Trade Policy Committee 1 
trade policy 
committee (wq) 
10742 11/29/57 Eisenhower 
Further Providing for the Administration of Foreign-Aid 
Functions 1 foreign-aid 
10745 12/12/57 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Section 203 of Executive Order No. 
10577 of November 22, 1954, as Amended, Providing for 




Appointments to Career Appointments 
10747 12/31/57 Eisenhower 
Designating the Secretary of State To Act for the United 
States in Certain Matters Pertaining to Japanese War 
Criminals 1 japan* 
10758 3/14/58 Eisenhower 
Establishing a Career Executive Program Within the Civil 
Service System 1 executive, career 
10761 3/27/58 Eisenhower 
Government Purchases of Crude Petroleum and 
Petroleum Products 3 petroleum 
10764 4/23/58 Eisenhower 
Suspension of the Eight-Hour Law as to Laborers and 
Mechanics Employed by the Civil Aeronautics 
Administration on Public Work Essential to the National 
Defense 1 
hour, 8 OR eight, 
defense 
10771 6/20/58 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10534, Relating to 
the Supervision and Direction of the Saint Lawrence 




10791 11/28/58 Eisenhower Designating Certain Officers To Act as Secretary of State 1 secretary of state 
10792 11/28/58 Eisenhower 
Excusing Federal Employees From Duty All Day on 
December 26, 1958 0 december 
10793 12/3/58 Eisenhower 
Transferring Certain Functions From the Department of 




10798 1/3/59 Eisenhower Flag of the United States 4 flag, alaska 
10802 1/23/59 Eisenhower 
Establishing the Committee on Government Activities 
Affecting Prices and Costs 1 
prices and costs 
(wq) 
10811 4/22/59 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between Pan American World Airways, Inc., and Certain 
of its Employees 1 pan american 
10812 4/24/59 Eisenhower Establishing a Flag for the United States Navy 1 flag, nav* 
10816 5/7/59 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10501 of November 
5, 1953, Relating to Safeguarding Official Information in 
the Interests of the Defense of the United States 2 
information, 
defense 
10820 5/18/59 Eisenhower 
Prescribing the Order of Succession of Officers To Act as 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of 
the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force 1 secretar*, succe* 
10823 5/26/59 Eisenhower 
Coat of Arms, Seal, and Flag of the President of the 
United States 1 
president, star OR 
alaska 
10825 6/12/59 Eisenhower 
Excusing Federal Employees From Duty All Day on July 
3, 1959 1 july, employ* 
10829 7/20/59 Eisenhower Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy 1 leahy 
10831 8/14/59 Eisenhower Establishing the Federal Radiation Council 2 radiation 
10834 8/21/59 Eisenhower The Flag of the United States 1 flag 
10842 10/6/59 Eisenhower 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on Certain Labor 
Disputes Affecting the Maritime Industry of the United 
States 6 maritime 
10843 10/9/59 Eisenhower 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on a Labor Dispute 
Affecting the Steel Industry of the United States 11 steel 
10845 10/12/59 Eisenhower 
Further Specification of Laws From Which Functions 
Authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as 
Amended, Shall Be Exempt 0 
mutual security act 
(wq) 
10848 10/14/59 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10843, Creating a 
Board of Inquiry to report on a Labor Dispute Affecting 




steel, 10843 OR 
board 
10858 1/13/60 Eisenhower The President's Committee for Traffic Safety 1 traffic 
10860 2/5/60 Eisenhower 
Coat of Arms, Seal, and Flag of the President of the 
United States 2 
president, star OR 
hawaii 
10863 2/18/60 Eisenhower 
Authorizing the Attorney General To Seize Arms and 
Munitions of War, and Other Articles, Pursuant to Section 




10865 2/20/60 Eisenhower Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry 4 industr* 
10868 2/29/60 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between the New York Central System and Certain of Its 
Employees 1 
new york central 
system 
10870 3/15/60 Eisenhower 
Designating the Facilities of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration at Huntsville, Alabama, as the 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 1 marshall 




Between Pan American World Airways, Inc., and Certain 
of Its Employees 
dispute 
10876 4/22/60 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order 10855, Authorizing the 
Inspection of Certain Tax Returns 1 
tax returns (wq), 
10855 
10888 9/28/60 Eisenhower 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate a Dispute 
Between Certain Carriers Represented by the New York 
Harbor Carriers' Conference Committee and Certain of 
Their Employees 1 
new york harbor 
carrier*, board OR 
dispute 
10891 11/1/60 Eisenhower 
Establishing a Commission To Inquire Into a Controversy 




10893 11/8/60 Eisenhower Administration of Mutual Security and Related Functions 1 mutual security 
10892 11/8/60 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order 10152, Prescribing 
Regulations Relating to Incentive Pay for the 
Performance of Hazardous Duty by Members of the 
Uniformed Services 1 
hazard*, 10152 
OR pay 




10901 1/9/61 Eisenhower 
Amendment of Executive Order 10501, Relating to 
Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the 





10914 1/21/61 Kennedy 
Providing for an expanded program of food distribution to 
needy families 6 
food distribution 
(wq) 
10915 1/24/61 Kennedy 
Amending prior Executive Orders to provide for the 
responsibilities of the Director of the Food-for-Peace 
Program 1 
director, "food for 
peace" OR "food-
for-peace" 
10918 2/16/61 Kennedy 
Establishing the President's Advisory Committee on 





10919 2/17/61 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Pan American World Airways, Inc., and 
certain of its employees 5 
pan, board OR 
dispute 
10920 2/20/61 Kennedy 
Revoking Executive Order No. 10700 of February 25, 




10921 2/21/61 Kennedy 
Establishing a commission to inquire into a controversy 
between certain air carriers and certain of their employees 3 
commission, 
carrier*, employ* 
10922 2/23/61 Kennedy 
Amending Executive Order 10922 of February 21, 1961, 
establishing a commission to inquire into a controversy 
between certain air carriers and certain of their employees 2 
commission, 
carrier*, employ* 
10924 3/1/61 Kennedy 
Establishment and administration of the Peace Corps in 
the Department of State 30 peace corps 
10925 3/6/61 Kennedy 
Establishing the President's Committee on Equal 




10929 3/24/61 Kennedy 
Establishing a commission to inquire into a controversy 
between certain carriers and certain of their employees 0 
commission, 
carrier* 
10934 4/13/61 Kennedy 




10936 4/24/61 Kennedy Reports of identical bids 1 identical bid* (wq) 
10939 5/5/61 Kennedy 
To provide a guide on ethical standards to Government 
officials 2 ethic* 
10940 5/11/61 Kennedy 
Establishing the President's Committee on Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Crime 4 
juvenile 
delinquency (wq) 
10945 5/24/61 Kennedy Administration of the Export Control Act of 1949 0 
export control act 
(wq) 
10946 5/26/61 Kennedy 
Establishing a program for resolving labor disputes at 
missile and space sites 1 
labor, missile OR 
space, disput* 
10949 6/26/61 Kennedy 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on a labor dispute 
affecting the maritime industry of the United States 1 
board, maritime, 
disput* 
10952 7/20/61 Kennedy 
Assigning civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of 




10956 8/10/61 Kennedy 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10841, relating to 




1954, as amended 
10957 8/10/61 Kennedy 
Assigning authority with respect to ordering persons and 
units in the Ready Reserve to active duty and with respect 
to the extension of enlistments and other periods of 
service in the Armed Forces 0 ready reserve (wq) 
10964 9/20/61 Kennedy 
Amendment to Executive Order 10501—Safeguarding 
official information in the interests of the defense of the 
United States 1 info*, defense 
10969 10/11/61 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Reading Company and certain of its 
employees 1 
reading, board OR 
disput* 
10971 11/1/61 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between Trans World Airlines, Inc., and certain of its 
employees 1 
trans, board OR 
disput* 
10971 11/3/61 Kennedy 
Administration of the Agricultural Trade Development 




10972 11/3/61 Kennedy Administration of foreign assistance and related functions 0 
foreign assistance 
(wq) 
10974 11/8/61 Kennedy 




10976 11/15/61 Kennedy 
Suspension of the eight-hour law as to laborers and 
mechanics employed by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 1 
hour, 8 OR eight, 
space OR NASA 




10980 12/14/61 Kennedy 
Establishing the President's Commission on the Status of 
Women 0 
commission on the 
status of women 
(wq) 
10982 12/25/61 Kennedy 
Administration of the Act of September 26, 1961, relating 
to evacuation payments, assignments, and allotments, and 




10981 12/28/61 Kennedy 
Inspection of income, excess-profits, estate, and gift tax 
returns by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 2 
tax, senate OR 
judiciary 
10984 1/5/62 Kennedy Amending the Selective Service Regulations 1 
selective service 
(wq) 
10987 1/17/62 Kennedy Agency systems for appeals from adverse actions 0 
appeal*, agency 
OR adverse 




10989 1/22/62 Kennedy 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10168, of October 
11, 1950, as amended, prescribing regulations relating to 
the right of enlisted members of the uniformed services to 
additional pay for sea and foreign duty 1 
pay, enlist* OR 
service*, foreign 
OR sea 
10993 2/9/62 Kennedy 
Consolidating the Hiawatha and Marquette National 
Forests (Michigan) and correcting the land descriptions of 
Nebraska National Forest (Nebraska) and Wasatch 
National Forest (Utah) 1 
hiawatha OR 
marquette 
10995 2/16/62 Kennedy Assigning telecommunications management functions 1 
telecommunicatio
ns 
10999 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 





11003 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 





10997 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 




10998 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 









Secretary of Labor preparedness, 
secretary, labor 
11001 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 




OR education OR 
welfare 
11002 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 




11004 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning certain emergency preparedness functions to 
the Housing and Home Finance Administrator 0 
emergency 
preparedness, 
housing OR home 
11005 2/16/62 Kennedy 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 






11007 2/26/62 Kennedy 
Prescribing regulations for the formation and use of 
advisory committees 1 
advisory committ* 
(wq) 
11010 3/19/62 Kennedy 
Amending Executive Order No. 10713, relating to the 
administration of the Ryukyu Islands 2 ryukkyu 
11013 4/6/62 Kennedy 
Creating a board of inquiry to report on a labor dispute 
affecting the maritime industry of the United States 1 
maritime, board 
OR dispute 
11014 4/17/62 Kennedy 
Delegating to the Secretary of Commerce functions with 
respect to participation of the United States in the New 




11015 4/23/62 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the Chicago and North Western Railway 
Company, the former Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and 
Omaha Railway Company… 1 
railway, board OR 
dispute 
11016 4/25/62 Kennedy Authorizing award of the Purple Heart 4 purple heart (wq) 
11017 4/27/62 Kennedy 
Providing for coordination with respect to outdoor 
recreation resources and establishing the Recreation 




11020 5/7/62 Kennedy 
Inspection of income, excess-profits, estate, and gift tax 
returns by the Senate Committee on Armed Services 1 
tax, senate OR 
armed services, 
income OR profit 
11035 7/9/62 Kennedy Management of Federal office space 1 
federal office 
space (wq) 
11037 7/20/62 Kennedy 
Amendment of section 12 of Executive Order No. 6260 of 
August 28, 1933, as amended (gold) 1 gold 
11041 8/6/62 Kennedy 
Continuance and administration of the Peace Corps in the 
Department of State 1 
peace corps, state 
department (wq) 
11040 8/6/62 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate dispute 
between the Belt Railway Company of Chicago and 
certain of its employees 0 
rail, board OR 
dispute 
11042 8/10/62 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Southern Pacific Company (Pacific Lines) 
and certain of its employees 0 
rail, board OR 
dispute 
11043 8/14/62 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate dispute 
between the Pan American World Airways, Inc. and 
certain of its employees 0 
rail, board OR 
dispute 
11044 8/20/62 Kennedy 
Interagency Coordination of Arms Control and 
Disarmament Matters 1 
coordinat*, 
disarmament OR 
arms control (wq) 
11045 8/21/62 Kennedy 
Discontinuing the Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area 
and Guam Island Naval Airspace Reservation 2 guam 
11046 8/24/62 Kennedy Authorizing Award of the Bronze Star Medal 2 bronze star (wq) 
11051 9/27/62 Kennedy 
Prescribing responsibilities of the Office of Emergency 




11053 9/30/62 Kennedy 
Providing assistance for the removal of unlawful 
obstructions of justice in the State of Mississippi 3 justice, mississippi 
11054 10/1/62 Kennedy 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on certain labor 







11058 10/23/62 Kennedy 
Assigning authority with respect to ordering persons and 
units in the Ready Reserve to active duty and with respect 
to extension of enlistments and other periods of service in 
the armed forces 0 ready reserve (wq) 
11063 11/20/62 Kennedy Equal opportunity in housing 10 
hous*, equal OR 
opportunit* 
11064 11/21/62 Kennedy 
Excusing Federal employees from duty on December 24, 
1962 0 december 24 
11059 10/23/62 Kennedy 
Designating public international organizations entitled to 




11066 11/27/62 Kennedy 
Including certain tracts of land in the Cherokee and 
Jefferson National Forests, in Tennessee and Virginia 0 forest OR forests 
11067 11/27/62 Kennedy 
Including certain tracts of land in the Nantahala and 
Cherokee National Forests, respectively 0 forest OR forests 
11068 11/28/62 Kennedy 
Creating a board of inquiry to report on a labor dispute 
affecting the ballistics missile, space vehicle and military 
aircraft industry 1 
missile, board OR 
dispute 
11073 1/2/63 Kennedy Providing for Federal salary administration 1 salary 
11074 1/8/63 Kennedy Establishing the President's Council on Physical Fitness 1 
physical fitness 
(wq) 
11078 1/23/63 Kennedy 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on a labor dispute 
affecting the ballistics missile, space vehicle and military 
aircraft industry 1 
missile, board OR 
dispute 
11080 1/29/63 Kennedy 
Inspection of income, excess-profits, estate, and gift tax 
returns by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1 
tax, senate OR 
foreign relations 
11085 2/22/63 Kennedy The Presidential Medal of Freedom 1 
medal of freedom 
(wq) 
11098 3/15/63 Kennedy Amending the Selective Service regulations 3 
selective service 
(wq) 
11100 3/30/63 Kennedy 
Establishing the President's Commission on Registration 




11103 4/10/63 Kennedy 
Providing for the appointment of former Peace Corps 
volunteers to the civilian career services 0 peace corps 
11104 4/12/63 Kennedy U.S.S. Thresher 1 thresher 
11105 4/18/63 Kennedy 
Transferring to the Housing and Home Finance 
Administrator certain functions of the Atomic Energy 




11108 5/22/63 Kennedy 
Delegating authority under the International Wheat 
Agreement Act of 1949, as amended, to the Secretary of 
Agriculture 2 what 
11111 6/11/63 Kennedy 
Providing assistance for the removal of obstructions of 
justice and suppression of unlawful combinations within 
the State of Alabama 5 alabama 
11112 6/12/63 Kennedy Establishing the President's Advisory Council on the Arts 5 
advisory council 
on the arts (wq) 
11114 6/22/63 Kennedy 
Extending the authority of the President's Committee on 




11115 7/4/63 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the Pullman Company, the Chicago, Rock Island 
& Pacific Railroad Company, the New York Central 
System, and the Soo Line Railroad Company and certain 
of their employees 0 
rail*, board OR 
disput* 
11117 8/13/63 Kennedy 




11119 9/10/63 Kennedy Amending the Selective Service regulations 4 
selective service 
(wq) 
11118 9/10/63 Kennedy 
Providing assistance for removal of unlawful obstructions 
of justice in the State of Alabama 3 alabama 
11122 10/17/63 Kennedy Establishing the Rural Development Committee 1 
rural development 
committee 
11124 10/28/63 Kennedy 
Enlarging the membership of the President's Advisory 
Council on the Arts 1 
advisory council 
on the arts (wq) 
11125 10/29/63 Kennedy 
Delegating authority of the President under sections 205 
and 208 of Title 18 of the United States Code, relating to 2 
authority, conflicts 




conflicts of interest conflict of interest 
11126 11/1/63 Kennedy 
Establishing a committee and a council relating to the 




11127 11/9/63 Kennedy 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Florida East Coast Railway Company and 
certain of its employees 1 
railway, board OR 
dispute 
11128 11/23/63 Johnson 
Closing Government departments and agencies on 
November 25, 1963 1 november 25 
11129 11/29/63 Johnson 
Designating certain facilities of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and of the Department of 
Defense, in the State of Florida, as the John F. Kennedy 
Space Center 2 
kennedy space 
center 
11130 11/29/63 Johnson 
Appointing a commission to report upon the assassination 




11133 12/17/63 Johnson 
Inspection of income, estate, and gift tax returns by the 
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration 2 
tax, senate OR 
rules, income OR 
estate 
11134 12/20/63 Johnson 
Extension of the President's Commission on Registration 




11136 1/3/64 Johnson 
Establishing the President's Committee on Consumer 
Interstate and the Consumer Advisory Council 0 
committee, 
consumer 
interstate (wq) OR 
consumer advisory 
council (wq) 
11135 1/3/64 Johnson 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the carriers represented by the Eastern, Western 
and Southeastern Carriers' Conference Committee, and 
certain of their employees 1 
carrier*, board OR 
dispute 
11141 2/12/64 Johnson 
Declaring a public policy against discriminating on the 
basis of age 1 age, discriminat* 
11145 3/7/64 Johnson 
Providing for a Curator of the White House and 
establishing a Committee for the Preservation of the 




11149 4/1/64 Johnson 
Establishing the President's Advisory Committee on 
Supersonic Transport 1 
supersonic 
transport (wq) 
11150 4/2/64 Johnson 
Establishing the Federal Reconstruction and Development 
Planning Commission for Alaska 2 alaska 
11152 4/15/64 Johnson Establishing the President's Committee on Manpower 2 
committee on 
manpower (wq) 
11153 4/17/64 Johnson 
Inspection of income, estate, and gift tax returns by the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1 
tax, senate OR 
judiciary 
11154 5/8/64 Johnson 
Exemption of J. Edgar Hoover from compulsory 
retirement for age 6 
hoover, retir* OR 
age 
11155 5/23/64 Johnson 
Providing for the recognition of certain students as 
Presidential Scholars 0 
presidential 
scholars (wq) 
11161 7/7/64 Johnson 
Relating to certain relationships between the Department 
of Defense and the Federal Aviation Agency 1 aviation, defense 
11168 8/18/64 Johnson 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the carriers represented by the National Railway 
Labor Conference and certain of their employees 1 
rail*, board OR 
disput* 
11175 9/2/64 Johnson 
Exclusion for original or new Canadian issues as required 
for international monetary stability 0 
monetary OR 
money, canada OR 
canadian 
11185 10/16/64 Johnson To facilitate coordination of Federal education programs 1 
education, 
coordinat* 
11193 1/24/65 Johnson Winston Spencer Churchill 1 churchill 
11197 2/5/65 Johnson Establishing the President's Council on Equal Opportunity 0 
equal opportunity 
(wq), council 
11207 3/20/65 Johnson Providing Federal assistance in the State of Alabama 2 alabama 





11211 4/2/65 Johnson 
Exclusion for original or new Japanese issues as required 
for international monetary stability 1 japan 
11213 4/2/65 Johnson 
Inspection of certain interest equalization tax information 
returns by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and the Federal Reserve Banks 0 
federal reserve, tax 
OR interest 
11215 4/8/65 Johnson 
Establishing the President's Commission on the Patent 
System 0 patient 
11216 4/24/65 Johnson 
Designation of Vietnam and waters adjacent thereto as a 
combat zone for the purposes of section 112 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 2 
vietnam, water OR 
combat 
11222 5/8/65 Johnson 
Prescribing standards of ethical conduct for Government 
officers and employees 2 ethic* 
11224 5/13/65 Johnson 
Designation of certain foreign countries as economically 
less developed countries for purposes of the interest 
equalization tax 1 




11234 7/16/65 Johnson 
Establishing the President's Commission on Crime in the 
District of Columbia 1 
crime, district of 
columbia (wq) or 
DC 
11241 8/26/65 Johnson Amending the Selective Service regulations 4 
selective service 
(wq) 
11243 9/11/65 Johnson 
Creating an emergency board to investigate dispute 
between the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway 
Company, Lines East and West, and certain of their 
employees 1 
rail*, board or 
dispute 
11247 9/24/65 Johnson 
Providing for the coordination by the Attorney General of 
enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 1 
attorney general, 
civil rights, title vi 
(wq) OR title 6 
(wq) 
11246 9/24/65 Johnson Equal Employment Opportunity 2 
equal employment 
opportunity (wq) 
11251 10/20/65 Johnson Food-for-Peace Program 1 
food for peace OR 
food-for-peace 
11253 11/4/65 Johnson 
Establishing the President's Committee on Food and Fiber 
and the National Advisory Commission on Food and 
Fiber 1 food, fiber 
11258 11/17/65 Johnson 
Prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution by 
Federal activities 1 
water pollution 
(wq) 
11259 12/3/65 Johnson 
Amending Executive Order No. 11157 as it relates to 
incentive pay for hazardous duty involving parachute 
jumping 1 
pay, jump OR 
parachute 
11266 1/18/66 Johnson Amending the Selective Service regulations 1 
selective service 
(wq) 
11278 5/4/66 Johnson 
Establishing a President's Council and a Committee on 
Recreation and Natural Beauty 2 
recreation natural 
beauty (wq) 
11280 5/11/66 Johnson 




11289 7/2/66 Johnson National Advisory Commission on Selective Service 3 
selective service 
(wq) 
11291 7/27/66 Johnson 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the American Airlines, Inc., and certain of its 
employees 2 
airlines, board OR 
dispute 
11297 8/11/66 Johnson Coordinates of Federal urban programs 2 federal urban (wq) 
11301 9/2/66 Johnson 
Establishing the President's Committee on Libraries and 
the National Advisory Commission on Libraries 1 libraries 
11308 9/30/66 Johnson 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Pan American World Airways, Inc., and 
certain of its employees 1 airway* 
11311 10/14/66 Johnson 
Carrying out provisions of the Beirut Agreement of 1948 
relating to audio-visual materials 1 beirut 
11312 10/14/66 Johnson 
Designating the Secretary of State to perform functions 
relating to certain objects of cultural significance 
imported into the United States for temporary display or 
exhibition 1 
secretary state 
(wq), cultur* OR 
import* 
11314 10/17/66 Johnson 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on certain labor 
disputes affecting the military jet engine industry, military 
aircraft industry, military armament industry and military 3 





electronics industry of the United States 
11321 12/19/66 Johnson 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on a labor dispute 
affecting the military aircraft engine industry of the 
United States 1 
military, board OR 
disput* 
11322 1/5/67 Johnson 
Relating to trade and other transactions involving 
Southern Rhodesia 5 rhodesia 
11324 1/28/67 Johnson 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the carriers represented by the National Railway 
Labor Conference and certain of their employees 1 
rail*, board or 
disput* 
11325 1/30/67 Johnson Prescribing a new part of the Selective Service regulations 1 
selective service 
(wq) OR draft, 
parol* 
11328 2/20/67 Johnson 
Modifying Executive Order No. 11198, relating to the 
interest equalization tax on certain commercial bank loans 1 loans 
11329 3/2/67 Johnson 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on a labor dispute 
affecting the shipbuilding and repair industries of the 
United States 1 
ship*, board OR 
disput* 
11341 4/8/67 Johnson 




11344 4/15/67 Johnson 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on a labor dispute 
affecting the military aircraft industry and the military 
aircraft engine industry of the United States 1 
military, board OR 
disput* 
11350 5/3/67 Johnson Amending the Selective Service regulations 1 
selective service 
(wq) 
11360 6/30/67 Johnson Amending the Selective Service regulations 5 
selective service 
(wq) 
11362 7/16/67 Johnson 
Providing for the use of transportation priorities and 
allocations during the current railroad strike 1 strike, rail* 
11364 7/24/67 Johnson 
Providing for the restoration of law and order in the State 
of Michigan 3 michigan 
11365 7/29/67 Johnson 




11366 8/4/67 Johnson 
Assigning authority to order certain persons in the Ready 
Reserve to active duty 1 reserv* 
11368 8/28/67 Johnson 
Modifying rates of interest equalization tax and amending 
Executive Order No. 11211 1 tax, interest 
11375 10/13/67 Johnson 
Amending Executive Order No. 11246, relating to equal 
employment opportunity 1 
equal employment 
opportunity (wq) 
11386 12/28/67 Johnson 
Prescribing arrangements for coordination of the activities 
of regional commissions and activities of the Federal 
Government relating to regional economic development, 
and establishing the Federal Advisory Council on 
Regional Economic Development 1 region* 
11387 1/1/68 Johnson Governing certain capital transfers abroad 3 capital 
11392 1/24/68 Johnson 
Ordering certain units of the Ready Reserve of the Naval 
Reserve, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard of the 
United States to active duty 1 
ready reserve (wq) 
OR active duty 
(wq) 
11396 2/7/68 Johnson 
Providing for the coordination by the Attorney General of 
Federal law enforcement and crime prevention programs 2 
attorney general, 
law OR crime 
11397 2/9/68 Johnson 
Authorizing transitional appointments of veterans who 
have served during the Vietnam era 1 veteran 
11399 3/6/68 Johnson Establishing the National Council on Indian Opportunity 1 
indian opportunity 
(wq) 
11403 4/5/68 Johnson 
Providing for the restoration of law and order in the 
Washington Metropolitan Area 3 
washington, law 
OR order, riot OR 
disorder 
11412 6/10/68 Johnson 
Establishing a National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence 1 
violence, caus* 
OR preven* 
11413 6/11/68 Johnson Adjusting rates of pay for certain statutory schedules 0 pay 
11414 6/11/68 Johnson 
Adjusting the rates of monthly basic pay for members of 
the Uniformed Services 0 pay 
11415 6/24/68 Johnson 
Reconstituting the National Advisory Committee on the 
Selection of Physicians, Dentists, and Allied Specialists 









11423 8/16/68 Johnson 
Providing for the performance of certain functions 
heretofore performed by the President with respect to 
certain facilities constructed and maintained on the 
borders of the United States 1 border OR borders 
11425 8/30/68 Johnson Study of United States foreign trade policy 1 
foreign trade 
policy (wq) 
11429 9/9/68 Johnson 
Amending Executive Order No. 11302, relating to travel 
expenses of claimants and beneficiaries of the Veteran's 
Administration and their attendants 1 
travel expenses 
(wq) 
11433 11/6/68 Johnson 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the Illinois Central Railroad Company, 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company… 1 
rail, board OR 
dispute 
11438 12/3/68 Johnson 
Prescribing procedures governing interdepartmental cash 
awards to the members of the Armed Forces 1 cash 
11452 1/23/69 Nixon Establishing the Council for Urban Affairs 4 urban affairs (wq) 
11453 1/24/69 Nixon Establishing the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy 0 
economic policy 
(wq) 
11455 2/14/69 Nixon Establishing an Office of Intergovernmental Relations 2 
intergovernmental 
relations (wq) 
11458 3/5/69 Nixon 
Prescribing arrangements for developing and coordinating 
a national program for minority business enterprise 2 
minority business 
enterprise (wq) 
11460 3/20/69 Nixon Establishing the President's Intelligence Advisory Board 1 intelligence 
11463 4/1/69 Nixon 
Placing an additional position in level V of the Federal 
Executive Salary Schedule 2 salary 
11464 4/3/69 Nixon Modifying rates of interest equalization tax 2 interest tax (wq) 
11472 5/29/69 Nixon 
Establishing the Environmental Quality Council and the 
Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality 3 
environmental, 
quality 
11474 6/12/69 Nixon Adjusting rates of pay for certain statutory schedules 1 pay 
11478 8/8/69 Nixon 




11482 9/22/69 Nixon 
Establishing a Construction Industry Collective 




11483 9/23/69 Nixon 
Inspection of income tax returns by the Select Committee 
on Crime, House of Representatives 1 
tax, committee on 
crime (wq) OR 
house of 
representatives 
11491 10/29/69 Nixon Labor-management relations in the Federal service 1 labor-management 
11494 11/14/69 Nixon Establishing the Presidential Citizens Medal 1 medal 
11493 11/14/69 Nixon Establishing the Council for Rural Affairs 0 rural 
11497 11/26/69 Nixon 
Amending the Selective Service regulations to prescribe 
random selection 6 
selective service 
(wq) 
11498 12/1/69 Nixon 
Delegating to the Secretary of Defense the authority to 
approve regulations governing the early discharge of 
enlisted members 1 
secretary defense 
(wq), discharge 
11503 12/23/69 Nixon 
Excusing Federal employees from duty on December 26, 
1969 1 christmas 
11504 1/14/70 Nixon 
Amending Executive Order No. 11248, placing certain 
positions in levels IV and V of the Federal Executive 
Salary Schedule 1 salary 
11506 2/2/70 Nixon 
Further amending Executive Order No. 11211, relating to 
the exclusion for original or new Japanese issues as 
required for international monetary stability 1 japan* 
11507 2/4/70 Nixon 
Prevention, control, and abatement of air and water 
pollution at Federal facilities 5 pollution 
11508 2/10/70 Nixon 




11509 2/11/70 Nixon 
Establishing the President's Advisory Council on 
Management Improvement 1 
management 
improvement 
11513 3/3/70 Nixon 
Establishing the President's Commission on School 
Finance 1 school finance 
11519 3/23/70 Nixon 
Calling into service members and units of the National 
Guard 4 national guard 
11521 3/26/70 Nixon 
Authorizing veterans readjustment appointments for 
veterans of the Vietnam era 2 veterans 
11522 4/6/70 Nixon 
Assigning emergency preparedness functions to the 






11526 4/22/70 Nixon 
Establishing the National Council on Federal Disaster 
Assistance 1 disaster 
11527 4/23/70 Nixon Amending the Selective Service regulations 3 
selective service 
(wq) 
11528 4/24/70 Nixon 
Changing the jurisdiction and membership of the New 
England River Basins Commission 1 new england 
11529 4/24/70 Nixon 




11534 6/4/70 Nixon Establishing the National Council on Organized Crime 1 
organized crime 
(wq) 
11537 6/16/70 Nixon 
Amending the Selective Service regulations concerning 
the ordering of registrants for induction 1 
selective service 
(wq) 
11541 7/1/70 Nixon 
Prescribing the duties of the Office of Management and 
Budget and the Domestic Council in the Executive Office 




11563 9/26/70 Nixon Amending the Selective Service regulations 2 
selective service 
(wq) 
11566 10/26/70 Nixon Consumer product information 2 
consumer product 
information (wq) 
11568 11/16/70 Nixon 
Exempting A. Everette MacIntyre from compulsory 
retirement for age 1 macintyre 
11574 12/23/70 Nixon Administration of Refuse Act permit program 1 refuse act 
11575 12/31/70 Nixon 
Providing for the administration of the Disaster Relief Act 
of 1970 1 
disaster relief act 
(wq) 
11576 1/8/71 Nixon Adjusting rates of pay for certain statutory pay systems 1 
pay, statutory OR 
systems 
11577 1/8/71 Nixon 
Adjusting the rates of monthly basic pay for members of 
the Uniformed Services 1 
pay, military OR 
unifor* 
11582 2/11/71 Nixon Observance of Holidays by Government agencies 1 holiday 
11583 2/24/71 Nixon Office of Consumer Affairs 2 
consumer affairs 
(wq) 
11585 3/4/71 Nixon 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between certain carriers represented by the National 
Railway Labor Conference 1 rail* 
11588 3/29/71 Nixon 
Providing for the stabilization of wages and prices in the 
construction industry 16 
construction, wage 
OR price 
11593 5/13/71 Nixon Protection and enhancement of the cultural environment 1 cultur* 
11599 6/17/71 Nixon 
Establishing a special action office for drug abuse 
prevention 2 drug 
11605 7/2/71 Nixon 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 
1953, relating to security requirements for Government 
employment 6 security, employ* 
11614 8/5/71 Nixon 




11615 8/15/71 Nixon 
Providing for stabilization of prices, rents, wages, and 
salaries 29 stabiliz* 
11621 10/4/71 Nixon 
Creating a board of inquiry to report on certain labor 




11625 10/13/71 Nixon 
Prescribing additional arrangements for developing and 




11627 10/15/71 Nixon Further providing for the stabilization of the economy 4 economy 
11631 11/9/71 Nixon 
Inspection of income, estate, and gift tax returns by the 
Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives 1 
tax, public works 
(wq) OR house of 
representatives 
(wq) 
11632 11/22/71 Nixon 
Amending Executive Order No. 11627 of October 15, 




11634 12/6/71 Nixon 
Amending Executive Order No. 11248, placing certain 
positions in levels IV and V of the Federal Executive 
Salary Schedule 1 salary 
11636 12/17/71 Nixon 
Employee-management relations in the Foreign Service of 
the United States 2   
11641 1/28/72 Nixon 
Concentration of law enforcement activities relating to 
drug abuse 4 drug 




compulsory retirement for age 
11644 2/8/72 Nixon Use of off-road vehicles on the public lands 2 off-road 
11643 2/8/72 Nixon 
Environmental safeguards on activities for animal damage 
control on Federal lands 5 animal 
11651 3/3/72 Nixon Textile Trade Agreements 1 textile 
11652 3/8/72 Nixon 
Classification and declassification of national security 
information and material 6 
security 
information (wq) 
11660 3/23/72 Nixon 
Amending Executive Order No. 11640, further providing 
for the stabilization of the economy 0 
stabiliz* OR 
economy 
11663 3/31/72 Nixon 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the carriers represented by the National Railway 
Labor Conference and certain of their employees 1 rail 
11664 3/31/72 Nixon 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Penn Central Transportation Company and 
certain of its employees 1 rail 
11667 4/19/72 Nixon 
Establishing the President's Advisory Committee on the 
Environmental Merit Awards Program 1 
environmental 
merit awards (wq) 
11673 6/6/72 Nixon 
Amending Executive Order No. 8684 to redefine the 
Culebra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area 1 culebra 
11677 8/1/72 Nixon Continuing the regulation of exports 1 export 
11679 8/19/72 Nixon 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Long Island Rail Road Company and certain 
of its employees 0 rail 
11686 10/7/72 Nixon Committee management 0 
committee 
management (wq) 
11690 12/14/72 Nixon 
Delegation of certain functions to the Executive Director 
of the Domestic Council 1 
domestic council 
(wq) 
11693 12/26/72 Nixon 
Providing for the closing of Government departments and 
agencies on December 28, 1972 (Truman's Death) 1 truman 
11695 1/11/73 Nixon Further providing for the stabilization of the economy 7 stabiliz* 
11697 1/17/73 Nixon 
Inspection by Department of Agriculture of income tax 
returns made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 of 
persons having farm operations 3 farm, tax 
11702 1/25/73 Nixon Relative to the Executive Office of the President 0 
consumer affairs 
OR council on 
economic policy 
11701 1/25/73 Nixon 
Employment of veterans by Federal agencies and 
Government contractors and subcontractors 1 veterans 
11703 2/7/73 Nixon 
Assigning policy development and direction functions 
with respect to the oil import control program 0 
oil import (wq) 
OR oil control 
(wq) 
11704 2/28/73 Nixon 
Further exempting A. Everett MacIntyre from compulsory 
retirement for age 1 macintyre 
11709 3/27/73 Nixon 
Inspection by Department of Agriculture of income tax 
returns made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 of 
persons having farm operations 1 farm, tax 
11712 4/18/73 Nixon Special Committee on Energy and National Energy Office 2 
committee on 
energy (wq) OR 
national energy 
office (wq) 
11717 5/9/73 Nixon 
Transferring certain functions from the Office of 
Management and Budget to the General Services 




11723 6/13/73 Nixon Further providing for the stabilization of the economy 6 
stabiliz* OR 
economy 
11738 9/10/73 Nixon 
Providing for administration of the Clean Air Act and the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act with respect to 
Federal contracts, grants or loans 1 
clearn air OR 
water pollution 
11741 10/15/73 Nixon 
Federal agency use of the official American Revolution 
Bicentennial symbol 1 bicentennial 
11748 12/4/73 Nixon Federal Energy Office 3 
federal energy 
office (wq) 
11750 12/13/73 Nixon 
Providing for the closing of Government departments and 
agencies on Monday, December 24, 1973 and Monday, 
December 31, 1973 1 
new year eve (wq) 
OR christmas eve 
(wq) 
11757 12/30/73 Nixon 
Exemption of Lawrence Quincy Mumford from 
mandatory retirement 1 mumford 




11777 4/12/74 Nixon 
Amending Executive Order No. 11691, adjusting rates of 
pay for certain statutory pay systems 1 
pay, october 1972 
(wq) 
11781 5/1/74 Nixon 
Providing for an orderly termination of the Economic 
Stabilization Program 1 
econom* OR 
stabiliz* 
11783 5/21/74 Nixon 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the carriers represented by the National Railway 
Labor Conference and certain of their employees 1 rail* 
11787 6/11/74 Nixon 
Revoking Executive Order No. 10987, relating to agency 
systems for appeals from adverse actions 0 appeals, agency 
11788 6/18/74 Nixon 
Providing for the orderly termination of economic 
stabilization activities 1 
cost of living 
council (wq) OR 
secretary treasury 
(wq) 
11803 9/16/74 Ford 
Establishing a Clemency Board to review certain 
convictions of persons under section 12 or 6 (j) of the 
Military Selective Service Act… 4 clemency 
11805 9/20/74 Ford 
Inspection by President and certain designated employees 
of the White House Office of Tax Returns made under the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 1 tax returns 
11808 9/30/74 Ford 
Establishing the President's Economic Policy Board, and 
for other purposes 1 
economic policy 
board 
11809 9/30/74 Ford 




11821 11/27/74 Ford Inflation Impact Statements 2 inflation* 
11828 1/4/75 Ford 
Establishing a commission on CIA activities within the 
United States 4 
central intelligence 
agency OR c.i.a. 
11832 1/9/75 Ford 
Establishing a National Commission on the Observance 
of International Women's Year, 1975 1 women's year (wq) 
11837 1/30/75 Ford 
Amending Executive Order No. 11803 of September 16, 
1974, to extend the period for application for Clemency 
Board review of certain convictions and military service 
discharges 0 clemency 
11844 3/24/75 Ford 
Designation of beneficiary developing countries for the 
Generalized System of Preferences under the Trade Act of 
1974 1 trade act 
11847 3/28/75 Ford Exemption of Walter C. Sauer from mandatory retirement 1 sauer 
11848 3/29/75 Ford 
Extending the reporting date for the Commission on CIA 
Activities Within the United States 1 
central intelligence 
agency OR c.i.a. 
11868 6/19/75 Ford President's Commission on Olympic Sports 1 olympic 
11869 6/24/75 Ford 
Exemption of Arthur S. Flemming from mandatory 
retirement 1 flemming 
11870 7/18/75 Ford 
Environmental safeguards on activities for animal damage 
control on Federal lands 1 
animal OR 
predator 
11878 9/10/75 Ford 
Assigning responsibilities relating to activities of the 
Presidential Clemency Board 3 clemency 
11886 10/17/75 Ford 
Abolishing the Culebra Island naval defensive sea area 
established by Executive Order No. 8684 1 culebra 
11888 11/24/75 Ford Implementing the Generalized System of Preferences 1 preferences 
11901 1/30/76 Ford 
Amending Executive Order No. 11491, relating to labor-
management relations in the Federal service 1 
labor management 
(wq) 
11904 2/6/76 Ford Establishing the Defense Superior Service Medal 1 medal 
11905 2/18/76 Ford United States foreign intelligence activities 18 
foreign 
intelligence (wq) 
11914 4/28/76 Ford 
Nondiscrimination with respect to the handicapped in 
Federally assisted programs 1 
handicap* OR 
nondiscrimination 
11916 5/28/76 Ford 
Amending Executive Order No. 11649, regulations 
governing the seals of the President and the Vice 
President of the United States 0 seal 
11930 7/30/76 Ford 
Performance by the Federal Energy Office of energy 




11940 9/30/76 Ford Continuing the regulation of exports 2 exports 
11967 1/21/77 Carter 
Relating to violations of the Selective Service Act, 
August 4, 1964 to March 28, 1973 4 
selective service 
(wq) 
11972 2/14/77 Carter 
Establishing the United States Circuit Judge Nominating 
Commission 3 
judge commission 





11980 3/29/77 Carter 
National Commission on the Observance of International 
Women's Year, 1975 1 women's year (wq) 
11982 4/29/77 Carter 
Committee on Selection of the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 0 
federal bureau of 
investigation OR 
f.b.i. 
11988 5/24/77 Carter Floodplain management 0 
floodplain OR 
flood 
11989 5/24/77 Carter Off-road vehicles on public lands 0 
vehicle OR off 
road (wq) OR off-
road 
12003 7/20/77 Carter Relating to energy policy and conservation 0 
energy policy (wq) 
OR conservation 
12008 8/25/77 Carter Presidential Management Intern Program 1 intern 
12011 9/30/77 Carter 
Exemption of G. Joseph Minetti from mandatory 
retirement 1 minetti 
12022 12/1/77 Carter 
Establishing the National Commission for the Review of 
Antitrust Laws and Procedures 1 antitrust 
12036 1/24/78 Carter United States Intelligence Activities 18 intelligence 
12044 3/23/78 Carter Improving Government Regulations 4 regulations 
12046 3/27/78 Carter Relating to the transfer of telecommunications functions 1 
telecommunicatio
ns 
12050 4/4/78 Carter Establishing a National Advisory Committee for Women 0 
committee women 
(wq) 
12059 5/11/78 Carter United States Circuit Judge Nominating Commission 0 
judge commission 
(wq) OR circuit 
judge (wq) OR 
appellate judge 
(wq) 
12062 5/26/78 Carter President's Commission on the Coal Industry 1 coal 
12065 6/28/78 Carter National security information 2 information 
12071 7/12/78 Carter President's Commission on Pension Policy 1 pension 
12072 8/16/78 Carter Federal space management 0 space 
12093 11/1/78 Carter President's Commission on the Holocaust 1 holocaust 
12092 11/1/78 Carter Prohibition Against Inflationary Procurement Practices 1 inflationary 
12097 11/8/78 Carter 
Standards and guidelines for the merit selection of United 
States District Judges 1 district judge (wq) 
12103 12/14/78 Carter President's Commission on the Coal Industry 1 coal 
12114 1/4/79 Carter Environmental effects abroad of major Federal actions 1 environment* 




12129 4/5/79 Carter Critical Energy Facility Program 2 
energy facility 
(wq) 
12137 5/16/79 Carter The Peace Corps 0 peace corps 
12140 5/29/79 Carter 
Delegation of authorities relating to motor gasoline end-
user allocation 7 gasoline 
12153 8/17/79 Carter Decontrol of heavy oil 4 oil 
12159 9/20/79 Carter 
Creating an emergency board to investigate disputes 
between the Chicago, Rock Island, Pacific Railroad & 
Peoria Terminal Company and Brotherhood of Railway… 1 
rail*, board OR 
dispute 
12160 9/26/79 Carter 
Providing for enhancement and coordination of Federal 
consumer programs 3 consumer 
12170 11/14/79 Carter Blocking Iranian Government property 5 iran* 
12171 11/19/79 Carter 
Exclusions from the Federal Labor-Management 
Relations Program 0 
labor management 
(wq) 
12172 11/26/79 Carter Entry of Iranian aliens into the United States 1 iran OR iranian 
12174 11/30/79 Carter Paperwork 1 paperwork 
12182 12/14/79 Carter 
Creating an Emergency Board to investigate a dispute 
between the Long Island Rail Road and certain of its 
employees 1 
rail, board OR 
dispute 
12186 12/21/79 Carter Change in definition of heavy oil 1 heavy oil (wq) 
12187 12/29/79 Carter Base production control level for marginal properties 0 
property OR 
properties 




12192 2/12/80 Carter 
State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste 
Management 1 waste 
12194 2/21/80 Carter Radiation Policy Council 1 radiation 
12200 3/12/80 Carter Rates of pay and allowances 1 
pay, federal OR 
military 
12202 3/18/80 Carter Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee 1 
nuclear safety 
(wq) 
12205 4/7/80 Carter Prohibiting certain transactions with Iran 3 iran 
12207 4/12/80 Carter 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation 
and certain of its employees 1 
port, board OR 
dispute 
12208 4/15/80 Carter Consultations on the admission of refugees 1 refugees 
12218 6/19/80 Carter 
Export of special nuclear material and components to 
India 3 india 
12231 8/4/80 Carter Strategic Petroleum Reserve 0 
strategic 
petroleum reserve 
OR strategic oil 
reserve 
12242 9/30/80 Carter Synthetic fuels 2 synthetic fuel (wq) 
12244 10/3/80 Carter Exemption for Fort Allen 2 fort allen 
12255 12/5/80 Carter 
Providing for the Closing of Government Departments 
and Agencies on Friday, December 26, 1980 1 christmas 
12259 12/31/80 Carter 
Leadership and coordination of fair housing in Federal 
programs 1 fair housing (wq) 
12264 1/15/81 Carter 
Federal policy regarding the export of banned or 
significantly restricted materials 1 
banned OR 
restricted 
12276 1/19/81 Carter Direction relating to establishment of escrow accounts 0 escrow 
12277 1/19/81 Carter Direction to transfer Iranian Government assets 6 
iran OR iranian, 
assets 
12278 1/19/81 Carter Direction to transfer Iranian Government assets overseas 6 
iran OR iranian, 
assets 
12279 1/19/81 Carter 
Direction to transfer Iranian Government assets held by 
domestic banks 6 
iran OR iranian, 
assets 
12280 1/19/81 Carter 
Direction to transfer Iranian Government financial assets 
held by non-banking institutions 6 
iran OR iranian, 
assets 
12281 1/19/81 Carter Direction to transfer certain Iranian Government assets 6 
iran OR iranian, 
assets 
12282 1/19/81 Carter 
Revocation of prohibitions against transactions involving 
Iran 3 
iran OR iranian, 
carter 
12283 1/19/81 Carter 
Non-prosecution of claims of hostages and for actions at 
the United States Embassy and elsewhere 2 
iran OR iranian, 
embassy OR 
hostage, carter 
12284 1/19/81 Carter 
Restrictions on the transfer of property of the former Shah 
of Iran 0 shah 
12286 1/19/81 Carter Responses to environmental damage 1 
environmental, 
carter 
12285 1/19/81 Carter President's Commission on Hostage Compensation 1 compensation 
12287 1/28/81 Reagan Decontrol of crude oil and refined petroleum products 4 
crude oil OR 
petroleum 
12288 1/29/81 Reagan Termination of the Wage and Price Regulatory Program 0 wage price (wq) 
12290 2/17/81 Reagan Federal exports and excessive regulation 0 export 
12291 2/17/81 Reagan Federal Regulation 17 regulation 
12294 2/24/81 Reagan Suspension of litigation against Iran 2 iran 
12301 3/26/81 Reagan Integrity and efficiency in Federal programs 1 
integrity OR 
efficien* 
12302 4/1/81 Reagan Amending the Generalized System of Preferences 0 
generalized OR 
preferences 
12305 5/5/81 Reagan Termination of certain Federal advisory committees 0 advisory 
12320 9/15/81 Reagan Historically Black Colleges and Universities 3 
black, college OR 
universit* 
12323 9/22/81 Reagan Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba 1 cuba 
12324 9/29/81 Reagan Interdiction of illegal aliens 2 alien 
12330 10/15/81 Reagan Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 1 pay 







12333 12/4/81 Reagan United States Intelligence Activities 5 
intelligence 
activities (wq) 








12336 12/21/81 Reagan The Task Force on Legal Equity for Women 1 women 
12342 1/27/82 Reagan 
Environmental safeguards for animal damage control on 
Federal lands 1 
animal (but story 
doesn't actually 
mention Reagan's 
EO, just "Reagan's 
action" 
12346 2/8/82 Reagan Synthetic Fuels 1 synthetic fuel (wq) 
12348 2/25/82 Reagan Federal Real Property 4 
federal property 
(wq) 
12353 3/23/82 Reagan Charitable fund-raising 3 
charit* OR fund-
rais* 




12367 6/15/82 Reagan President's Committee on the Arts and the Humanities 1 
arts humanities 
(wq) 
12369 6/30/82 Reagan 
President's private sector survey on cost control in the 
Federal Government 1 cost control 
12370 7/8/82 Reagan 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers… 1 
rail*, board OR 
dispute 





12373 7/21/82 Reagan 
Establishing an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the United Transportation Union and certain 
railroads… 1 
rail*, board OR 
dispute 
12387 10/8/82 Reagan Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 0 pay OR allowance 
12397 12/23/82 Reagan National Commission on Social Security Reform 1 
social security 
reform 
12399 12/31/82 Reagan Continuance of certain Federal advisory committees 1 advisory 
12404 2/10/83 Reagan Charitable fund-raising 2 fund-rais*, charit* 
12428 6/28/83 Reagan President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness 0 
industrial 
competitiveness 
12432 7/14/83 Reagan Minority Business Enterprise Development 1 
minority business 
(wq) 
12435 7/28/83 Reagan President's Commission on Organized Crime 1 organized crime 
12444 10/14/83 Reagan Continuation of export control regulations 2 export 
12456 12/30/83 Reagan Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 1 
pay OR allowance, 
reagan 
12465 2/24/84 Reagan Commercial expendable launch vehicle activities 1 launch 
12470 3/30/84 Reagan Continuation of export control regulations 3 export 
12475 5/9/84 Reagan Textile Import Program Implementation 0 textile 
12490 10/12/84 Reagan National Commission on Space 1 space 
12494 12/8/84 Reagan 
Amending Executive Order No. 11157 as it relates to pay 
for hazardous duty 1 hazardous 
12498 1/4/85 Reagan Regulatory planning process 1 regulatory, reagan 
12507 3/22/85 Reagan 
Continuance of the President's Commission on Organized 
Crime 1 organized crime 
12513 5/1/85 Reagan 
Prohibiting trade and certain other transactions involving 
Nicaragua 5 nicaragua 
12529 8/14/85 Reagan President's Commission on American Outdoors 1 outdoors 
12530 8/29/85 Reagan Establishment of Nicaraguan Humanitarian Aid Office 1 
humanitarian aid, 
nicaragua 
12531 8/30/85 Reagan 
Establishing an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the United Transportation Union… 1 
rail*, board OR 
dispute 
12532 9/9/85 Reagan 
Prohibiting trade and certain other transactions involving 
South Africa 20 






12535 10/1/85 Reagan 





12537 10/28/85 Reagan President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 0 
foreign 
intelligence 
12538 11/15/85 Reagan Imports of refined petroleum products from Libya 0 
libya, oil OR 
petroleum 
12540 12/30/85 Reagan Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 0 
pay OR allowance, 
reagan 
12542 12/30/85 Reagan 
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management 0 
blue ribbon (wq) 
OR defense 
management 
12543 1/7/86 Reagan Prohibiting trade and certain transactions involving Libya 15 libya 
12544 1/8/86 Reagan 
Blocking Libyan Government property in the United 
States or held by U.S. persons 3 
libya, property OR 
assets 
12546 2/3/86 Reagan 
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Accident 3 challenger 
12548 2/14/86 Reagan Grazing Fees 2 graz* 
12563 9/12/86 Reagan 
Establishing an emergency board to investigate a dispute 
between the LIRR… 1 
rail, board OR 
dispute 
12564 9/15/86 Reagan Drug-Free Federal Workplace 16 drug, reagan 
12570 10/24/86 Reagan 
Delegating authority to implement assistance for Central 
American democracies and the Nicaraguan Democratic 
Resistance 0 nicaragua 
12571 10/27/86 Reagan 





12575 12/1/86 Reagan President's Special Review Board (Iran Contra) 1 
iran contra review 
board (wq) 
12577 12/22/86 Reagan 
Closing of Government departments and agencies on 
Friday, December 26 0 christmas 
12578 12/31/86 Reagan Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 1 
pay OR allowance, 
reagan 
12581 1/28/87 Reagan President's Special Review Board 1 
special review 
board (wq) 
12588 3/18/87 Reagan Action against certain assets of disputed title (Duvalier) 1 duvalier 
12590 3/26/87 Reagan National Drug Policy Board 1 drug 
12601 6/24/87 Reagan 
Presidential Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic 2 
human 
immunodeficiency 
OR HIV or AIDS 
12603 7/16/87 Reagan 
Presidential Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic 0 
human 
immunodeficiency 
OR HIV or AIDS, 
reagan 
12606 9/2/87 Reagan The Family 1 family, reagan 
12622 12/31/87 Reagan Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 1 
pay OR allowance, 
reagan 
12630 3/15/88 Reagan 
Governmental actions and interference with 
constitutionally protected property rights 1 property 
12631 3/18/88 Reagan Working Group on Financial Markets 3 market 
12635 4/8/88 Reagan Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to Panama 3 panama 
12651 9/9/88 Reagan Offices of the Commission of the European Communities 1 
european 
communit* (wq) 
12657 11/18/88 Reagan 
Federal Emergency Management Agency assistance in 
emergency preparedness planning at commercial nuclear 
power plants 15 
nuclear, 
emergency 
12656 11/18/88 Reagan Assignment of emergency preparedness responsibilities     
12660 12/16/88 Reagan National Microgravity Research Board 1 microgravity 
12661 12/27/88 Reagan 
Implementing the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 and Related International Trade Matters 1 trade, reagan 
12667 1/18/89 Reagan Presidential Records 0 records, reagan 
12668 1/25/89 Bush I President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform 1 ethics 
12674 4/12/89 Bush I 
Principles of ethical conduct for Government officers and 
employees 2 ethic* 
12676 4/26/89 Bush I 
Delegating authority to provide assistance for the 
Nicaraguan Assistance 1 nicaragua 





12696 11/13/89 Bush I President's Drug Advisory Council 1 drug council (wq) 
12698 12/23/89 Bush I Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 1 
pay OR allowance, 
bush 
12711 4/11/90 Bush I 
Policy implementation with respect to nationals of the 
People's Republic of China 2 china 
12719 7/11/90 Bush I 
President's Commission on the Federal Appointment 
Process 1 appointment 
12722 8/2/90 Bush I 
Blocking Iraqi government property and prohibiting 
transactions with Iraq 0 iraq 
12723 8/2/90 Bush I Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property 0 kuwait 
12727 8/22/90 Bush I 
Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to 
active duty 2 
reserve OR armed 
forces (wq) 
12728 8/22/90 Bush I 
Delegating the President's authority to suspend any 
provision of law relating to the promotion, retirement, or 
separation of members of the Armed Forces 1 armed forces (wq) 
12729 9/24/90 Bush I Educational Excellence for Hispanic Americans 2 hispanic 
12731 10/17/90 Bush I 
Principles of ethical conduct for Government officers and 
employees 0 ethic* OR conduct 
12735 11/16/90 Bush I Chemical and biological weapons proliferation 1 weapon 
12736 12/12/90 Bush I Adjustments of certain rates of pay and allowances 1 
pay OR allowance, 
bush 
12740 12/29/90 Bush I 
Waiver under the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the 
Soviet Union 0 soviet union 




12744 1/21/91 Bush I 
Designation of Arabian Peninsula areas, airspace, and 
adjacent waters as a combat zone 0 
arabia* OR 
combat 
12759 4/17/91 Bush I Federal energy management 1 energy 
12769 7/10/91 Bush I 
Implementation of section 311(a) of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act 2 apartheid 
12775 10/4/91 Bush I Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to Haiti 1 haiti 
12778 10/23/91 Bush I Civil Justice Reform 1 justice, bush 
12779 10/29/91 Bush I Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to Haiti 2 haiti, bush 
12800 4/13/92 Bush I 
Notification of employee rights concerning payment of 
union dues or fees 4 union, bush 
12803 4/20/92 Bush I Infrastructure Privatization 0 infrastructure 
12806 5/19/92 Bush I Establishment of a Fetal Tissue Bank 2 tissue 
12807 5/24/92 Bush I Interdiction of illegal aliens 18 
haiti OR alien; 
bush 
12810 6/5/92 Bush I 
Blocking property of and prohibiting transactions with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 4 yugoslavia 
12812 7/22/92 Bush I 
Declassification and Release of Materials Pertaining to 
Prisoners of War and Missing in Action 2 
prisoner of war 
(wq) OR missing 
in action (wq) 
12818 10/23/92 Bush I 
Open Bidding on Federal and Federally Funded 
Construction Projects 3 
construction, bid 
OR bush 
12834 1/20/93 Clinton Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Appointees 3 
ethic, clinton OR 
appointee 
12836 2/1/93 Clinton 
Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning 
Federal Contracting 2 contract, clinton 
12837 2/10/93 Clinton 
Deficit Control and Productivity Improvement in the 




12838 2/10/93 Clinton 




12839 2/10/93 Clinton Reduction of 100,000 Federal positions 0 
100,000, job OR 
position, clinton 
12843 4/21/93 Clinton 
Procurement requirements and policies for Federal 
agencies for ozone-depleting substances 0 ozone 
12844 4/21/93 Clinton Federal use of Alternative fueled vehicles 1 vehicle 
12845 4/21/93 Clinton 
Requiring agencies to purchase energy efficient computer 
equipment 0 computer 
12848 5/19/93 Clinton Federal plan to break the cycle of homelessness 1 homeless*, clinton 
12850 5/28/93 Clinton 
Conditions for renewal of Most-Favored-Nation Status for 







12857 8/3/93 Clinton Budget Control 0 
budget control 
(wq), clinton 
12858 8/4/93 Clinton Deficit Reduction Fund 2 
deficit, reduc*, 
clinton 
12862 9/11/93 Clinton Setting Customer Service Standards 0 
customer service 
(wq), clinton 
12866 9/30/93 Clinton Regulatory Planning and Review 1 
regulat*, plan OR 
review, clinton 
12873 10/20/93 Clinton Federal acquisition, recycling, and waste prevention 5 recycl* OR waste 
12875 10/26/93 Clinton Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership 0 
intergovernmental 
partnership (wq) 
12898 2/11/94 Clinton 
Federal actions to address environmental justice in 
minority populations and low-income populations 1 
environmental 
justice (wq) 
12901 3/3/94 Clinton Identification of trade expansion priorities 5 
trade, clinton OR 
white house, 
expan* 
12914 5/7/94 Clinton Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to Haiti 1 haiti 
12917 5/21/94 Clinton Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to Haiti 1 haiti 
12922 6/21/94 Clinton Blocking property of certain Haitian nationals 0 
haiti OR haitian, 
property 
12932 10/14/94 Clinton Termination of emergency with respect to Haiti 1 haiti 
12937 11/10/94 Clinton 
Declassification of selected records within the National 
Archives of the United States 1 
classif* OR 
declassif* 
12947 1/24/95 Clinton 
Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who threaten to 
disrupt the Middle East peace process 3 middle east (wq) 
12951 2/22/95 Clinton 
Release of imagery acquired by space-based national 
intelligence reconnaissance systems 1 
space, intelligence 
OR release 
12953 2/27/95 Clinton 
Actions required of all Executive agencies to facilitate 
payment of child support 2 child support 
12954 3/8/95 Clinton 
Ensuring the economical and efficient administration and 




clinton OR white 
house 
12957 3/15/95 Clinton 
Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the 
development of Iranian petroleum resources 4 iran OR iranian 
12958 4/17/95 Clinton Classified National Security Information 5 
classif* OR 
declassif* 
12959 5/5/95 Clinton Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran 1 iran 
12968 8/2/95 Clinton Access to Classified Information 3 
classif* OR 
declassif* 
12969 8/8/95 Clinton Federal acquisition and community right-to-know 1 
right to know 
(wq), clinton OR 
white house 
12978 10/21/95 Clinton 
Blocking assets and prohibiting transactions with 
significant narcotics traffickers 1 
drugs OR 
narcotics 
12984 12/28/95 Clinton Adjustments of Certain Rates of Pay and Allowances 2 
pay OR allowance, 
clinton OR white 
house 
12985 1/11/96 Clinton Establishing the Armed Forces Service Medal 1 medal 
12987 1/31/96 Clinton Amendment to Executive Order No. 12964 1 
pacific trade (wq), 
clinton OR white 
house 
12989 2/13/96 Clinton 
Economy and efficiency in Government procurement 
through compliance with certain Immigration and 
Naturalization Act provisions 1 immigration 
12996 3/25/96 Clinton 
Management and general public use of the National 
Wildlife Refuge System 1 wildlife 
13019 9/28/96 Clinton 
Supporting Families: Collecting Delinquent Child 
Support Obligations 2 child support 
13021 10/19/96 Clinton Tribal Colleges and Universities 2 
trib*, college OR 
universit* 
13026 11/15/96 Clinton 
Administration of Export Controls on Encryption 
Products 3 encryp* 
13038 3/11/97 Clinton 
Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of 




13045 4/21/97 Clinton 
Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks 
and Safety Risks 1 
risk, children OR 
kid 
13057 7/26/97 Clinton Federal Actions in the Lake Tahoe Region 1 tahoe 
13058 8/9/97 Clinton 
Protecting Federal employees and the Public From 
Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Federal Workplace 1 smoke 
13061 9/11/97 Clinton 
Federal Support of Community Efforts Along American 
Heritage Rivers 1 heritage river 
13067 11/3/97 Clinton 
Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting 
Transactions With Sudan 1 sudan 
13073 2/4/98 Clinton Year 2000 Conversion 1 2000 
13087 5/28/98 Clinton 
Further Amendments to Executive Order 11478, Equal 
Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government 3 
equal employment 
(wq) 
13088 6/9/98 Clinton 
Blocking Property of the Governments of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the 
Republic of Serbia… 2 
yugoslavia OR 
serbia 
13089 6/11/98 Clinton Coral Reef Protection 1 coral 
13091 6/29/98 Clinton 
Administration of Arms Export Controls and Foreign 
Assistance 1 arms 
13093 7/27/98 Clinton 
American Heritage Rivers, Amending Executive Order 
13061 and 13080 0 river 
13094 7/28/98 Clinton Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 1 weapons OR arms 
13099 8/20/98 Clinton 
Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten 
To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process 2 terrorist 
13100 8/25/98 Clinton President's Council on Food Safety 1 food safety (wq) 
13103 9/30/98 Clinton Computer Software Piracy 1 software 
13107 12/10/98 Clinton Human Rights Treaties 1  human rights (wq) 
13112 2/3/99 Clinton Invasive Species 3 invasive 
13121 4/30/99 Clinton 
Blocking Property of the Governments of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the 
Republic of Serbia… 2 
yugoslavia OR 
serbia 
13123 6/3/99 Clinton 
Greening the Government Through Efficient Energy 
Management 1 
energy, clinton OR 
white house 
13126 6/12/99 Clinton 
Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by 
Forced or Indentured Child Labor 2 child labor (wq) 
13129 7/3/99 Clinton 
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the 
Taliban 1 taliban 
13132 8/5/99 Clinton Federalism 1 federalism 
13134 8/12/99 Clinton 
Developing and Promoting Biobased Products and 
Bioenergy 1 bio* OR energy 
13140 10/6/99 Clinton 
1999 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
United States 2 
courts martial 
(wq) 
13141 11/16/99 Clinton Environmental Review of Trade Agreements 1 
trade, clinton OR 
white house 
13145 2/8/00 Clinton 
To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based 
on Genetic Information 3 genetic 
13152 5/2/00 Clinton 
Further Amendment to Executive Order 11478, Equal 
Employment Opportunity in Federal Government 0 
equal employment 
(wq) 
13155 5/10/00 Clinton 
Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical 
Technologies 5 
hiv OR aids, 
clinton OR white 
house, africa 
13158 5/26/00 Clinton Marine Protected Areas 1 marine 
13160 6/23/00 Clinton 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Race, Sex, Color, 




13166 8/11/00 Clinton 
Improving Access to Services for Persons With Limited 
English Proficiency 0 
english, limited 
proficien* (wq), 
clinton OR white 
house 
13176 11/27/00 Clinton Facilitation of a Presidential Transition 1 transition 
13198 1/29/01 Bush II 
Agency Responsibilities With Respect to Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives 1 faith-based 
13199 1/29/01 Bush II 
Establishment of White House Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives 2 faith-based 
13201 2/17/01 Bush II 
Notification of Employee Rights Concerning Payment of 
Union Dues or Fees 3 union dues (wq) 
13202 2/17/01 Bush II 
Preservation of Open Competition and Government 
Neutrality Towards Government Contractors' Labor 3 
construction, labor 




Relations on Federal and Federally Funded Construction 
Projects 
OR white house 
13203 2/17/01 Bush II 
Revocation of Executive Order and Presidential 




OR white house 
13205 3/9/01 Bush II 
Establishing an Emergency Board To Investigate a 
Dispute Between Northwest Airlines 6 northwest 
13211 5/18/01 Bush II 
Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect 
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 4 
energy, bush OR 
white house 
13212 5/18/01 Bush II Actions To Expedite Energy-Related Projects 3 
energy project 
(wq), bush OR 
white house 
13224 9/23/01 Bush II 
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With 




bush OR white 
house 
13228 10/8/01 Bush II 
Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the 
Homeland Security Council 3 homeland security 
13233 11/1/01 Bush II Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act 10 
presidential 
records (wq) 
13241 12/18/01 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 
of Agriculture 0 
succe*, 
department 
13242 12/18/01 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 
of Commerce 0 
succe*, 
department 
13243 12/18/01 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 0 
succe*, 
department 
13244 12/18/01 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 
of the Interior 0 
succe*, 
department 
13245 12/18/01 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 
of Labor 0 
succe*, 
department 
13246 12/18/01 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 
of the Treasury 0 
succe*, 
department 
13247 12/18/01 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 
of Veterans Affairs 0 
succe*, 
department 
13248 12/20/01 Bush II 
Establishing an Emergency Board To Investigate a 
Dispute Between United Airlines, Inc., and its Mechanics 
and Related Employees Represented by the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 1 
airline, board OR 
dispute 
13252 1/7/02 Bush II 
Exclusions From the Federal Labor-Management 
Relations Program 0 
labor management 
(wq) 
13254 1/29/02 Bush II Establishing the USA Freedom Corps 0 
freedom corps 
(wq) 
13256 2/12/02 Bush II 
President's Board of Advisors on Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities 1 
black, college OR 
universit* 
13260 3/19/02 Bush II 
Establishing the President's Homeland Security Advisory 
Council and Senior Advisory Committees for Homeland 
Security 1 homeland security 
13266 6/20/02 Bush II Activities To Promote Personal Fitness 1 fitness 
13269 7/3/02 Bush II 
Expedited Naturalization of Aliens and Noncitizen 
Nationals Serving in an Active-Duty Status During the 
War on Terrorism 4 naturaliz* 
13271 7/9/02 Bush II Establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task Force 2 fraud 
13274 9/18/02 Bush II 
Environmental Stewardship and Transportation 
Infrastructure Project Reviews 1 
environmen*, 
bush OR white 
house 
13279 12/12/02 Bush II 
Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and 
Community Organizations 5 faith-based 
13280 12/12/02 Bush II 
Responsibilities of the Department of Agriculture and the 
Agency for International Development With Respect to 
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 1 faith-based 
13288 3/6/03 Bush II 
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic 
Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe 1 zimbabwe 
13290 3/20/03 Bush II Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi Property 2 
iraq OR iraqi, 
bush OR white 
house 
13292 3/25/03 Bush II 
Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as 
Amended, Classified National Security Information 2 classif* 




13312 7/29/03 Bush II Implementing the Clean Diamond Trade Act 1 diamond 
13328 2/6/04 Bush II 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 1 
weapons of mass 
destruction 
13336 4/30/04 Bush II American Indian and Alaska Native Education 1 native OR indian 
13338 5/11/04 Bush II 
Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the 
Export of Certain Goods to Syria 2 syria 
13340 5/18/04 Bush II 
Establishment of Great Lakes Interagency Task Force and 
Promotion of a Regional Collaboration of National 
Significance for the Great Lakes 1 great lakes 
13342 6/1/04 Bush II 
Responsibility of the Departments of Commerce and 
Veterans Affairs and the Small Business Administration 
With Respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 2 faith-based 
13353 8/27/04 Bush II 
Establishing the President's Board on Safeguarding 
Americans' Civil Liberties 1 civil liberties 
13354 8/27/04 Bush II National Counterterrorism Center 2 counterterrorism 
13355 8/27/04 Bush II Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community 6 
intelligence, bush 
OR white house 
13356 8/27/04 Bush II 
Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information To 
Protect Americans 1 
terroris*, bush OR 
white house 
13357 9/20/04 Bush II 
Termination of Emergency Declared in Executive Order 
12543 With Respect to the Policies and Actions of the 
Government of Libya and Revocation of Related 
Executive Orders 0 libya 
13364 11/29/04 Bush II 
Modifying the Protection Granted to the Development 
Fund for Iraq and Certain Property in Which Iraq Has an 
Interest and Protecting the Central Bank of Iraq 1 
iraq, bank, bush 
OR white house 
13366 12/17/04 Bush II Committee on Ocean Policy 2 
ocean, bush OR 
white house 
13375 4/1/05 Bush II 
Amendment to Executive Order 13295 Relating to 
Certain Influenza Viruses and Quarantinable 
Communicable Diseases 1 disease 
13382 6/28/05 Bush II 
Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferators and Their Supporters 0 
weapons of mass 
destruction 
13392 12/14/05 Bush II Improving Agency Disclosure of Information 0 
agency disclos* 
(wq), bush OR 
white house 
13394 12/22/05 Bush II 
Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department 





13397 3/7/06 Bush II 
Responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security 
With Respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 0 faith-based 
13398 4/18/06 Bush II National Mathematics Advisory Panel 1 
math OR 
mathematics 
13406 6/23/06 Bush II Protecting the Property Rights of the American People 0 property 
13421 12/28/06 Bush II 
Providing for the Closing of Government Departments 
and Agencies on January 2, 2007 1 new year OR ford 
13422 1/18/07 Bush II 
Further Amendment to Executive Order 12866 on 
Regulatory Planning and Review  0 
planning, bush OR 
white house 
13425 2/14/07 Bush II 




13432 5/14/07 Bush II 
Cooperation Among Agencies in Protecting the 
Environment With Respect to Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
From Motor Vehicles, Nonroad Vehicles, and Nonroad 
Engines 1 greenhouse gas 
13433 5/16/07 Bush II 
Protecting American Taxpayers From Payment of 
Contingency Fees 1 
contingency fee 
(wq) 
13435 6/20/07 Bush II 
Expanding Approved Stem Cell Lines in Ethically 
Responsible Ways 3 stem cell (wq) 
13439 7/18/07 Bush II 
Establishing an Interagency Working Group on Import 
Safety 1 import 
13440 7/20/07 Bush II 
Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common 
Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and 
Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency 5 geneva 
13441 8/1/07 Bush II 
Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the 
Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and 
Institutions 1 lebanon 




Related to Burma 
13449 10/20/07 Bush II 
Protection of Striped Bass and Red Drum Fish 
Populations 1 fish 
13457 1/29/08 Bush II 
Protecting American Taxpayers From Government 
Spending on Wasteful Earmarks 2 earmark 
13465 6/6/08 Bush II 
Amending Executive Order 12989, as Amended 
(Immigration-E-verify) 2 e-verify 
13469 7/25/08 Bush II 
Blocking Property of Additional Persons Undermining 
Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe 1 zimbabwe 
13470 7/30/08 Bush II 
Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United 
States Intelligence Activities 1 intelligence 
13476 10/9/08 Bush II Facilitation of a Presidential Transition 1 
transition, bush 
OR white house 
13480 11/26/08 Bush II 
Exclusions From the Federal Labor-Management 
Relations Program 0 
labor management 
(wq) 
Notes: (1) The search tool for ProQuest is not case sensitive. (2) An additional column of secondary 
search terms is omitted here (and was not used for every single entry) but would provide the 
opportunity to make multiple searches when topics were broad enough. (3) An asterisk in a search term 
indicates that the system would search all branch endings of a word. For example, the search term 
“terminat*” would find instances of the word “terminate,” “terminates,” “terminated,” “termination,” 
“terminating,” and more so as to provide sufficient results with all reasonable attempts to find an 
executive order. (4) The notation “wq” means that words were searched with quotation marks. This 
approach was used when multiple words were part of a phrase that were sufficiently likely to appear 
together. Otherwise, the ProQuest search tool would find stories that contained both words anywhere 
in the story but not when they were necessarily together. For a topic like “stem cell research,” we can 
reasonably narrow the search to times when “stem” and “cell” appear next to each other as there are 
not likely to be references to the topic that omit that particular phrase (as opposed to, for example, 
“Defense Secretary” or “Secretary of Defense” where the words may appear in several different 
arrangements).  
 
Table A3.2: List of All Critical Executive Orders, 1945-2009 
Order 
No. President Date Title Type Stories 
9547 Truman 5/2/1945 
Providing for rep of the US in 
preparing/prosecuting charges of atrocities 
and war crimes 
Foreign 3 
9585 Truman 7/4/1945 
Auth the Sec of Navy to take poss of/operate 
the plants/facilities of Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Company Inc., 
Foreign 3 
9599 Truman 8/18/1945 
..for the orderly mod of wartime controls over 
prices, wages, materials, and facilities Domestic 14 
9601 Truman 8/21/1945 
Revocation of EO 9240, as amended, entitled 
``Regs Relating to Overtime Compensation'' Domestic 5 
9617 Truman 9/19/1945 
Transfer of Certain Agencies and Functions to 
the Department of Labor Domestic 4 
9621 Truman 9/20/1945 
Termination of the Office of Strategic 
Services and Disposition of its Functions Foreign 3 
9635 Truman 10/1/1945 
Organization of the Navy Department and the 




9639 Truman 10/4/1945 
Auth the Sec Navy To Take Possession of and 
Operate Certain Plants and Facilities Used in 
the Transportation, Refining and Processing of 
Petroleum and Petroleum Products 
Foreign 3 
9643 Truman 10/19/1945 
Transferring Certain Personnel, Records, 
Property, and Funds of the Department of 
Commerce, with Respect to Surplus Property, 
to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
Foreign 3 
9651 Truman 10/30/1945 
Amend EO 9599, Providing for Assistance to 
Expanded Production and Continued 
Stabilization of the National Economy During 
the Transition from War to Peace, 
Domestic 7 
9672 Truman 12/31/1945 
Establishing the National Wage Stabilization 
Board and Terminating the National War 
Labor Board 
Domestic 4 
9679 Truman 1/16/1946 
Amend EO 9547, Entitled ``Providing for 
Representation of the United States in 
Preparing and Prosecuting Charges of 
Atrocities and War Crimes Against the 
Leaders of the European Axis Powers and 
Their Principal Agents and Accessories'' 
Foreign 3 
9697 Truman 2/14/1946 
Providing for continued stabilization of the 
nat'l econ the trans from war to peace Domestic 7 
9719 Truman 5/7/1946 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate 
Disputes Between the Transcontinental & 
Western Air, Inc., and Other Carriers, and 
Certain of Their Employees 
Domestic 3 
9727 Truman 5/17/1946 
Possession, Control, and Operation of Certain 
Railroads Foreign 4 
9728 Truman 5/21/1946 
Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior To 
Take Possession of and To Operate Certain 
Coal Mines 
Foreign 10 
9731 Truman 5/29/1946 
Creating an Emergency Board To Investigate 
a Dispute Between the Hudson & Manhattan 
Railroad Company and Certain of Its 
Employees 
Domestic 5 
9801 Truman 11/9/1946 
Removing Wage and Salary Controls Adopted 
Pursuant to the Stabilization Act of 1942 Domestic 3 
9806 Truman 11/25/1946 
Establishing the President's Temporary 




9809 Truman 12/12/1946 
Providing for the Disposition of Certain War 
Agencies Foreign 3 
9832 Truman 2/25/1947 Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program Foreign 3 
9835 Truman 3/22/1947 
Prescribing Procedures for the Administration 
of an Employees Loyalty Program in the 
Executive Branch of the Government Domestic 17 
9857 Truman 5/22/1947 
Regulations for Carrying Out the Provisions 
of the Act Entitled "An Act To Provide for 
Assistance to Greece and Turkey" Foreign 3 
9912 Truman 12/24/1947 
Establishing the Interdepartmental Committee 
on Scientific Research and Development Domestic 4 
9939 Truman 3/23/1948 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on a 
Labor Dispute Affecting the Bituminous Coal 
Industry of the United States Domestic 3 
9957 Truman 5/10/1948 
Possession, Control, and Operation of 
Railroads Foreign 6 
9981 Truman 7/26/1948 
Establishing the President's Committee on 
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the 
Armed Services 
Foreign 5 
10004 Truman 10/5/1948 
Prescribing Procedures for the Administration 
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program Foreign 5 
10007 Truman 10/15/1948 
Organization of the Reserve Units of the 
Armed Forces Foreign 5 
10106 Truman 2/6/1950 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on a 
Labor Dispute Affecting the Bituminous Coal 
Industry of the United States Domestic 5 
10155 Truman 8/25/1950 
Possession, Control, and Operation of Certain 
Railroads Foreign 3 
10161 Truman 9/9/1950 
Delegating Certain Functions of the President 
Under the Defense Production Act of 1950 Foreign 12 
10193 Truman 12/16/1950 
Providing for the Conduct of the Mobilization 
Effort of the Government Foreign 4 
10202 Truman 1/13/1951 
Prescribing or Amending Portions of the 
Selective Service Regulations Foreign 4 
10207 Truman 1/23/1951 
Establishing the President's Commission on 
Internal Security and Individual Rights Foreign 9 
10224 Truman 3/15/1951 
Establishing the National Advisory Board on 




10230 Truman 3/31/1951 
Regulations Relating to the Safeguarding of 
Vessels, Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront 
Facilities in the Canal Zone Foreign 6 
10233 Truman 4/21/1951 
Amending Executive Order 10161 With 
Respect to Wage Stabilization and Settlement 
of Labor Disputes 
Domestic 8 
10281 Truman 8/28/1951 
Defense Materials Procurement and Supply 
Foreign 3 
10290 Truman 9/24/1951 
Prescribing Regulations Establishing 
Minimum Standards for the Classification, 
Transmission, and Handling, by Department 
and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of 
Official Information Which Requires 
Safeguarding in the Interest of the Security of 
the US 
Foreign 5 
10308 Truman 12/3/1951 
Improving the Means for Obtaining 
Compliance With the Nondiscrimination 
Provisions of Federal Contracts 
Domestic 6 
10340 Truman 4/8/1952 
Directing the Secretary of Commerce To Take 
Possession of and Operate the Plants and 
Facilities of Certain Steel Companies Foreign 10 
10422 Truman 1/9/1953 
Prescribing Procedures for Making Available 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations 
Certain Information Concerning United States 
Citizens Employed or Being Considered for 
Employment on the Secretariat of the United 
Nations 
Foreign 13 
10426 Truman 1/16/1953 
Setting Aside Submerged Lands of the 
Continental Shelf as a Naval Petroleum 
Reserve 
Domestic 13 
10434 Eisenhower 2/6/1953 
Suspension of Wage and Salary Controls 
Under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as 
Amended 
Foreign 4 
10450 Eisenhower 4/27/1953 
Security Requirements for Government 
Employment Domestic 12 
10459 Eisenhower 6/2/1953 
Amend of EO 10422, Prescribing Procedures 
for Making Available to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations Certain Information 
Concerning United States Citizens Employed 
or Being Considered for Employment on the 
Secretariat of the United Nations 
Foreign 4 
10463 Eisenhower 6/25/1953 
Amendment of Section 6.4 of Civil Service 




10469 Eisenhower 7/11/1953 
Amending the Selective Service Regulations 
Foreign 3 
10472 Eisenhower 7/20/1953 
Establishing the National Agricultural 
Advisory Commission Domestic 4 
10501 Eisenhower 11/5/1953 
Safeguarding Official Information in the 
Interests of the Defense of the United States Foreign 8 
10582 Eisenhower 12/17/1954 
Prescribing Uniform Procedures for Certain 
Determinations Under the Buy-American Act Foreign 12 
10631 Eisenhower 8/17/1955 
Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed 
Forces of the United States Foreign 5 
10647 Eisenhower 11/28/1955 
Providing for the Appointment of Certain 
Persons Under the Defense Production Act of 
1950, as Amended 
Domestic 3 
10730 Eisenhower 9/24/1957 
Providing Assistance for the Removal of an 
Obstruction of Justice Within the State of 
Arkansas 
Domestic 3 
10761 Eisenhower 3/27/1958 
Government Purchases of Crude Petroleum 
and Petroleum Products Domestic 3 
10771 Eisenhower 6/20/1958 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10534, 
Relating to the Supervision and Direction of 
the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation 
Domestic 4 
10798 Eisenhower 1/3/1959 Flag of the United States Domestic 4 
10842 Eisenhower 10/6/1959 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on 
Certain Labor Disputes Affecting the 
Maritime Industry of the United States 
Foreign 6 
10843 Eisenhower 10/9/1959 
Creating a Board of Inquiry To Report on a 
Labor Dispute Affecting the Steel Industry of 
the United States 
Domestic 11 
10848 Eisenhower 10/14/1959 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10843, 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on a 
Labor Dispute Affecting the Steel Industry of 
the United States 
Domestic 3 
10865 Eisenhower 2/20/1960 
Safeguarding Classified Information Within 
Industry Foreign 4 
10914 Kennedy 1/21/1961 
Providing for an expanded program of food 
distribution to needy families Domestic 6 
10919 Kennedy 2/17/1961 
Creating an emergency board to investigate a 
dispute between the Pan American World 
Airways, Inc., and certain of its employees Domestic 5 
10921 Kennedy 2/21/1961 
Establishing a commission to inquire into a 
controversy between certain air carriers and 
certain of their employees 
Domestic 3 
10924 Kennedy 3/1/1961 
Establishment and administration of the Peace 




10925 Kennedy 3/6/1961 
Establishing the President's Committee on 
Equal Employment Opportunity Domestic 19 
10934 Kennedy 4/13/1961 
Establishing the Administrative Conference of 
the United States Domestic 3 
10940 Kennedy 5/11/1961 
Establishing the President's Committee on 
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime Domestic 4 
10952 Kennedy 7/20/1961 
Assigning civil defense responsibilities to the 
Secretary of Defense and others Foreign 3 
10988 Kennedy 1/17/1962 
Employee-management cooperation in the 
Federal service Domestic 3 
11016 Kennedy 4/25/1962 Authorizing award of the Purple Heart Foreign 4 
11053 Kennedy 9/30/1962 
Providing assistance for the removal of 
unlawful obstructions of justice in the State of 
Mississippi 
Domestic 3 
11063 Kennedy 11/20/1962 Equal opportunity in housing Domestic 10 
11098 Kennedy 3/15/1963 
Amending the Selective Service regulations 
Foreign 3 
11111 Kennedy 6/11/1963 
Providing assistance for the removal of 
obstructions of justice and suppression of 
unlawful combinations within the State of 
Alabama 
Domestic 5 
11112 Kennedy 6/12/1963 
Establishing the President's Advisory Council 
on the Arts Domestic 5 
11119 Kennedy 9/10/1963 
Amending the Selective Service regulations 
Foreign 4 
11118 Kennedy 9/10/1963 
Providing assistance for removal of unlawful 
obstructions of justice in the State of Alabama Domestic 3 
11154 Johnson 5/8/1964 
Exemption of J. Edgar Hoover from 
compulsory retirement for age Domestic 6 
11241 Johnson 8/26/1965 
Amending the Selective Service regulations 
Foreign 4 
11289 Johnson 7/2/1966 
National Advisory Commission on Selective 
Service Foreign 3 
11314 Johnson 10/17/1966 
Creating a Board of Inquiry to report on 
certain labor disputes affecting the military jet 
engine industry, military aircraft industry, 
military armament industry and military 
electronics industry of the United States 
Foreign 3 
11322 Johnson 1/5/1967 
Relating to trade and other transactions 
involving Southern Rhodesia Foreign 5 
11360 Johnson 6/30/1967 
Amending the Selective Service regulations 
Foreign 5 
11364 Johnson 7/24/1967 
Providing for the restoration of law and order 




11387 Johnson 1/1/1968 
Governing certain capital transfers abroad 
Foreign 3 
11403 Johnson 4/5/1968 
Providing for the restoration of law and order 
in the Washington Metropolitan Area Foreign 3 
11452 Nixon 1/23/1969 
Establishing the Council for Urban Affairs 
Domestic 4 
11472 Nixon 5/29/1969 
Establishing the Environmental Quality 
Council and the Citizens' Advisory Committee 
on Environmental Quality 
Domestic 3 
11478 Nixon 8/8/1969 
Equal employment opportunity in the Federal 
Government Domestic 3 
11497 Nixon 11/26/1969 
Amending the Selective Service regulations to 
prescribe random selection Foreign 6 
11507 Nixon 2/4/1970 
Prevention, control, and abatement of air and 
water pollution at Federal facilities Domestic 5 
11519 Nixon 3/23/1970 
Calling into service members and units of the 
National Guard Foreign 4 
11527 Nixon 4/23/1970 
Amending the Selective Service regulations 
Foreign 3 
11588 Nixon 3/29/1971 
Providing for the stabilization of wages and 
prices in the construction industry Domestic 16 
11605 Nixon 7/2/1971 
Amendment of Executive Order No. 10450 of 
April 27, 1953, relating to security 
requirements for Government employment Domestic 6 
11615 Nixon 8/15/1971 
Providing for stabilization of prices, rents, 
wages, and salaries Domestic 29 
11627 Nixon 10/15/1971 
Further providing for the stabilization of the 
economy Domestic 4 
11641 Nixon 1/28/1972 
Concentration of law enforcement activities 
relating to drug abuse Foreign 4 
11643 Nixon 2/8/1972 
Environmental safeguards on activities for 
animal damage control on Federal lands Domestic 5 
11652 Nixon 3/8/1972 
Classification and declassification of national 
security information and material Foreign 6 
11695 Nixon 1/11/1973 
Further providing for the stabilization of the 
economy Domestic 7 
11697 Nixon 1/17/1973 
Inspection by Department of Agriculture of 
income tax returns made under the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 of persons having farm 
operations 
Domestic 3 
11723 Nixon 6/13/1973 
Further providing for the stabilization of the 




11748 Nixon 12/4/1973 Federal Energy Office Domestic 3 
11803 Ford 9/16/1974 
Establishing a Clemency Board to review 
certain convictions of persons under section 
12 or 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service 
Act… 
Foreign 4 
11828 Ford 1/4/1975 
Establishing a commission on CIA activities 
within the United States Foreign 4 
11878 Ford 9/10/1975 
Assigning responsibilities relating to activities 
of the Presidential Clemency Board Domestic 3 
11905 Ford 2/18/1976 
United States foreign intelligence activities 
Foreign 18 
11967 Carter 1/21/1977 
Relating to violations of the Selective Service 
Act, August 4, 1964 to March 28, 1973 Foreign 4 
11972 Carter 2/14/1977 
Establishing the United States Circuit Judge 
Nominating Commission Domestic 3 
12036 Carter 1/24/1978 United States Intelligence Activities Foreign 18 
12044 Carter 3/23/1978 Improving Government Regulations Domestic 4 
12140 Carter 5/29/1979 
Delegation of authorities relating to motor 
gasoline end-user allocation Domestic 7 
12153 Carter 8/17/1979 Decontrol of heavy oil Domestic 4 
12160 Carter 9/26/1979 
Providing for enhancement and coordination 
of Federal consumer programs Domestic 3 
12170 Carter 11/14/1979 Blocking Iranian Government property Foreign 5 
12188 Carter 1/2/1980 International trade functions Foreign 3 
12205 Carter 4/7/1980 
Prohibiting certain transactions with Iran 
Foreign 3 
12218 Carter 6/19/1980 
Export of special nuclear material and 
components to India Foreign 3 
12277 Carter 1/19/1981 
Direction to transfer Iranian Government 
assets Foreign 6 
12278 Carter 1/19/1981 
Direction to transfer Iranian Government 
assets overseas Foreign 6 
12279 Carter 1/19/1981 
Direction to transfer Iranian Government 
assets held by domestic banks Foreign 6 
12280 Carter 1/19/1981 
Direction to transfer Iranian Government 
financial assets held by non-banking 
institutions 
Foreign 6 
12281 Carter 1/19/1981 
Direction to transfer certain Iranian 
Government assets Foreign 6 
12282 Carter 1/19/1981 
Revocation of prohibitions against 
transactions involving Iran Foreign 3 
12287 Reagan 1/28/1981 
Decontrol of crude oil and refined petroleum 




12291 Reagan 2/17/1981 Federal Regulation Domestic 17 
12320 Reagan 9/15/1981 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
Domestic 3 
12333 Reagan 12/4/1981 United States Intelligence Activities Foreign 5 
12348 Reagan 2/25/1982 Federal Real Property Domestic 4 
12353 Reagan 3/23/1982 Charitable fund-raising Domestic 3 
12356 Reagan 4/2/1982 National Security Information Foreign 12 
12470 Reagan 3/30/1984 
Continuation of export control regulations 
Foreign 3 
12513 Reagan 5/1/1985 
Prohibiting trade and certain other 
transactions involving Nicaragua Foreign 5 
12532 Reagan 9/9/1985 
Prohibiting trade and certain other 
transactions involving South Africa Foreign 20 
12543 Reagan 1/7/1986 
Prohibiting trade and certain transactions 
involving Libya Foreign 15 
12544 Reagan 1/8/1986 
Blocking Libyan Government property in the 
United States or held by U.S. persons Foreign 3 
12546 Reagan 2/3/1986 Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Domestic 3 
12564 Reagan 9/15/1986 Drug-Free Federal Workplace Domestic 16 
12631 Reagan 3/18/1988 Working Group on Financial Markets Domestic 3 
12635 Reagan 4/8/1988 
Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to 
Panama Foreign 3 
12657 Reagan 11/18/1988 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
assistance in emergency preparedness 
planning at commercial nuclear power plants Domestic 15 
12800 Bush I 4/13/1992 Notification of employee rights concerning payment of union dues or fees Domestic 4 
12807 Bush I 5/24/1992 Interdiction of illegal aliens Foreign 18 
12810 Bush I 6/5/1992 
Blocking property of and prohibiting 
transactions with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
Foreign 4 
12818 Bush I 10/23/1992 
Open Bidding on Federal and Federally 
Funded Construction Projects Domestic 3 
12834 Clinton 1/20/1993 
Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch 
Appointees Domestic 3 
12850 Clinton 5/28/1993 
Conditions for renewal of Most-Favored-
Nation Status for the People's Republic of 
China in 1994 
Foreign 27 
12873 Clinton 10/20/1993 Federal acquisition, recycling, and waste prevention Domestic 5 
12901 Clinton 3/3/1994 
Identification of trade expansion priorities 
Foreign 5 
12947 Clinton 1/24/1995 
Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who 






12957 Clinton 3/15/1995 
Prohibiting certain transactions with respect to 
the development of Iranian petroleum 
resources 
Foreign 4 
12958 Clinton 4/17/1995 Classified National Security Information Foreign 5 
12968 Clinton 8/2/1995 Access to Classified Information Domestic 3 
13026 Clinton 11/15/1996 
Administration of Export Controls on 
Encryption Products Foreign 3 
13038 Clinton 3/11/1997 
Advisory Committee on Public Interest 
Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters Domestic 4 
13087 Clinton 5/28/1998 
Further Amendments to Executive Order 
11478, Equal Employment Opportunity in the 
Federal Government 
Domestic 3 
13112 Clinton 2/3/1999 Invasive Species Domestic 3 
13145 Clinton 2/8/2000 
To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal 
Employment Based on Genetic Information Domestic 3 
13155 Clinton 5/10/2000 
Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and 
Medical Technologies Foreign 5 
13201 Bush II 2/17/2001 
Notification of Employee Rights Concerning 
Payment of Union Dues or Fees Domestic 3 
13202 Bush II 2/17/2001 
Preservation of Open Competition and 
Government Neutrality Towards Government 
Contractors' Labor Relations on Federal and 
Federally Funded Construction Projects 
Domestic 3 
13205 Bush II 3/9/2001 
Establishing an Emergency Board To 
Investigate a Dispute Between Northwest 
Airlines 
Domestic 6 
13211 Bush II 5/18/2001 
Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use 
Domestic 4 
13212 Bush II 5/18/2001 
Actions To Expedite Energy-Related Projects 
Domestic 3 
13224 Bush II 9/23/2001 
Blocking Property and Prohibiting 
Transactions With Persons Who Commit, 
Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism Foreign 5 
13228 Bush II 10/8/2001 
Establishing the Office of Homeland Security 
and the Homeland Security Council Domestic 3 
13233 Bush II 11/1/2001 
Further Implementation of the Presidential 
Records Act Domestic 10 
13269 Bush II 7/3/2002 
Expedited Naturalization of Aliens and 
Noncitizen Nationals Serving in an Active-
Duty Status During the War on Terrorism 
Foreign 4 




and Community Organizations 
13295 Bush II 4/4/2003 Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable Diseases Domestic 3 
13355 Bush II 8/27/2004 Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community Foreign 6 
13435 Bush II 6/20/2007 Expanding Approved Stem Cell Lines in Ethically Responsible Ways Domestic 3 
13440 Bush II 7/20/2007 
Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions 
Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of 
Detention and Interrogation Operated by the 




Table A3.3: Summary Statistics for Executive Orders by President 
President Average NYT stories per SEO 
Total 




Truman 1.86 894 248 44 17.74% 
Eisenhower 1.60 482 129 18 13.95% 
Kennedy 1.83 214 96 17 17.71% 
Johnson 1.38 324 82 9 10.98% 
Nixon 2.14 346 94 18 19.15% 
Ford 1.96 169 24 4 16.67% 
Carter 2.02 320 64 17 26.56% 
Reagan 2.39 381 80 17 21.25% 
Bush I 1.84 165 31 4 12.90% 
Clinton 1.82 364 74 14 18.92% 
Bush II 1.61 291 70 14 20.00% 
Total 1.84 3950 992 176 17.74% 
This table provides the summary statistics for executive orders, significant 
executive orders, and critical executive orders by president. It also displays the 
average number of New York Times stories per significant executive order and a 
calculation for the percentage of significant executive orders that are critical 
executive orders. This information is the basis for the material presented in 
Figures 3.2 through 3.6. 
 
Chapter 4: Model Analysis 
 
Table A4.1: Means and Variances to Justify Negative Binomial 
Regression Models 
Dependent Variable Mean Variance 
Critical executive orders (176) 2.32 10.19 
Critical domestic orders (77) 1.14 3.16 
Critical foreign orders (79) 1.17 3.45 
Summary statistics for means and variances (with total numbers in 






Table A4.2: Poisson Count Model on Number of Critical Executive Orders with Robust 
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N of cases 76 76 76 
Log pseudo-likelihood -95.851 -65.165 -70.463 
Pseudo-R2 .552*** .514*** .489*** 
The dependent variable in these models is a count of critical executive orders (total and 
by policy type) within a president-Congress dyad using Poisson count models for 
comparison to negative binomial regression models in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Values are 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001, 
one-tailed (except for constant, timing variables, and presidential fixed effects). 






















Presidential Fixed Effects     
















































































   Bush II 
 omitted omitted omitted omitted 
The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is a count of critical executive orders within a 
president-Congress dyad. The dependent variable in Models 0 and 3 is a count of significant 
executive orders within a president-Congress dyad for comparison. Values are coefficients 
with standard errors in parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001, two-tailed (as 













Presidential Fixed Effects   








































   Bush II 
 omitted omitted 
The dependent variable in these models is a count of critical executive orders of 
the given policy type within a president-Congress dyad. Values are coefficients 
with standard errors in parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, *p≤.01, ***p≤.001, two-
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Timing Variables     
































N of cases 76 76 76 76 
Adjusted R2 .207* .187* .082 .187* 
The dependent variable in these models is a rate of significant or critical executive orders per 
day issued within a president-Congress dyad. Values are coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001, one-tailed (except for constant and timing 







Table A4.6: Negative Binomial Regression Count Models on Critical Executive Orders with 
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N of cases 76 76 76 76 
Log likelihood -181.402 -107.226 -71.235 -74.905 
Pseudo-R2 .326*** .288*** .358*** .330*** 
The dependent variable in these models is a count of significant and critical (total and by 
policy type) executive orders within a president-Congress dyad. Values are coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses. °p≤.10, *p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001, one-tailed (except for 
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